Modern Confucian Mou Zongsan’s Negation of “Cognitive Awareness”
İlknur SertdemirThe early twentieth century in mainland China exemplifies the modernization process in many areas, including language, literature, traditional thought, education, and even the political system. Among these reformist movements, it is important to note that this movement of thought was established under the name of New Confucianism, which dates back to the ancient ages, was based on Confucius (479–551 BC), and was widely adopted by the human nature view of Mencius (372–289 BC). Unlike Confucius’ normative moral sentiment, this new movement is more akin to Mencius’ innatist theory. Xiong Shili (1885–1968), who established the foundations of New Confucianism, emphasized the concept of “self,” which can be found in Mencius’ doctrine and may correspond to the heart–mind correlation. Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), one of the movement’s later representatives, is regarded as the most effective intellectual of the time for his remarkable comments on heart–mind correlation and self-cultivation. Mou philosophy includes some hypothetical arguments that explain the cognitive and affective processes in completely different stages, contrary to Mencius’s view of integration; coordinate those stages with the two-tiered nature of the self; and equate existential essence with the essence of human nature. In this study, the how of the sense of self will be examined in relation to the Mou philosophy’s ontocosmological approach, and the details of the thesis that negates cognitive awareness in internalizing knowledge and virtue, which are assumed to be innate, will be analyzed.
Modern Konfuçyüsçü Mou Zongsan’ın “Bilişsel Farkındalık” Olumsuzlaması
İlknur SertdemirÇin anakarasında yirminci yüzyılın başları; dilden edebiyata, geleneksel düşünceden eğitim sistemine ve hatta siyasal rejime dek pek çok alanda modernleşmeye gidilen süreci kapsar. Kültürel çaptaki bu yenilikçi hareketler arasında; antik çağa tarihlenen, Konfuçyüs (MÖ 479-551) tarafından ilkeleştirilen ve Mengzi’nın (MÖ 372-289) insan doğası görüşü sayesinde geniş kitlelerce benimsenen düşünce akımının “Yeni Konfuçyanizm” adı altında kurulması oldukça mühimdir. Konfuçyüs’ün normatif ahlak anlayışının aksine bu yeni akım, Mengzi’nın doğuştancı kuramına daha yakın durmaktadır. Yeni Konfuçyanizm’in temellerini atan Xiong Shili (1885-1968), Mengzi öğretisinde okunabilen ve akılkalp ilgileşimi karşılığını verebilen “benlik” kavramını merkeze alır. Akımın sonraki temsilcilerinden Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) ise, gerek akıl-kalp ilgileşimine gerekse benliğin beslenmesine getirdiği çarpıcı yorumlarıyla dönemin en etkili fikir adamı olarak dikkatleri üzerine çekmektedir. Mou felsefesi; Mengzi’nın bütünleşik kabul ettiği bilişsel ve duyuşsal süreçleri tamamen farklı aşamalarda açıklayan, bu aşamaları benliğin iki katmanlı yapısıyla eşleştiren ve varoluşsal özü insan doğasının özüne özdeş sayan bazı varsayımsal yargılar içermektedir. Bu çalışmada, Mou felsefesinin onto-kozmolojik yaklaşımından hareketle benlik algısının nasıllığı incelenecek; doğuştan var olduğu farzındaki bilginin ve erdemin özümsenmesinde bilişsel farkındalığa karşı çıkan önermenin ayrıntıları analiz edilecektir.
Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), the most effective intellectual of the 20th century, is known for his sophisticated philosophy that renounces traditionalism. Mou’s teaching distinguishes him from other New Confucianism representatives in that it integrates cosmology and ontology into an epistemological approach. Greatly influenced by Xiong Shili (1885–1968), Mou has also developed his theory based on the metaphysics of morality, which was at the heart of New Confucianism. He believes that the primary goal of New Confucianism is to preserve the moral values articulated by Confucius (479–551 BC) in ancient times. However, because traditional Confucian rules do not correspond to modern perspectives, he focuses on the moral psychology ideas suggested by Mencius (372–289 BC) to argue his own point of view. Mou believes that the moral entity (daode shiti 道德实体) of human nature has the ability to be aware of cosmological and ontological facts, making the origin of knowledge and virtue discernible. Although the traditional rules of Confucian thought have resulted in social inequality, which has negatively affected educational life, the metaphysical principles of Confucian thought have extremely regulated social life. Mou Zongsan claims that Mencian philosophy places equal emphasis on people, assuming that humans are innately good, in contrast to Mencius’ opponent Xunzi (313–238 BC), who assumed that human beings are innately bad. As a result, Mou has sought to revitalize Confucian teachings that conform with Mencian philosophy. Confucian ethics, as demonstrated in his works, is the practice of achieving harmony between metaphysical establishment and personal development. Mou believes that the spiritual values of Confucian ethics, as detailed by Mencius, can serve as a permanent way of teaching moral metaphysics in the new era. For centuries, Chinese culture has emphasized the spiritual values of benevolence (ren 仁), righteousness (yi义), propriety (li 礼) and wisdom (zhi智). Based on the necessity and possibility of reinvigorating Confucian thought, Mou Zongsan has proposed a distinct philosophy that incorporates the fundamental concepts of Mencius’ innatist theory but excludes the specific phases of this ancient theory. In other words, the arguments of Mou philosophy distinguish psychological stages in the learning process, prioritizing the origin of knowledge and virtue.
