Research Article


DOI :10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003   IUP :10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003    Full Text (PDF)

Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy

Yahya Berkol Gülgeç

The hierarchy of norms is determined according to the contents of the norms and their potential normative power based on the requirement of conformance between the norms. Thus, a hierarchical relationship exists when a norm must conform to the other. Moreover, the concepts of “source of law” and “legal norm” are not synonyms. The “theory of individuation of norms” helps in determining the normative hierarchy in cases where a norm is formed from several sources. The first part ofthe article determinesthe essential qualities ofthe normative hierarchy. The second part discusses whether it is possible to view morality as the hierarchical superior of legal systems and whether this would be contrary to legal positivism. The minimum condition of legal positivism is the separability thesis. This thesis can be expressed as a combination of two claims: “law’s validity and content are independent of its moral value” and “addressees do not have to have moral reason to conform to law”. This thesis is compatible with the claim that law should be morally good. As long as the moral value does not affect the existence of the law, the minimum thesis of legal positivism stands. However, since the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the norms does not require the invalidity of the inferior norm’s contrariness, could morality be viewed as the law’s superior even if in conformity with legal positivism? The article ends by explaining why the question must be answered negatively.

DOI :10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003   IUP :10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003    Full Text (PDF)

Normlar Hiyerarşisi Teorisi Doğrultusunda Hukukun Ahlaka Uygun Olma Gerekliliğinin Hukuki Pozitivizm Açısından Değerlendirilmesi

Yahya Berkol Gülgeç

Normlar hiyerarşisi normların içeriği ve potansiyel normatif gücü doğrultusunda ve normların birbirine uygun olma gerekliliği temelinde belirlenir. Bu anlamda hiyerarşik ilişkinin varlığı için “aykırılığın yaptırıma bağlanmış olması” zorunlu değildir. Ayrıca, hukuk kaynağı ve hukuk normu kavramlarının eşanlamlı olmadığı, hiyerarşinin kaynaklar arasında değil normlar arasında var olacağı unutulmamalıdır. Normların farklı kaynakların bir araya gelmesiyle oluştuğu durumlarda hiyerarşinin nasıl tespit edileceği “normların ayrılması teorisi” aracılığıyla ortaya konmalıdır. Anılan hususlara değinen birinci bölüm normlar hiyerarşisini ana hatlarıyla ortaya koymayı hedefliyor. İkinci bölüm ise hukuki pozitivist olmanın minimum şartından hareket ederek ideal ahlakın hukuk sisteminin üstünde olup olamayacağını tartışıyor. Hukuki pozitivizmin minimum şartı ayrılabilirlik tezidir. Bu tez “hukukun varlığı ve içeriğinin ahlaki doğruluğuna bağlı olmaması” ve “muhatapların hukuka uymak için ahlaki eylem sebebine sahip olmasının gerekmemesi” şeklindeki iki iddianın birleşimi olarak ifade edilebilir. Bu tez hukukun ahlaken iyi olması gerektiği iddiasıyla uyumludur. Ahlaken kötü olmak hukukun varlığına etki etmediği sürece hukuki pozitivizmin minimum tezi zarar görmez. Madem, ilk bölümde vurgulandığı üzere, normlar arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişki aykırılık durumunda geçersizlik yaptırımının varlığını şart koşmuyor ve uygun olma gerekliliğini yeterli görüyor, bu durumda hukukun ahlaka uygun olma gerekliliği dolayısıyla ideal ahlakın hukuktan üstün olduğu iddia edilebilir mi? Makale bu sorunun niçin olumsuz yanıtlanması gerektiğine dair açıklamalarla son buluyor.


EXTENDED ABSTRACT


The article has two main purposes. First, it sheds light on a few crucial details about the normative hierarchy that are sometimes overlooked by scholars or students. This revisit of the issue also provides me with an opportunity to take a second look at issues associated with the normative hierarchy. The issues clarified in the first part will also help in answering the questions asked in the second part. The second purpose of the article is to raise what seems to be an interesting question only to reject it. The question is whether the normative superiority of morality over law could be claimed based on the explanations made in the first part and whether this could affect the truth of legal positivism. The second part of the article is dedicated to answering these two problems. 

