Anlaşma Temeline Dayalı Boşanma Davalarında Hakimin Yoksulluk Nafakasına Müdahalesi
Nihan Koyuncu AktaşAnlaşma temeline dayalı boşanma davalarında tarafların boşanmasına karar verilebilmesi için taraflarca kabul edilen bir düzenlemenin mevcut olması gerekmektedir (TMK md 166/III). Taraflarca kabul edilen düzenleme ile eşler, boşanmanın mali sonuçları ve çocukların durumuna ilişkin anlaşmış olmalıdır. Bununla birlikte TMK md 166/III c 3 hükmünde yer alan bu düzenleme hakimin, taraflarca kabul edilen düzenlemede değişikliğe neden olabilecek müdahalesinin mümkün olduğunu işaret etmektedir. Çalışma konumuz olan ve boşanmanın mali sonuçları arasında yer alan yoksulluk nafakası da taraflarca kabul edilecek düzenlemenin zorunlu içeriğine dahildir. Bu kapsamda hakimin yoksulluk nafakasına müdahalesinin mümkün olduğu sonucuna varılmaktadır. Ne var ki yabancı hukuk sistemlerinde boşanma hukukundaki güncel değişiklikler hakimin boşanmanın mali sonuçlarına yönelik müdahalesinin sınırlı tutulması yönündedir. Çocuğun durumuna ilişkin düzenlemelerin tersine, tarafların serbest tasarrufuna dahil olması nedeni ile yoksulluk nafakasına müdahalenin dar yorumlanması, olması gereken hukuk açısından yerindedir. Bununla birlikte tarafların yoksulluk nafakasına yönelik sözleşme serbestisinin sınırları mevcuttur. Gerçekten taraflar, sözleşmenin içeriğini belirlerken bu içeriğin kanunun emredici düzenlemelerine, kamu düzenine, kişilik haklarına uygunluğa ve konusunun imkansız olmamasına riayet etmekle yükümlüdür. Buna ilaveten Medeni Kanunun genel ve çerçeve nitelikli amir hükümleri de tarafların sözleşme özgürlüğünü sınırlamaktadır. Bu sınırlamalar hakimin yoksulluk nafakasına müdahalesinin kapsamını da belirlemektedir. Bu kapsamda öncelikle hakimin yoksulluk nafakasına ilişkin düzenlemenin geçerli olup olmadığını denetleme ödevi bulunduğu belirtilmelidir. Hakim, yoksulluk nafakası da dahil olmak üzere düzenlemenin zorunlu içeriğinin serbest bir irade ürünü olup olmadığını da incelemelidir. Bu belirtilenler kapsamında hakimin yoksulluk müdahalesinin kapsamı ve sınırları özellikle uygulamada karşılaşılan muhtemel problemlerle birlikte ele alınmaktadır. Tarafların yoksulluk nafakası hususunda sessiz kalması, yoksulluk nafakasını saklı tutması, nafakanın belirli bir süre için verileceği yönünde anlaşması, nafakadan feragat edilmesi ve nafaka miktarının çok yüksek ya da çok düşük belirlenmesi gibi durumlarda hakimin müdahalesinin kapsamı ve sınırları değerlendirilmektedir.
Alimony Scrutiny by Judge in Mutual Consent Divorces
Nihan Koyuncu AktaşAccording to Turkish Civil Code (TMK) Art 166/III, there shall be an agreement by the parties in order to place a judgement in a judicial divorce by mutual consent. The parties shall agree upon the financial consequences and a parenting plan, which constitute the mandatory scope of the agreement. TMK Art 166/III indicates that a judge may overrule stipulations in the agreement resulting in alterations. Therefore, scrutiny and alimony intervention, the subject of this study, is possible. Notably, current changes in foreign divorce law address limited scrutiny related to financial consequences. Unlike provisions related to the parenting plan, it is appropriate to restrict the extent of scrutiny on alimony since it is a matter the parties are free to decide. However, parties’ freedom to the agreement has limitations. Parties shall guarantee that the content of agreement complies with the restrictive rules, public order, and personal rights. Freedom also has its According to Turkish Civil Code (TMK) Art 166/III, there shall be an agreement by the parties in order to place a judgement in a judicial divorce by mutual consent. The parties shall agree upon the financial consequences and a parenting plan, which constitute the mandatory scope of the agreement. TMK Art 166/III indicates that a judge may overrule stipulations in the agreement resulting in alterations. Therefore, scrutiny and alimony intervention, the subject of this study, is possible. Notably, current changes in foreign divorce law address limited scrutiny related to financial consequences. Unlike provisions related to the parenting plan, it is appropriate to restrict the extent of scrutiny on alimony since it is a matter the parties are free to decide. However, parties’ freedom to the agreement has limitations. Parties shall guarantee that the content of agreement complies with the restrictive rules, public order, and personal rights. Freedom also has its
TMK Art 166/III regulates special grounds in mutual consent divorces. The Article mandates that with the presence of both parties’ consensus (or acceptance of the claim by the other party) the marriage shall be deemed as it has been irretrievably broken. The presumption prohibits judges from making further examinations, such as if the marriage is in fact broken or if the parties have a fault. The judge shall pronounce the divorce if the Article’s conditions are met.
One of the conditions is the judge’s approval of the spousal agreement. Precisely, TMK Art 166/III requires that both spouses agree on the financial consequences of divorce and a parenting plan. Yet, this agreement alone does not enable a judge to decide on a judicial divorce. It must be approved by a judge. Therefore, both parties accept that a judge’s scrutiny may result in alterations to the agreement. This phrase clarifies that a judge can propose necessary changes in the agreement. In this case, the divorce is pronounced only if the proposal is accepted by both parties. Otherwise, the action is dismissed and the Supreme Court considers it a contested divorce action.
In this study, the judge’s scrutiny and intervention on alimony provisions is examined taking into consideration that divorcing parties reach a consensus on alimony as it is included in the mandatory content of the spousal agreements. To this end, the legal nature of spousal agreement is examined primarily. We conclude that spousal agreements are like a private-law contract with the similar character of a settlement agreement. The necessity of a judge’s approval is not a constituent element but a complementary one. Thus, the legal nature of the agreement remains unchanged after it is approved by the court. In light of the conclusions mentioned, a judge’s scrutiny of alimony provisions is critical since this area has the highest possible conflicts.
A judge’s intervention is primarily required when the parties are silent about alimony in the spousal agreement. The same can be said when a provision is reserved for further resolution by the parties. A judge shall not approve any agreement that is silent about alimony as TMK Art 166/III only refers to agreements that include a consensus on the financial consequences of divorce and the parenting plan. The result is also the same when the parties reserve their rights to claim future alimony since this shows a non-consensus on alimony. Contrarily, it is considered as leaving the judge to decide the alimony solution is possible, as is the case with Swiss Civil Code (ZGB) Art 112, TMK Art 166/III, where there is no restraint to do so.
When the agreement includes a provision about alimony but not the ratio of change in the following years, it shall still be approved since the ratio of change is not mandatory content of the spousal agreement. Notably, most problems regarding alimony stem from the alimony waiver or when the amount is defined as too high or too low, in which case TMK Art 23 shall be decisive.
