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DOI :10.26650/PB/SS46PS01.2023.004.001   IUP :10.26650/PB/SS46PS01.2023.004.001    Full Text (PDF)

From Competition to Confrontation: US Space Strategy

Kasım İleri

Space has not been immune to the global geopolitical power politics since early 1950s, but it has never been so congested, contested and a real war fighting domain as it is today. It is not a domain where only great powers could afford anymore. Mid-level powers, even companies now claim their share in the space. Outer space, upper orbits are yet to be areas of confrontation, but lower orbit has already turned into a battle field. Confrontations in space are inevitable in a digitized world where from basic daily needs to war plans, pretty much everything is being relied onto a heavily loaded digital realm. However, norms and customary laws are not being set as fast as the escalation currently building up in space. There is almost no room for cooperation as geopolitical power race between China and the United States (US) has already spread to space. China and the US almost weekly conduct space launches with classified payloads. Militarization of the space has long been an international concern and intervening the lower orbit from the Earth via advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) is now a raging trend. Moreover, unlike other domains such as air, land and sea, space has significant constraints in terms of building defenses for the assets floating in it. In other words, there is a disparity between counter space offensive and defensive capabilities.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War, viewed space as a sanctuary free of conflict and a non-warfighting domain. However, many states and international entities has now declared space a war fighting domain. The US has been concerned regarding the increasing threat in the space since mid 2000s but American security bureaucracy had remained restrained about confrontation in space until China launched a projectile up to geostationary orbit that is 36,000 kms above the Earth and Russia and China’s launch of maneuverable satellites in 2013. Space war has since then been an inevitable fate in the future. So the US space policy accordingly evolved from a competition led strategy to a potential confrontation driven one.

Under the light of this context, this study looks into the US space policy and tries to navigate answers for questions such as how the US approach to space has evolved over time? What are the main tenets of the updated US space strategy? How does the US security bureaucracy perceive the threats and security in space? Before divulging the US space policy and strategy, I will touch upon concepts related to the security, power projection, risk and threat in space and the literature surrounding these concepts. By doing that, this research will not only hypostasize the future of US space policy but it will also sketch out a conceptual framework for space as a military theater.

This research is divided into three main parts. In the first part, theoretical discussions and their limitations is being elaborated on. Without diving too much deep into the theory, this part portrays analogies drawn between space power and some of the theories in international politics. Cautiously approaching these analogies, this study points out the limits of these theories to explain the space.

In the second part, legal frameworks that are governing the use of space and celestial bodies. It should be emphasized that most of the agreements are crafted in late 1960s and 1970s led by US and USSR. Since then, no other sweeping multi-lateral agreement has been signed except for US-led Artemis Accords which opened to signatories in 2020 and stipulates use Moon as a permanent base.

In the third part, this research details the US space policy and strategy from 1950’s to today. It handles the US space strategy in two conceptual eras. Chronologically the US space policy up until late 1990s was based on a competitive but strategic restraint. However, from early 2000s to today, this study purports, the US has moved from a competitive approach to a more confrontational one in space. This research unveils the developments that triggered this evolution by divulging into US national security documents related to space.

Hypothetically, this research claims that for the US, space is not a domain for competition anymore but a theater of confrontation and war fighting domain. In this context, on one hand the US is investing in space capabilities and heavily militarize its space assets, on the other, it is investing in capabilities to counter counter-space measures or deter counter-space adventures.



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