The universal and dominant human motive of “survival” is the driving force behind people’s desire to live in communities and the development of various social/political institutions over time. The term “survival” should be considered to include both the material (biological) and spiritual (psychological) aspects of the human being’s existential makeup as a “bio–psychic” whole. Thus, a more general summary of this motivation would be the concurrent satisfaction of the desire for “preservation of physical and psychological integrity,” or, as it is more commonly known nowadays, “security and freedom.” The need for security necessitates a hierarchical power structure that ensures people’s obedience and facilitates governance, that is, the establishment of public order and the consolidation (concentration) of political power. In contrast, the need for freedom necessitates limiting political power in a way that protects people’s spiritual and moral integrity and allows them to realize themselves. However, as one might expect, power concentration and power limitation are diametrically opposed processes. In this regard, a political order that can adequately and long-term meet human beings’ existential needs is based on a delicate balance that requires significant effort and competence to establish and maintain. In cases where this effort and competence are insufficient, the political order collapses. Moreover, the societies in question drift uncontrollably along a political spectrum ranging from tyranny (lack of freedom) to chaos and anarchy (lack of security).

Just as in other civilizations, Islamic civilization, particularly in the mainstream of Islamic political thought, that is, the juristic–theological line or, more broadly, the Ahl al-Sunnah tradition, has emphasized the principles and provisions for power concentration while defending frameworks that limit political power. This would guarantee the preservation of people’s individual existence and moral integrity while establishing public order to protect people’s collective existence and physical integrity. Thus, throughout Islamic history, the theoretical balance of “security and freedom” has always been maintained, even though different principles and practically decentralized forces can be found on both sides of the equation as historical circumstances change.

However, the second part of the equation, namely, the issue of “limitation of power,” will be left for another study, focusing here on the theoretical basis of the formation of political authority in Islamic thought. In the classical period of Islamic thought, the following three aspects stand out in this context and, as a result, distinguish Islamic political theory from historical counterparts. The first is a strong emphasis on the historical existence and unity of the Muslim community, both in the Qur’an and hadith, and among Ahl al-Sunnah scholars who study these texts. To this end, the Muslim community was almost synonymous with the existence of Islam, and scholars’ primary goal has been to maintain social unity and integrity.

 Second, the Sunni perspective on politics necessitates the distinction between “formal” and “substantive” elements of the political order, also known as “qatiyyât”  and “dhanniyyât” in literature. As is well known, although the purpose and function of the political order and the principles upon which it is based have been sufficiently emphasized, neither the Qur’an nor the Sunnah contains clear and binding regulations on the formal requirements of the political order. Scholars developed these principles over time and in the context of historical events, particularly by examining the practices of the Rashid Caliphs and the Companions. As historical conditions changed and the application of these formal conditions became practically impossible, scholars had to revise political theory based on the essential (qat’i) elements of the political order and the basic principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah. In this context, “qatiyyât” refers to the purpose and nature of the political order, whereas “dhanniyyât” refers to the constitutive process of the political order and the conditions that rulers must meet.

In Islam, as in all other cultural systems, the primary goal of political order is to ensure society’s collective existence, unity, and continuity. This necessitates a hierarchical structure, centralization of power, and obedience to political leadership. Unlike other systems, the second purpose of Islam’s political order is to enforce Sharia law, which provides the Muslim society with its identity and serves as its raison d’être. These two fundamental objectives are the absolute elements of the political order. Aside from this, the process of establishing the political order (particularly the election or non-election of the ruler) and the conditions that the candidate for rulership must meet (knowledge, power, competence, and even Quraysh citizenship) are secondary elements that serve to realize the main objectives and constitute presumptive principles. Throughout Islamic history, as the conditions of the time changed and the realization of the secondary elements became more difficult, scholars were able to give up the secondary (dhannī) elements for the sake of the main objectives.

Third, the source of political authority in Islam is the law. Although almost all other traditions achieve power concentration by attributing divinity to governments and rulers, Islamic thought categorically rejects this practice. Power concentration in Islam is only justified on a legal basis, not on a metaphysical or theological basis. This has enabled the development of a theoretical framework and a political–moral mechanism that is highly resistant to corruption and abuse of power. In other cases, the reference to divinity tended to reinforce an “unrestrained” understanding of power, which occasionally resulted in power abuse and corruption and the establishment of authoritarian governments.

The political theories of al-Māwardī, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī, and Ibn Taymiyya can be given as examples of this attitude of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars. These scholars saw the Muslim community’s unity, integrity, continuity, and the application of Sharī’ah law as the two indispensable central purposes of political order. The political order can only be considered legitimate if it meets these two criteria. In pursuit of these goals, al-Māwardī, for example, legitimized the rule of the al-Buwayhī emirs, who seized power by force  of arms, contradicting the principle of government establishment through election. Meanwhile, Al-Juwaynī was able to waive the Qurayshite requirement because he believed that the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk could establish the most suitable government for the aforementioned purposes. Meanwhile, Al-Ghazālī included the Seljuk sultan in the caliphate system because he believed that the political order in question could only be established through military power, and he argued that a candidate lacking knowledge qualifications could become caliph if he received assistance from the scholars around him. In contrast, Ibn Taymiyya was able to propose a model of political order, at least in some of his works, that made no reference to the classical theory of imamate and was based on the belief that the primary condition for a legitimate political order is the application of Sharī’ah law.

To summarize, while the Qur’an and Sunnah have established the purpose of the political order and the fundamental principles upon which it is to be based, they have not addressed the formal dimension or mechanism of the political order. In accordance with the circumstances of the time, the jurisprudence and ijma of the scholars filled the gap that resulted from this silence. In this regard, where the Qur’an and Sunnah are silent or open to interpretation, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars focused on the essence of the political order as expressed in the Qur’an and Sunnah, namely, its purpose and function, while accepting some formal flexibility. When this nuance is not recognized, this flexibility is perceived as spinelessness or a lack of identity, which is not the case, and Ahl al-Sunnah scholars may be unfairly accused.