Research Article


DOI :10.26650/mcd2023-1328396   IUP :10.26650/mcd2023-1328396    Full Text (PDF)

Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity

İbrahim KeklikAbdullah Barış

The duties undertaken by the state to meet social needs and to have an impact on social and economic life cause public expenditure to be made and increased on a regular basis. This increase in public expenditure has a positive effect on economic growth. One of the factors that has an impact on the planning and implementation of public expenditure is the bureaucracy. Bureaucrats may want to increase the sizeof their offices in order to increase their power, prestige and monetary authority, while adopting the aim of contributing to economic growth in the planning and implementation process of public expenditure. The increase in the size of officesallows the number of personnel to rise and this in turn has an effect on the service production capacity of the bureau causing potential changes in the hierarchical structure. The fact that bureaucrats are not an organic unit, but people who can make choices and have a set of attitudes and behavioral models, reveals that the decisions taken on public expenditure are taken in line with individual preferences. This situation results in a waste of resources in the economy through rent-seeking, and also negatively affects economic growth by making public expenditure inefficient. In this study, the effects of bureaucracy on public expenditure and bureaucratic behavior models affecting public expenditure are evaluated within the framework of rent-seeking activity.

DOI :10.26650/mcd2023-1328396   IUP :10.26650/mcd2023-1328396    Full Text (PDF)

Bürokrasinin Kamu Harcamalarına Etkilerinin Rant Kollama Faaliyeti ile Birlikte Değerlendirilmesi

İbrahim KeklikAbdullah Barış

Devletin toplumsal ihtiyaçları karşılamak, sosyal ve ekonomik hayat üzerinde etki edebilmek amacı ile yüklendiği görevler kamu harcamalarının yapılmasına ve bu harcamaların yıllar itibari ile artışına sebebiyet vermektedir. Kamu harcamalarının artışı ise ekonomik büyümeye pozitif bir etkide bulunmaktadır. Kamu harcamalarının planlanmasında ve uygulanmasında etkisi bulunan unsurlardan biri bürokrasi ve bürokrasinin bir üyesi olan bürokratlardır. Bürokratlar kamu harcamalarının plan ve uygulama sürecinde ekonomik büyümeye katkı sağlamak amacını da benimsemek ile birlikte diğer bir yandan kendi güçlerini, prestijlerini ve parasal yetkilerini artırabilmek amacı ile bürolarının büyüklüğünü de artırmak isteyebilmektedirler. Büroların büyümesi personel sayısının dolayısı ile büro hizmet üretim kapasitesini de artırmakta ve hiyerarşik yapının da değişmesini sağlamaktadır. Bürokratların organik bir birim olmaması, seçimler yapabilen ve birtakım tutum ve davranış modeline sahip insanlar olması, kamu harcamalarında alınan kararların da bireysel tercihler doğrultusunda alınması durumunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu durum ekonomide yer alan kaynakların rant kollama yoluyla israf edilmesini, kamu harcamalarının verimsiz hale gelerek ekonomik büyümeyi de olumsuz olarak etkilemesi sonucunu doğurmaktadır. Bu çalışmada bürokrasinin kamu harcamalarına olan etkileri ve kamu harcamalarına etki eden bürokratik davranış modelleri, rant kollama faaliyeti çerçevesinde ele alınarak bir değerlendirme yapılmıştır.


EXTENDED ABSTRACT


Public expenditure is defined as expenditure made by the state within the framework of certain rules in order to meet social needs and to intervene in social and economic life. The classic view of economics, based on a free market economy in which the presence of the state in the economy is limited, was the dominant economic view until the Great Depression. After the Great Depression, Keynes stated that a free market economy cannot always provide full employment, that full employment is a rare and short-term situation, and that the state should intervene in the economy, and with this view, the idea that the state should take a more active role in the market was accepted. The primary reason for the increase in public expenditure in this period was the increase in the duties of the state and public activities, that is, the diversity of expenditure.

The volume and content of public expenditure are influenced by economic, cultural and political factors. When we look at the increase in public expenditure from a political perspective, it can be seen that political parties, pressure groups, voters and bureaucrats involved in the political decision-making mechanism are influential.

