Research Article


DOI :10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003   IUP :10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003    Full Text (PDF)

Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance

Fatih Buğra Erdem

Short-termism is known as sacrificing long-term sustainable earnings for short-term returns. The pressure on management to obtain short-term results usually generates negative medium and long-term outcomes. This is because investors are inclined to sell their stocks when they hear about a shadow of bad news. In this context, business executives can decide to meet short-term shareholders expectations or prioritise the growth of their company. In other words, on the one hand, the company management should consider all possible economic variables within the scope of the necessity of protecting the company’s capital, on the other hand, it should also ensure the participation to the capital that will benefit the financial structure of the company, especially from the cash flow point of view. Short-termism hinders effective company management, particularly for publicly listed companies, due to the convenience of trading stock transactions and more transparent management decisions. Considering abovementioned facts, this study examines the increasing trend in short-termism as an intertemporal choice and discusses solutions that can be offered through corporate governance principles.

DOI :10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003   IUP :10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003    Full Text (PDF)

Halka Açık Şirketlerde Kısa Vadecilik ve Kurumsal Yönetim

Fatih Buğra Erdem

Kısa vadecilik, pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemde kar elde etmek için uzun dönemli sürdürülebilir gelirlerini feda etmesi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Kısa vadede getiri elde etmek isteyen şirket ortaklarının şirket yöneticilerine yaptıkları baskı orta ve uzun vadede olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Aslında bu durum, pay sahiplerinin ortağı oldukları şirketlere dair olumsuz bir duyum almaları halinde, paylarını derhal satışa çıkarmaya meyilli olmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Hal böyle iken, yöneticiler pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemli getiri beklentilerini karşılamak ya da şirketin uzun dönemli büyüme hedeflerini yerine getirmek hususlarında bir öncelik ayrımına sürüklenmektedirler. Başka bir deyişle, şirket yönetiminin bir yandan şirket sermayesinin korunması gerekliliği kapsamında olası tüm ekonomik değişkenleri derpiş etmesi gerekirken, bir yandan da şirketin finansal yapısına, özellikle nakit akışına, fayda sağlayacak sermayedar katılımını da sağlaması gerekmektedir. Bu kapsamda, özellikle halka açık şirketlerde pay devri işlemlerinin kolaylığı ve alınan kararların şeffaf olması gerekliliği gibi hususlar etkin bir yönetimin sağlanabilmesine engel teşkil etmektedir. Bu makale, yukarıda açıklanan nedenler bağlamında, kısa vadecilik cereyanını zamanlararası bir tercih problem olarak incelemekte ve kurumsal yönetim ilkeleri bağlamında sunulabilecek potansiyel çözüm önerilerini irdelemektedir.


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APA

Erdem, F.B. (2021). Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, 0(70), 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


AMA

Erdem F B. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul. 2021;0(70):73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


ABNT

Erdem, F.B. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 70, p. 73-89, 2021.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Erdem, Fatih Buğra,. 2021. “Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance.” Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul 0, no. 70: 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


Chicago: Humanities Style

Erdem, Fatih Buğra,. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance.” Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul 0, no. 70 (Jun. 2023): 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


Harvard: Australian Style

Erdem, FB 2021, 'Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance', Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, vol. 0, no. 70, pp. 73-89, viewed 5 Jun. 2023, https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Erdem, F.B. (2021) ‘Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance’, Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, 0(70), pp. 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003 (5 Jun. 2023).


MLA

Erdem, Fatih Buğra,. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance.” Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul, vol. 0, no. 70, 2021, pp. 73-89. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


Vancouver

Erdem FB. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul [Internet]. 5 Jun. 2023 [cited 5 Jun. 2023];0(70):73-89. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003 doi: 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003


ISNAD

Erdem, FatihBuğra. Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance”. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d’Istanbul 0/70 (Jun. 2023): 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003



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Submitted09.04.2021
Accepted09.04.2021
Published Online09.08.2021

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