Mou takes a new approach to reinvigorating Confucian thought, criticizing ancient concepts such as Confucius’ social inequality and Xunzi’s moral understanding, which are still limited to explaining psychological components. According to Mou, Mencius’ innatist theory is similar to key models of developmental psychology, particularly the concept of self (xin 心), which is known as the heart–mind correlation and is centered in New Confucianism by Xiong Shili. Maintaining Mencius’ innatist theory, Mou first addressed the fact that knowledge and wisdom are innate, but unlike Mencius, he discussed the stages based on cognitive and affective processes. The idea of “expounding the inner morality of human nature (neizai daode xing内在道德性)” clearly opposes both logical and rational learning, which are based on external factors. Mou’s works demonstrate a systematic increase in the abilities of perception, emotion, and intuition in moral awareness. This assumption generates two references: the ontocosmological reference, which refers to human beings’ immanent transcendence (neizai chaoyue 内在超越), and the existential reference, which refers to their original self (benxin 本心). These arguments suggest that human nature has the ability to become conscious of innate knowledge and virtue. Mou considers that our original self is an essence that evolves without nonempirical or nonexperiential phases. Therefore, this type of essence includes more than just cognitive activities. Accordingly, when emotions and thoughts bestowed upon human nature transcend cognitive activities, sageliness and virtuousness are achieved.
Mou Zongsan holds that our original self has a two-tiered existence (liang ceng cunyou两层 存有), which consists of finite (youxian 有限) and infinite (wuxian 无限) functions. According to his two-tiered understanding, there are two ways for humans to perceive and recognize before engaging in thoughts and feelings. As Mou mentioned, learning through the phenomenological way has a substantial finite function, whereas learning through the nonphenomenological way has an infinite function. This means that in their two-tiered existence, humans can acquire two types of knowledge: permanent and temporary. Permanent knowledge in this context corresponds to intuitive, perceptive, and sensitive activities, whereas temporary knowledge corresponds to cognitive activities. Mou’s distinction between phenomenological and nonphenomenological knowledge acquisition suggests that he may deny cognitive awareness to achieve sageliness and virtuousness. According to his work, acquiring phenomenological knowledge of the self can be external (waizai de 外在的) and objective (keguan de 客观的). However, he claims that the acquisition of nonphenomenological knowledge of self is both internal (neizai de 内在的) and subjective (zhuguan de 主观的). Although Mou’s ontocosmological thought includes a postulate similar to Kant’s phenomenal-noumenal knowledge theory, his assumptions are fundamentally different from Kant’s philosophy. According to Kant’s analysis, human beings can gain knowledge of the phenomenal realm through sensitive faculties because it is impossible to know what exists in the noumenal realm without transcendental absoluteness. More importantly, Kant claims that sensitive faculties correspond to active phenomenal knowledge, whereas intuitive faculties correspond to passive noumenal knowledge. Nevertheless, Mou asserts that human nature has the ultimate potential to comprehend the noumenal realm through the intuitive, perceptive, and sensitive abilities of the existential essence bestowed by transcendence power. In other words, sensitive faculties cannot be distinguished from intuitive faculties because humans are born with immanent transcendence and naturally understand heavenly principles. Indeed, Mou Zongsan seeks to demonstrate that humans possess inner sageliness and virtuousness, as long as perceptive awareness prevails over all finite functions of cognitive activities capable of restraining the highest goodness of the original self, bestowed by heaven.
