Research Article


DOI :10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008   IUP :10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008    Full Text (PDF)

Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance

Ömer Mahir Alper

The issue of ignorance (jahl), which has been dealt with by many Islamic philosophers in the history of Islamic philosophy, is related to not only epistemology but also logic, psychology, and ethics. We can say that the most elaborate account of “ignorance” in the early Islamic philosophy appears in the works of Avicenna (d. 429/1037). However, it seems that Avicenna’s idea of ignorance has not yet been extensively studied. The purpose of this article is to study and present Avicenna’s view of ignorance, focusing on its important aspects.

In his Kitāb al-Burhān of al-Shifā, which is one of the logical books of the Shifā compilation, Avicenna defines ignorance as the soul’s illness (maraḍun nafsāniyyun). Knowledge is not inherent in humans; however, it is gained over time, and is added to human soul. With the attachment of knowledge to the soul, humans achieve perfection. Thus, we can say that humans are potentially knowledgeable and actively ignorant at birth. This active ignorance, in other words, simple ignorance, is not what is described as an illness by Avicenna.

Avicenna describes another type of ignorance that is not simple, but is rather added to the soul. In other words, this type of ignorance is not inherent to the soul and, in this respect, is additional to the soul in the same way as knowledge is. This ignorance, which is also called composite (murakkab) ignorance, is temporally posterior to or comes after the the the soul comes into existence.

While simple ignorance is a state of pure deficiency of knowledge, composite ignorance is the deficiency attached with a belief that is contrary to the popular meaning of knowledge. Its combined nature is what causes its ill-nature.

Another difference between simple and composite ignorance is that of awareness; it is possible for someone with simple ignorance to be aware of his/her lack of knowledge and to eventually seek knowledge as a result of this awareness. At this point, simple ignorance opens a passage to knowledge. It can be claimed that awareness of one’s own ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

Avicenna exemplifies, through many examples, how composite ignorance is related to mistakes made in syllogistic forms. Examples of synonymous middle terms and mistakenly distributed middle terms, also demonstrate that the art of logic is critical to avoid composite ignorance.

It is, thus, no surprise that his evaluation also addresses dialectical debate (jadal) and regards the mentioned-method as an explicit source of combined ignorance. As per Avicenna, using misused and ambiguous terminology and mistakes in the form of syllogism are in the very essence of dialectical debate. Burhān (demonstration), on the other hand, represents perfection in the form and content of syllogism.

Another classification of ignorance is due to the conceptuality (tasawwurī) and assertiveness (tasdīqī) of ignorance. Some philosophers claim that conceptual ignorance can take only the simple form. And, only composite ignorance is obtained in the assertive form.

Avicenna also speaks of the idea of particularity about ignorance. The particular ignorance maintains that something which is potentially known can be actively unknown as well.

The ethical dimension of the issue of ignorance is more explicit when we reach the discussions in the Adhawiya where Avicenna connects the types of ignorance to degrees and stages of humans in afterlife. In this respect, ignorance is connected to the level of a human being’s self-realization in terms of practical and theoretical dimensions, and this ignorance is a defining factor for the future life of humans.

In conclusion, Avicenna’s theory of ignorance is developed in relation to epistemology, logic and ethics. Ignorance is defined as an illness of the soul, an illness which is to be treated by logic. Additionally, composite ignorance when not treated, causes one to be subject to eternal punishment even if the human achieves some level of ethical perfection. When a human is aware of the ways to reach his or her perfection, and ,still chooses ignorance over perfection, despite possession of this awareness, then this human will be punished in afterlife.

DOI :10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008   IUP :10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008    Full Text (PDF)

İbn Sînâ'nın Cehâlet Teorisi

Ömer Mahir Alper

İslâm felsefe geleneğinde birçok filozof tarafından ele alınıp tartışılan “cehâlet (cehl) sorunu”, bilgi teorisi kadar mantık, psikoloji ve ahlâk felsefesi gibi alanlarla da yakından irtibatlı önemli bir meseledir. Klasik dönem İslâm filozofları (felâsife) arasında –pek çok meselede olduğu gibi- bu mesele hakkında da en kapsamlı açıklamalarda bulunan filozofun İbn Sînâ (ö. 429/1037) olduğu söylenebilir. Bununla birlikte İbn Sînâ’nın cehâlet görüşünün bütüncül bir biçimde ortaya konulması, bugüne kadar İslâm felsefe tarihçileri tarafından ihmal edilmiş görünmektedir. Bu makale, İbn Sînâ’nın cehâlet görüşünü çeşitli boyutlarıyla ele almayı ve analiz etmeyi amaçlamakta ve onun bu meseleyle ilgili yaklaşımının bütüncül bir resmini ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir.


