Konkordato Borçlusunun Rehinle Yüklü Mevduatı Üzerindeki Blokenin İİK m 287 Uyarınca Verilecek Bir Mahkeme Kararı İle Kaldırılmasının Mümkün Olup Olmadığı Üzerine Değerlendirmeler
Zeynep Damla Taşkınİcra ve İflas Kanunu’nun 285. maddesi uyarınca, vadesi geldiği halde borçlarını ödeyemeyen veya bu yönde bir tehlike olan herhangi bir borçlu, vade verilmek ve/veya tenzilat yapılmak suretiyle borçlarını ödeyebilmek veya muhtemel bir iflastan kurtulmak için konkordato talep edebilecektir. Bu yönde bir taleple karşılaşan mahkeme, borçluya geçici mühlet verecek ve borçlunun malvarlığının muhafazası için gerekli bütün tedbirleri alabilecektir (İİK m 287). Kanun koyucu mahkemelerce alınabilecek tedbirleri saymamışsa da, uygulamada sıklıkla talep edilenlerden biri, konkordato borçlusunun bankadaki mevduatı üzerinde mevcut blokelerin kaldırılması yönündeki tedbirlerdir. Bu tür bir tedbir talebinin mahkemece kabul edilmesinin konkordato borçlusu açısından olumlu sonuçları olduğu tartışmasızdır. Zira halihazırda borçlarını ödemekte güçlük çeken bir kişinin, bankadaki mevduatını kullanması engellendiğinde bu ekonomik güçlüğü geride bırakmasının pek kolay olmayacağı aşikardır. Öte yandan bu yönde bir tedbirden etkilenecek tek kişi kuşkusuz konkordato borçlusu değildir. Borçlunun hesabındaki mevduat alacağını bloke eden bankaların amacı, çoğunlukla, üzerinde rehin hakkına sahip oldukları bu alacağın sona ermesine engel olmak ve sonuç itibariyle, konkordato borçlusunun üstlendiği edimi yerine getiremezse, bu mevduat sayesinde alacaklarını karşılamaktır. Buradan hareketle mevcut blokenin kaldırılmasının, rehinli alacaklı banka açısından ne derece büyük bir tehlike arz ettiği kolaylıkla anlaşılabilir. Mahkemelerin İİK m 287 uyarınca sahip olduğu yetkiye dayanarak bu yönde tedbirler verip veremeyeceği konusunda henüz bir görüş birliği oluşmuş değildir. Bu kapsamda uyuşmazlıklarla karşılaşan Bölge Adliye Mahkemeleri’nin çelişen kararları da bu durumu gözler önüne sermektedir. Bu çalışma ile amaçlanan ise mevduatın bloke edilmesine engel olmaya yönelik tedbirler hakkında verilen kararları ve bu kararlarda ortaya konan gerekçeleri inceleyerek, bu tedbirlerin İİK m 287 kapsamında verilmesinin yerindeliğini tartışmaktır.
Evaluation on Whether the Blockage of Pledged Receivables Credited to the Concordat Debtor’s Bank Account Can Be Lifted by a Court Decision under Art.287 DEBL
Zeynep Damla TaşkınAs per Art.285 of the Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Law, any debtor who fails to perform his or her due obligations or who is under such a threat may request concordat to perform his or her obligations by way of postponement and/or reduction; or to avoid a possible bankruptcy situation. The court would then grant a provisional period and be entitled to take the conservatory measures necessary to preserve the debtor’s assets (Art 285 DEBL). Although the lawmaker has abstained from listing possible measures, unblocking a blocked bank account is frequently requested in practise. If accepted, the debtor would clearly benefit from this measure. The debtor, who has already had a hard time performing his/her duties, may not overcome this financial setback without access to his/her account. However, debtors are not the only people affected by such a measure. The bank, which blocks the debtor’s account, usually intends to preserve the receivable credited to that account so that it can enjoy its pledge on that receivable in case the debtor fails to fulfil its obligations. The severity of consequences that the pledgee will have to bear if the blockage is lifted is self-explanatory. Nevertheless, no unanimous opinion has been reached on whether the courts may grant this measure relying on Art.287 DEBL. The contradictory court rulings also prove this. This article aims to discuss whether Art. 287 DEBL could be the legal basis for such measures by focusing on the legal grounds presented in rulings where they are sought.
