History and dogmatics of law by Puchta and Rudolf von Jhering
Ahmet ArslanSince Roman law, the systematic understanding of the law has been based on natural law. However, the systematization and abstraction of law reached their pinnacle with the Pandectists under the influence of Friedrich Carl von Savigny. The jurisprudence of concepts is a legal methodology that systematizes legal concepts and rules in a pyramid through abstraction and generalization. The aim is to mathematically calculate/geometrize the law to prevent it from being arbitrary and unpredictable. This theory is exemplified in the right of way (Wegeservitut) by Puchta, the first jurist to come to mind regarding the jurisprudence of concepts. Jhering criticized Puchta’s views as unrealistic, impractical, and contrary to the sense of justice, following his turnabout. In this manner, he demonstrated sociological approaches to the law and shifted methodologically toward purpose-oriented, practical jurisprudence. Jhering criticized Puchta’s ideas for being unrealistic, difficult to implement, and devoid of a sense of justice (Rechtsgefühl). Jhering demonstrated sociological legal approaches and turned to pragmatic jurists. According to him, the ultimate purpose of the law and its practical application should not be overlooked. Consequently, the purpose of law and a sense of justice should play a determining role in legal methodology. With these ideas, he pioneered the current dominant methodological jurisprudence of interests/values.
Geschichte und Dogmatik des Rechts bei Puchta und Rudolf von Jhering
Ahmet ArslanDie systematische Auffassung des Rechts besteht seit dem römischen Recht und gründet sich grundlegend auf das Naturrecht. Insbesondere bei den Pandektenjuristen unter dem Einfluss Friedrich Carl von Savignys erreichte die Systematisierung und Abstraktion des Rechts ihren Höhepunkt. Die Begriffsjurisprudenz ist eine juristische Methodik, die Rechtsbegriffe und -regeln durch Abstraktion und Verallgemeinerung pyramidenartig systematisiert. Ziel ist die Mathematisierung/Geometrisierung des Rechts, um Willkür und Unberechenbarkeit im Recht zu vermeiden. Georg Friedrich Puchta ist wohl der erste Jurist, der mir im Zusammenhang mit der Begriffsjurisprudenz einfällt. Er veranschaulicht seine „Genealogie der Begriffe“ am Beispiel des Wegeservituts. Auch der junge Rudolf von Jhering war ein Anhänger der Begriffsjurisprudenz. Jedoch kritisierte er Puchtas Ansichten, nach seinem Umschwung, als lebensfremd, praktisch kaum durchführbar und dem Rechtsempfinden widersprechend. Jhering zeigte somit rechtssoziologische Ansätze auf und wandelte er sich methodisch zu einer praktischen, zweckgerichteten Jurisprudenz. Das Endziel des Rechts, nämlich die Umsetzung in die Lebenspraxis, dürfe nicht außer Acht gelassen werden. Der Zweck und das Rechtsgefühl sollten daher in der juristischen Methodik eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Mit seinen Ansichten ist er ein Vorläufer der heute vorherrschenden methodischen Interessen- und Wertungsjurisprudenz.
The systematic way of thinking and perceiving law originates mainly in natural law, and the foundations can also be found in Roman law. However, the 19th-century Pandectists reached the pinnacle of systematization and abstraction when they systematically organized the sources in the Roman law fragments.
The legal methodology of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, founder of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, is characterized by influences from natural law, i.e., a systematic approach to thinking about law. Savigny’s methodology is therefore not only historical, but also systematic and philosophical. According to Savigny, legal propositions and rules are formulated through the abstraction and totalization of legal institutions. Savigny paved the way for the jurisprudence of concepts with these approaches (Begriffsjurisprudenz).
In the second third of the 19th century, German legal thought was dominated by the jurisprudence of concepts, a logical-systematic understanding and methodology of law. It excluded the law’s metaphysical assumptions. General and abstract legal rules and legal concepts are organized in a conceptual pyramid through abstraction. Further, logical deduction can be used to construct more specific legal rules from these legal concepts.
This article aims to explain the significance and systematic position of Georg Friedrich Puchta’s “Genealogy of Concepts” (Genealogie der Begriffe), expose it to Rudolf von Jhering’s criticism in the comparison of theories, and demonstrate his own analysis of legal formation and legal change.
In pursuit of this aim, the second section examines the significance and structural positioning of Puchta’s Genealogy of Concepts. Expanding on this foundation, the third section examines Jhering’s criticism of this methodology as well as his alternative approaches. Consequently, the conclusion summarizes the key findings. Primary sources include Puchta’s Genealogy of Concepts in Cursus der Institutionen 33 and Jhering’s critique and evolving understanding of law.
This work demonstrates that the jurisprudence of concepts and its critique include many philosophical, sociological, and even economic considerations. Puchta developed a legal formalism with the “genealogy of concepts” method, distinguishing between law’s systematic and historical aspects. Conceptual jurisprudence limits the function of a judge to the “logical subsumption of the factual situation under legal concepts.” If a judge cannot derive a “firm, well-founded conviction” from this system, they can depart from its practical requirements to establish new legal rules.
Jhering criticized Puchta’s methodology for being formalistic, positivistic, inapplicable, and insensitive to justice. Since the school of the free law school and the jurisprudence of interest, Puchta’s entire body of work is to blame for the new methodology’s criticism of “the jurisprudence of concepts” With the Puchta ancestry, jurisprudence, according to Jhering, has become divorced from social facts and political and moral reality. Due to this, the movement against Puchta was born from a philosophical point of view and a sociological perspective. Jhering criticized Puchta’s “failed” legal theory for still being remembered in the jurisprudence of concepts.
Many of Jhering’s criticisms appear to be justified. Several legal institutions/ concepts that were deemed impossible in the jurisprudence of concepts are already in use in modern law.
Jhering vacillated between the two extremes because he found Puchta’s methodology incompatible with social change. In a sense, Jhering’s turn signifies that legal thought prioritizes justice over legal formalism. According to him, the law should not be divorced from life’s realities. In addition to the law, Jhering considered the sense of justice (Rechtsgefühl), which has remained pertinent to this day.
Puchta’s method does not find many adherents in today’s methodology because it focuses only on the subject matter of the law and not on the law as a whole. This is primarily because it does not adequately address the practical end goal of law. However, it cannot be denied that the historical school of jurisprudence has significantly influenced the law.
Since the 1880s, the systematic treatment of Roman legal principles and the dogmatic rigidity of German law has been abandoned, and Jhering’s concept of “purpose in law” became popular. Jhering’s return to pragmatic jurisprudence is regarded as the beginning of the jurisprudence of interests. In the jurisprudence of concepts, reason takes precedence, whereas in the jurisprudence of interests, “primacy of life research and life values” take precedence.