Bureaucracy is the system that assists the political authority in the production of public goods and services and ensures that daily state services are provided. A bureaucrat is defined as a member of the organization referred to in the concept of bureaucracy. Bureaucrats especially want to increase the size of their offices in order to increase their power, prestige and monetary authority. With the expansion of the office, the number of personnel increases and the hierarchical structure changes accordingly. In addition, citizens who benefit from the services of the bureau want to access the public goods and services from which they benefit without any problems. In this regard, citizens who want the bureaus to work smoothly and without delay can create pressure. As a result of this pressure, the service production capacity of the bureau expands considerably. Another reason for the increase in public expenditure through bureaus is that bureaus are the sole producers of public goods and services. Due to this monopoly structure, bureaucrats try to increase the production of public goods and services to increase their monetary benefits. In order to reach this resource, they exaggerate the benefits obtained and ask for more appropriations than they need or make estimates based on higher figures than necessary. With the loss of control over the data provided to the government and the public on the costs of services and works, governments are often forced to give in to the demands of the bureaucracy.

Today, the bureaucracy plays a decisive role in the process of public policy making. Public choice theory is based on individual utility maximization, which also refers to the pursuit of utility by public decision-makers. It is stated that the basic units are not organic units such as parties, states or nations, but individuals who can make choices and have a set of attitudes and behavioral models, and hence it is assumed that the decisions taken in the public sector are based on individual preferences as in the private economy.

In an environment where bureaucrats are not rent-seeking, an exogenous increase in public expenditure that increases productivity will directly increase the productive capacity of the economy and directly contribute to economic growth. Government investment expenditure on public goods and services that have the highest potential to increase productivity will increase productivity and thus economic growth. Moreover, the impact of improvements in bureaucratic quality on economic growth depends on the relative magnitude of changes in public expenditure. If the change in bureaucratic quality is accompanied by a decrease in productivity-enhancing investment expenditure, this may have a negative impact on economic growth. The important point here is that improvement in bureaucratic quality reduces incentives for rentseeking. Strong institutions with good monitoring and accountability mechanisms can be effective in controlling rent-seeking activities. In this case, an improvement in bureaucratic quality is likely to produce positive economic growth outcomes.

In an economic system where there is no rent-seeking and where bureaucratic quality is high, the desired growth results will be achieved by directing public expenditure to investment expenditure that will increase productivity. In the presence of rent-seeking, the importance of bureaucratic quality emerges. High bureaucratic quality controlling the rent-seeking of bureaucrats in order to maximize their own interests will lead to the transfer of public expenditure to more productive channels. In the presence of a general policy and regulatory environment that will increase the efficiency of productive investment expenditure together with bureaucratic quality, the increase in public expenditure will have a direct and positive effect on economic growth.


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APA

Keklik, İ., & Barış, A. (2023). Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity. Journal of Public Finance Studies, 0(70), 61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


AMA

Keklik İ, Barış A. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity. Journal of Public Finance Studies. 2023;0(70):61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


ABNT

Keklik, İ.; Barış, A. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity. Journal of Public Finance Studies, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 70, p. 61-69, 2023.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Keklik, İbrahim, and Abdullah Barış. 2023. “Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity.” Journal of Public Finance Studies 0, no. 70: 61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


Chicago: Humanities Style

Keklik, İbrahim, and Abdullah Barış. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity.” Journal of Public Finance Studies 0, no. 70 (May. 2024): 61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


Harvard: Australian Style

Keklik, İ & Barış, A 2023, 'Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity', Journal of Public Finance Studies, vol. 0, no. 70, pp. 61-69, viewed 5 May. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Keklik, İ. and Barış, A. (2023) ‘Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity’, Journal of Public Finance Studies, 0(70), pp. 61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396 (5 May. 2024).


MLA

Keklik, İbrahim, and Abdullah Barış. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity.” Journal of Public Finance Studies, vol. 0, no. 70, 2023, pp. 61-69. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


Vancouver

Keklik İ, Barış A. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity. Journal of Public Finance Studies [Internet]. 5 May. 2024 [cited 5 May. 2024];0(70):61-69. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396 doi: 10.26650/mcd2023-1328396


ISNAD

Keklik, İbrahim - Barış, Abdullah. Evaluation of the Effects of Bureaucracy on Public Expenditure Together with Rent Seeking Activity”. Journal of Public Finance Studies 0/70 (May. 2024): 61-69. https://doi.org/10.26650/mcd2023-1328396



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Submitted17.07.2023
Accepted22.09.2023
Published Online26.09.2023

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