Demet Teorisi, Işınlanma Paradoksu ve Zaman Felsefesinde Dört-Boyutçuluk Açısından Bir Yaklaşım
Turan Argun SezerZamanda özdeşlik problemi felsefe tarihinin en önemli ve temel problemlerinden birisidir. Fakat bu özdeşlik problemi sadece fiziksel nesnelerde değil, bilincin özdeşliğinde de kendisini gösterir. Bilincin özdeşliği problemi onun salt bir tanımlama mı yoksa kendi içinde bir varlık olarak ontolojik bir statüsü olup olmadığı mı sorusuyla ilgilidir. Bu makalede demet teorisi gibi önde gelen bilinç teorilerinin bilincin geçişi veya bölünmüş zihin gibi temel problemlerin çözümünün açıklanmasında yetersiz olduklarını zaman felsefesinin bir kuramı olan dört-boyutçuluğun özdeşliğin geçişi konusundaki çözümlere yönelik yaklaşımını uyarlayarak savunacağım. Bu amaçla Theseus’un gemisi ve Chisholm’un kahve kupası gibi felsefenin bilinen örneklerini verecek ve aynı örnekleri bilincin geçişine uygulayacağım. Bu örneklerden hareket ederek, B-serisi yargılamalarıyla (özellikle Ezelicilikle) ışınlanma paradoksunun çözümünü öne süreceğim. Bilinç benzeri nesnelerden kastın, bilincin var olmasını sağlayan bir zamansal ilişki mi yoksa bu ilişkilerden soyut bir ontolojik statü mü olduğu sorununa da değineceğim. Eğer bilinç ve nesneler arasındaki bu ilişki ortaya konulursa Parfit ve diğer filozofların ortaya koyduğu benzeri sorunların çözülebileceğini düşünüyorum. Bunu yaparak bilincin diğer tüm uzay zaman nesneleri gibi mereolojik (parça bütün ilişkisi bağlamında) bir özü olduğunu ileri süreceğim. Bu sebeple de demet teorisini ve Parfit’in çözümünü, Sider’ın Perry ve Prior’a karşı argümanlarından analojiyle reddedeceğim. Bu sayede argümanımı özdeşliğin analitik metafizik konumu lehine güçlendireceğim.
Bundle Theory, Teletransportation Paradox, and FourDimensionalist Approach
Turan Argun SezerThe problem of “identity over time” is one of the most essential problems in the history of philosophy. However, the problem of identity arises not only with physical objects but also with the identity of consciousness itself. The problem of the identity of consciousness can be described as the question of whether it is a mere description or whether it has an ontological status as a being in itself. In this paper, I argue that the prominent theories of consciousness, such as the Bundle Theory, are insufficient for explaining problems, such as the transition of consciousness or split minds, by adapting the solutions of the four-dimensionalist approach to the transition of identity problems from the point of view of the philosophy of time. For this purpose, I cite examples from well-known puzzles of philosophy, namely the Ship of Theseus and Chisholm’s Coffee Cup, and apply the same examples to the transition of consciousness. Through the analogies of those examples, I argue for the temporal and half-temporal existence of consciousness. The main question here is whether there is a temporality of consciousness or an abstract ontological status of consciousness. In answering this question, I assume that consciousness, like any other spacetime object, has a mereological essence. I refute the Bundle Theory and Parfit’s solution by analogy with Sider’s argument against Perry and Prior. Thus, I enhance my argument in favor of the analytic metaphysics of identity.
The purpose of this article is to provide a solution to the paradox of teletransportation in terms of the philosophy of time, which leads to problems related to the philosophy of mind and consciousness. In the first chapter, I present a description and analysis of the problems. Teletransportation paradox, as a hypothetical assumption, simply asks whether or not consciousness survives the teletransportation operation. If consciousness as reality is “beamed up” to another location in the spacetime continuum, would it survive? For the same purpose, I cite an example from a work of fiction, an episode from Star Trek: The Next Generation, which is famous for the “teletransportation by energizing” concept. Some philosophers like Parfit and Chisholm have provided answers to this problem, but of course, the answers are not limited to them. In this article, I employ a different solution by adapting the puzzle of the philosophy of time known as the Ship of Theseus. I think that it is viable to apply Sider’s possible solution for the Ship of Theseus to the stream of consciousness. In the second chapter, I briefly discuss the main problems of the philosophy of time and their connections concerning the mind and consciousness, which I consider crucial for my purpose since there may be powerful objections against the ontological status of the mind in comparison to the other objects. To overcome these objections, I apply the tensed and detensed language operators and their ontological specifications. I hold the view that these tense operators—and the lack of their being—provide a truth value when it comes to the problem of identity. Why should one not apply the reducible detensed operators to consciousness when we can do the same thing to ordinary physical objects? This chapter, especially, addresses this question and tries to give a positive answer to it. In doing so, I show that the four-dimensionalist approach may be favored against the Bundle Theory. Therefore, my position is that of a Platonic essentialist, while arguing the position of the mind itself as a transition. In case there are other objections to my point of view, I defend the mind and its existence as being indispensable to the spacetime continuum , thereby revealing the fact that consciousness cannot be completely separated from spacetime. On the contrary, it depends on the so-called “transitions.” In this way, I believe I will be able to prove my thesis that the consciousness in time is inseparable from the identity of other objects over time that are real in terms of the flow of time. When time passes from the now to the past and finally to the future, it is merely a problem of alignment concerning the positions of objects in the spacetime continuum. Therefore, in the third and last chapter, I apply the four-dimensionalist approach by analogy to mind and consciousness. Everything that is created over time is not beyond time itself; therefore, I maintain my position as an eternalist, which states that there are no temporal locations but temporal realities in which the objects “perdure” their identities, consciousness being no exception. Since consciousness cannot be an exception to the spatiotemporal relations of objects in time, the nature of consciousness depends on the changes, or the lack thereof, in time.