EXTENDED ABSTRACT


The issue of ignorance (jahl), which has been dealt with by many Islamic philosophers in the history of Islamic philosophy, is related to not only epistemology but also logic, psychology, and ethics. We can say that the most elaborate account of “ignorance” in the early Islamic philosophy appears in the works of Avicenna (d. 429/1037). However, it seems that Avicenna’s idea of ignorance has not yet been extensively studied. The purpose of this article is to study and present Avicenna’s view of ignorance, focusing on its important aspects.

In his Kitāb al-Burhān of al-Shifā, which is one of the logical books of the Shifā compilation, Avicenna defines ignorance as the soul’s illness (maraḍun nafsāniyyun). Knowledge is not inherent in humans; however, it is gained over time, and is added to human soul. With the attachment of knowledge to the soul, humans achieve perfection. Thus, we can say that humans are potentially knowledgeable and actively ignorant at birth. This active ignorance, in other words, simple ignorance, is not what is described as an illness by Avicenna.

Avicenna describes another type of ignorance that is not simple, but is rather added to the soul. In other words, this type of ignorance is not inherent to the soul and, in this respect, is additional to the soul in the same way as knowledge is. This ignorance, which is also called composite (murakkab) ignorance, is temporally posterior to or comes after the the the soul comes into existence.

While simple ignorance is a state of pure deficiency of knowledge, composite ignorance is the deficiency attached with a belief that is contrary to the popular meaning of knowledge. Its combined nature is what causes its ill-nature.

Another difference between simple and composite ignorance is that of awareness; it is possible for someone with simple ignorance to be aware of his/her lack of knowledge and to eventually seek knowledge as a result of this awareness. At this point, simple ignorance opens a passage to knowledge. It can be claimed that awareness of one’s own ignorance is the beginning of wisdom.

Avicenna exemplifies, through many examples, how composite ignorance is related to mistakes made in syllogistic forms. Examples of synonymous middle terms and mistakenly distributed middle terms, also demonstrate that the art of logic is critical to avoid composite ignorance.

It is, thus, no surprise that his evaluation also addresses dialectical debate (jadal) and regards the mentioned-method as an explicit source of combined ignorance. As per Avicenna, using misused and ambiguous terminology and mistakes in the form of syllogism are in the very essence of dialectical debate. Burhān (demonstration), on the other hand, represents perfection in the form and content of syllogism.

Another classification of ignorance is due to the conceptuality (tasawwurī) and assertiveness (tasdīqī) of ignorance. Some philosophers claim that conceptual ignorance can take only the simple form. And, only composite ignorance is obtained in the assertive form.

Avicenna also speaks of the idea of particularity about ignorance. The particular ignorance maintains that something which is potentially known can be actively unknown as well.

The ethical dimension of the issue of ignorance is more explicit when we reach the discussions in the Adhawiya where Avicenna connects the types of ignorance to degrees and stages of humans in afterlife. In this respect, ignorance is connected to the level of a human being’s self-realization in terms of practical and theoretical dimensions, and this ignorance is a defining factor for the future life of humans.

In conclusion, Avicenna’s theory of ignorance is developed in relation to epistemology, logic and ethics. Ignorance is defined as an illness of the soul, an illness which is to be treated by logic. Additionally, composite ignorance when not treated, causes one to be subject to eternal punishment even if the human achieves some level of ethical perfection. When a human is aware of the ways to reach his or her perfection, and ,still chooses ignorance over perfection, despite possession of this awareness, then this human will be punished in afterlife.


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APA

Alper, Ö. (2017). Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance. darulfunun ilahiyat, 0(37), 7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


AMA

Alper Ö. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance. darulfunun ilahiyat. 2017;0(37):7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


ABNT

Alper, Ö. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance. darulfunun ilahiyat, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 37, p. 7-34, 2017.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Alper, Ömer Mahir,. 2017. “Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance.” darulfunun ilahiyat 0, no. 37: 7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


Chicago: Humanities Style

Alper, Ömer Mahir,. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance.” darulfunun ilahiyat 0, no. 37 (Aug. 2025): 7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


Harvard: Australian Style

Alper, Ö 2017, 'Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance', darulfunun ilahiyat, vol. 0, no. 37, pp. 7-34, viewed 12 Aug. 2025, https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Alper, Ö. (2017) ‘Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance’, darulfunun ilahiyat, 0(37), pp. 7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008 (12 Aug. 2025).


MLA

Alper, Ömer Mahir,. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance.” darulfunun ilahiyat, vol. 0, no. 37, 2017, pp. 7-34. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


Vancouver

Alper Ö. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance. darulfunun ilahiyat [Internet]. 12 Aug. 2025 [cited 12 Aug. 2025];0(37):7-34. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008 doi: 10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008


ISNAD

Alper, Ömer Mahir. Avicenna’s Idea of Ignorance”. darulfunun ilahiyat 0/37 (Aug. 2025): 7-34. https://doi.org/10.26650/ilahiyat.2017.19.2.0008



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Submitted19.07.2017
Accepted13.11.2017

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