The first section of the first part reiterates that whether a hierarchy exists between two norms or not should be determined based on the potential normative power of the norms. Therefore, for instance, the fact that at a certain point in time, a norm does not regulate the procedure of creation for another norm does not signify the absence of hierarchy as long as the first norm possesses the power to regulate it at another time. 

The next section is an answer to a possible critique of normative hierarchy that draws on H.L.A. Hart’s criticism of “validity purport”. Hart thought that the relationship of validity in Kelsen’s theory is reduced to a relationship between the contents of the norms and that this leads to problems for Kelsen’s understanding of the unity of the legal system. The reply stresses that Kelsen’s theory of validity does not merely take into account the contents of the norms but also pays attention to their normative power, i.e., what they can or cannot successfully regulate with their content. 

 The third section reiterates that for the existence of hierarchy, it is not required that a norm need to be invalidated in case of contrariness to another. This is simply irrelevant. The crucial element is the requirement that a legal norm should be in conformity with the other. This is often established by a norm superior to both norms. 

The last section touches upon the interesting distinction between a source of law and a legal norm to indicate that the hierarchy is between the norms and not the sources. Combined with the fact that a single norm can be constituted by several sources of law, this section offers a way to determine the hierarchy between “multi-sourced” legal norms. 

The second part of the article opens with an inquiry into the minimum condition of legal positivism. There are differences in opinion among the legal positivists, but what makes them all legal positivists? The first section suggests that a form of the separability thesis is taken to constitute the common ground. 

The second section asks the following question: Since, as expressed in the first part, the existence of a hierarchical relationship between the norms does not require the invalidity of the inferior norm’s contrariness and finds the existence of a requirement of conformance, could it be claimed that ideal morality is superior to law? The article answers the question in the negative. The first section argues that the existence of a requirement to conform is sufficient for the existence of hierarchy in case a norm superior to both norms in question provides for the requirement of conformance. In the case of morality and law, there is no such common denominator. Just as morality claims to be superior to law, law may claim to be superior to morality. Moreover, it is argued that the legal positivism formulated around the separability thesis manages to survive even when it is granted that it is necessary for the addressees to have moral or prudential reasons to conform to legal norms.  


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APA

Gülgeç, Y.B. (2024). Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy. Istanbul Law Review, 0(0), -. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


AMA

Gülgeç Y B. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy. Istanbul Law Review. 2024;0(0):-. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


ABNT

Gülgeç, Y.B. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy. Istanbul Law Review, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 0, p. -, 2024.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol,. 2024. “Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy.” Istanbul Law Review 0, no. 0: -. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


Chicago: Humanities Style

Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol,. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy.” Istanbul Law Review 0, no. 0 (Nov. 2024): -. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


Harvard: Australian Style

Gülgeç, YB 2024, 'Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy', Istanbul Law Review, vol. 0, no. 0, pp. -, viewed 2 Nov. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Gülgeç, Y.B. (2024) ‘Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy’, Istanbul Law Review, 0(0), pp. -. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003 (2 Nov. 2024).


MLA

Gülgeç, Yahya Berkol,. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy.” Istanbul Law Review, vol. 0, no. 0, 2024, pp. -. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


Vancouver

Gülgeç YB. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy. Istanbul Law Review [Internet]. 2 Nov. 2024 [cited 2 Nov. 2024];0(0):-. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003 doi: 10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003


ISNAD

Gülgeç, YahyaBerkol. Evaluation of The Requirement of Law’s Conformity to Morality From The Perspective of Legal Positivism In Line With The Theory of Normative Hierarchy”. Istanbul Law Review 0/0 (Nov. 2024): -. https://doi.org/10.26650/mecmua.2024.82.4.0003



TIMELINE


Submitted12.11.2023
Accepted27.08.2024
Published Online24.10.2024

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