When a debtor requests concordat, he or she receives a provisional period and, as per Art.287 DEBL, the courts are then entitled to take any conservatory measure they see fit to preserve the debtor’s assets. The receivables credited to the debtor’s bank account also constitute a part of these assets. However, this receivable may also be used as collateral for a loan granted to the debtor by the bank, and when this is the case, the bank may choose to block the account in question. This way, the bank secures the right to foreclose this pledge, provided that the debtor fails to fulfil the secured obligation that it has undertaken. A very vivid discussion today is whether the bank’s blockage may be lifted by a court order, relying on Art.287 DEBL. In some cases, courts consider this measure a conservatory measure that they are entitled to take; whereas in others, this measure is found to contradict the general principle that allows the pledgees to commence an execution proceeding for the foreclosure of the pledge. In this article, the author evaluates the legal grounds presented in these court decisions and seeks to determine whether such measures can be considered under Art.287 DEBL.
One of the arguments that the courts rely on while giving such orders is that the legal nature of the blockage of a bank account is a conservatory measure that, as per Art.295 DEBL, cannot be taken during the process of foreclosure of a pledge against a debtor who is granted a concordat period. However, blocking an account may not be seen as a conservatory measure because the blockage does not serve to preserve the receivable during the foreclosure of the pledge. Instead, the bank is already entitled to block the account following the establishment of the pledge. This derives from Art 961 TCC (Turkish Civil Code) which requires a third-party debtor to only perform its obligation against the obligee upon the pledgee’s consent. The bank may also enjoy its right to block the account when the pledge right secures a future receivable, provided that the receivable in question is factually concretised.
Another argument on which the courts rely while taking such measures is that the concordat procedure is designed to occasionally interfere with the rights of third parties as opposed to what could have been said regarding the postponement of bankruptcy. Although conservatory measures affecting third parties’ rights were not allowed back when the postponement of bankruptcy provisions were in force, in some decisions, courts tend to emphasise how the concordat provisions differ from those regulating the postponement of bankruptcy. The list of provisions under the DEBL that the courts find to interfere with third parties’ rights is as follows: Art. 294 (1), 294 (3), 294 (4), 294 (6), 296 (1), and 296 (2) DEBL. It is suggested that banning a measure that lifts the blockage on a bank account just because it would take a toll on the bank’s pledge right would not comply with the listed concordat provisions, pursuant to which third parties’ rights are occasionally compromised.
However, it is questionable to what extent the listed provisions affect third parties’ rights. First, Art. 294 (1) and (4) DEBL cannot justify a change of heart about the scope of the conservatory measures to be taken because the prevention of execution proceedings against the debtor and the restrictions regarding the use of the right to setoff were executed in the same manner under the postponement of bankruptcy as well. Art. 294 (6), on the other hand, cannot be seen as an interference with third parties’ rights because the article focuses on the assignment of future receivables. As the concordat debtor is no longer able to gratuitously assign receivables, the same restriction should apply to the assignment of future receivables. However, this cannot be seen as an interference with the assignee’s right because the assignee would not be able to fully enjoy its rights under the receivable before it is born. Art. 296 (1) prohibits contract provisions that allow one of the parties to terminate certain contracts once the other requests a concordat or the ones that stipulate that the request of the concordat would deem a breach of contract or would lead to maturity of the debt. This imposes a restriction on the freedom of contract but cannot be seen as an interference with the third parties’ rights; because a contract provision that is invalid in light of Art.296 (1) cannot give rise to any rights.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that Art.294 (3) regarding the restriction on interests and 296 (2) that regulates the concordat debtor’s right to terminate certain contracts interfere with third parties’ rights. However, in these cases, the interference is very limited, considering that it is possible to compensate for the damage it would cause; whereas the consequences of a measure consisting of lifting an existing blockage cannot be compensated or taken back. Hence, this kind of a measure cannot be justified with the help of Art 294 (3) and 296 (2). Lifting the blockage provides the debtor with the tools to destroy the subject of the pledge (i.e. spend the money that is deposited in the bank account) and deprives the pledgee of its means to protect the subject of the pledge (i.e. the blockage of the account) that it may eventually resort to. It is safe to say that this approach does not add up with the provisions allowing an execution proceeding for the foreclosure of a pledge against the debtor. Yet again, it should be noted that if the pledge also covers the receivables that would later be credited to the bank account, and this occurs only after the debtor is granted the concordat period, then the act of disposition that establishes the pledge on these receivables would be invalid, and the bank would not be able to block the receivables that are credited to the account following the grant of the concordat period.
