An Error in the Objective Conditions of Personal Grounds for Exclusion of Punishment
Erkan Sarıtaş, Hazal Algan CansevenPersonal grounds for exclusion of punishment refer to personal reasons that prevent the offender from being punished despite the presence of the elements of typicality, illegality, and culpability existing at the time the crime was committed. How to make a legal assessment in terms of an offender who has made a mistake is a very controversial issue regarding the objective conditions of these grounds. For example, will a woman who steals money from someone else’s wallet thinking that it belonged to her husband benefit from personal grounds for exclusion of punishment with regard to crimes against property (Turkish Penal Code [TPC] Art. 167)? While the objective theories put forward on this subject deny that such an error has an effect on the offender’s criminal responsibility, subjective theories accept that this error will eliminate criminal responsibility in some if not all cases. Conversely, separative theory makes categorical distinctions among the personal grounds for exclusion of punishment and has reached different results for each category. This study discusses these views and their justifications and presents an opinion on how the issue should be resolved, firstly in terms of de lege ferenda and then in terms of de lege lata .
Şahsi Cezasızlık Sebeplerinin Maddi Şartlarında Hata
Erkan Sarıtaş, Hazal Algan CansevenŞahsi cezasızlık sebepleri, istisnai olarak belli suç tipleri için öngörülen, tipiklik, hukuka aykırılık ve kusurluluk unsurları söz konusu olmasına rağmen failin cezalandırılmasını engelleyen ve suçun işlenmesi anında var olan şahsi sebepleri ifade etmekte olup bu sebeplerin maddi şartlarında hataya düşen fail açısından nasıl bir hukuki değerlendirme yapılacağı oldukça tartışmalı bir mesele olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Örneğin, eşine ait olduğunu zannederek aslında bir başkasının cüzdanından para (ç)alan kimse malvarlığına karşı suçlar için TCK m 167’de öngörülen şahsi cezasızlık sebebinden yararlanabilecek midir? Bu hususta ileri sürülen objektif teoriler söz konusu bu hatanın failin ceza sorumluluğuna etkisini tümüyle reddetmekte iken sübjektif teoriler, bu hatanın her durumda ya da en azından bazı hallerde ceza sorumluluğunu kaldıracağını kabul etmektedir. Buna karşılık ayırıcı teori şahsi cezasızlık sebepleri arasında kategorik bir ayrım yaparak her bir kategori açısından farklı sonuçlara ulaşmaktadır. Çalışmamızda bu görüşler ve gerekçeleri ele alınmakta ve evvela olması gereken hukuk, bilahare ise olan hukuk açısından meselenin nasıl çözümlenmesi gerektiğine dair görüşümüze yer verilmektedir.
Personal grounds for exclusion of punishment refer to personal reasons that prevent an offender from being punished despite the presence of the elements of typicality, illegality, and culpability existing at the time the crime was committed. How to make a legal assessment in terms of an offender who has made a mistake is a very controversial issue regarding the objective conditions of these grounds.
According to the objective theories put forward in this regard, the objective presence of personal grounds for exclusion of punishment is decisive, and the offender’s ignorance of the objective conditions of these reasons will not affect their criminal liability, because these are objective reasons that are completely beyond injustice and culpability.
On the other hand, according to strict subjective theories, a mistake made in terms of the objective conditions of personal grounds for exclusion of punishment should be accepted as also affecting the offender’s criminal responsibility. However, different theoretical and normative justifications have been put forward by various authors regarding the legal reason for this effect.
Other authors who accept that a result should be attached to the offender’s subjective situation do not reject the arguments of objective theories, nor have they made a general assessment on this subject. Instead, they support limited subjective theories and argue that a mistake made regarding the objective conditions of the personal grounds for exclusion of punishment as established for certain crimes will eliminate the offender’s criminal responsibility. However, these authors do not make categorical distinctions among the personal grounds for exclusion of punishment.
Lastly, still other authors have used separative theory to argue that distinctions should be made among the personal grounds for exclusion of punishment. Accordingly, if a personal ground for exclusion of punishment exclusively or predominantly serves the state’s policies on punishment, then the completely objective situation will be taken into account in terms how to apply these grounds, and the error is insignificant regarding the circumstances of these grounds.
Conversely, if these grounds primarily require consideration of the act’s motivation, similar to a state of necessity or decreased level of culpability of the crime, one must consider the what the offender envisaged.
Making such distinctions appears to be quite correct. However, the conclusions to be drawn from this distinction should be compatible with the letter and systematics of the law.
This study has reached the opinion that if a personal ground for exclusion of punishment exclusively or predominantly serves the state’s policies on crime and punishment, attributing a result to an error in the objective conditions is impossible, due to such a reason being unable to affect one’s culpability regarding an act. On the other hand, if the hypothetical formation of the offender’s motivation in committing an act was taken into account when the legislator established the personal grounds for exclusion of punishment, then the need exists to think differently. In such cases, the legislator accepts that the weight of the lack of judgment regarding normative social values in the face of the act has not reached a level worthy of punishment, which is reflected in law as a personal ground for exclusion of punishment regarding the crime in question.
For example, in cases falling within the scope of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) Art. 283/3, a legislator assumes that the conflict between compliance with the norm and protecting a relative from danger would shape the offender’s motivation to act. Because this assumption is based on the offender’s motivation to act, one should assumed that the mistake made regarding the objective conditions of such personal grounds for exclusion of punishment also shaped the motivation to act. Therefore, an offender who has made a mistake regarding the objective conditions of a personal ground for exclusion of punishment should also benefit from this mistake.
When looking at the TPC, an error in the objective conditions of personal grounds for exclusion of punishment is not seen to be regulated under any clear norm. When looking at the TPC systematically, this is understood to be an unconscious gap in the law. However, a legislator has regulated errors regarding the objective conditions of the reasons that remove or reduce culpability in TPC Art. 30/3. In this context, this study has the opinion that TPC Art. 30/3 should be applied by analogy in favor of the offender in terms of an error regarding the objective conditions of personal impunity in the narrow sense, which also affects culpability in terms of nature. Accordingly, an offender who makes an inevitable error regarding the objective conditions of personal grounds for exclusion of punishment should benefit from this mistake in accordance with the provision in TPC Art. 30/3.