The subject of the study is public officials who are members of unions that are being paid collective contract payments in accordance with the law No. 4688 in Turkey. Public officials are able to seek rights through trade unions as well as other employees in an organized manner against the employer. The purpose of the study is to investigate the collective contract payments being made to the members of the unions, which are a group of interests and pressure groups, in the framework of finance theory. Is the collective contract payment a discriminatory practice for favor of public officials’ unions? . Is the collective contract payment an unfair practice for favor of public officials’ unions? Could the collective bargaining bonus encourage membership in the civil servants’ unions and act as an indirect financing function? In the study, these questions were searched on the basis of the theory of finance, while in the context of the critical paradigm a qualitative research method was preferred and existing statistics research has been applied. The unionization rate of the public officials’ unions, which had been granted the right to pay for the collective contract payment since 2010, increased from approximately 58% in 2010 to approximately 68% in 2018. It is considered that collective bargaining payments can be effective by increasing the rate of unionization. The fact that the aforementioned bonus is paid only to unionized officials appears to be problematic in terms of justice as a discriminatory practice. On the other hand, collective contract payments, which provide indirect financing, constitute a separate problem area for the unions to fulfill the function of pressure group in the defense of the economic and social rights of public employees in an independent manner and for the establishment of union consciousness. Finally, it is concluded that there is no significant theoretical basis for the collective contract bonuses included in public expenditure financed by public revenues.