Understanding the Sudden Rise and Fall in Turkish-Egyptian Relations after 2011
Nuri YeşilyurtThis article seeks to explain sharp oscillations that have taken place in Turkish-Egyptian relations after 2011. In this context, it argues that post-Arab uprising developments are exceptional, considering the history of bilateral relations. To explain this development, the article highlights four main factors: shifts in the regional balance of powers, economic difficulties and opportunities, ideology and identity of political elites, and domestic political concerns and calculations. The article first examines the regional, political, and economic motives behind Ankara’s foreign policy opening toward Egypt and Cairo’s positive reaction during the transition period following the 2011 revolt. Second, the article sheds light on the historical peak in Turkish-Egyptian relations following the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi in the 2012 presidential elections. More specifically, the article focuses on the ideological affinity between the Brotherhood and the Justice and Development Party and the role of Turkey in supporting Morsi’s government politically and economically. Lastly, the study investigates the harsh reaction of Turkey to the 2013 military coup against Morsi and Egypt’s responses by investigating the shifts in the regional balance of powers and the porous line between domestic politics and foreign policy in both countries at the discourse level due to the rising problems and ideological polarization in domestic politics. The research is based on scanning of news, data, and analyses of political and economic dimensions of bilateral relations, along with personal in-depth interviews with Turkish and Egyptian diplomats, politicians, bureaucrats, businesspersons, and NGO officials who have a role and/or experience in Turkish-Egyptian relations.
2011 Sonrasında Türkiye-Mısır İlişkilerinde Yaşanan Ani Yükseliş ve Sert Düşüşü Anlamak
Nuri YeşilyurtBu makale, Türkiye-Mısır ilişkilerinde 2011 sonrasında meydana gelen sert salınımları ve süregiden bunalımı açıklamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrasında yaşananların ikili ilişkiler tarihinde istisnai bir döneme işaret ettiğini savlamakta ve bunu daha iyi anlayabilmek için dört temel etmene işaret etmektedir: Bölgesel güç dengesindeki değişimler, ekonomik zorluk ve fırsatlar, siyasal seçkinlerin kimlik ve ideolojileri ve son olarak iç politik kaygı ve hesaplamalar. Makale öncelikle, Mısır’daki halk ayaklanmasıyla birlikte başlayan geçiş döneminde Ankara’nın Mısır’a yönelik dış politika açılımının ve Kahire’nin buna verdiği olumlu tepkinin arkasında yatan bölgesel, siyasi ve ekonomik sebepleri anlamaya çalışmaktadır. İkinci olarak, makalede Mısır’da 2012’de Müslüman Kardeşlerin adayı Muhammed Mursi’nin iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte ikili ilişkilerin ulaştığı tarihî zirve noktası ele alınmaktadır. Bu yapılırken, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ile Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki ideolojik uyuma ve Türkiye’nin Mısır’daki Mursi iktidarını ekonomik ve siyasi anlamda desteklemekte oynadığı role özellikle vurgu yapılmaktadır. Makalede son olarak, Mursi’yi iktidardan uzaklaştıran 2013 darbesine Türkiye’nin verdiği sert tepki ve Mısır’ın süreç içerisinde bu tepkiye verdiği yanıtlar incelenmektedir. Bu kapsamda, bir yandan bölgesel güç dengelerindeki değişimler, diğer yandan her iki ülkede de iç politika kaynaklı sorunlar ve ideolojik kutuplaşma çerçevesinde iç politika-dış politika geçirgenliğinin söylemsel anlamda arttığı gerçeği göz önünde bulundurulmaktadır. Araştırma, 2011 sonrası ikili ilişkilerin siyasi ve ekonomik boyutlarına dair haber, veri ve analizlerin taranmasına ek olarak, Türkiye-Mısır ilişkilerinde rol ve/veya tecrübe sahibi Türkiyeli ve Mısırlı diplomat, siyasetçi, bürokrat, iş insanı ve sivil toplum görevlileriyle yapılan derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanmaktadır.
Turkish-Egyptian relations entered a new era following the 2011 revolt in Egypt. In deep contrast to the distant and cautious nature of bilateral relations until that point, an exceptional period of rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo had unfolded, particularly after the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi in the 2012 presidential elections in Egypt. However, when Morsi was ousted by a military coup led by Defence Minister Abdelfattah el Sisi in 2013, Turkish-Egyptian relations deteriorated at an unprecedented level, mainly due to Ankara’s harsh reactions to the developments in Egypt. This article analyses the above mentioned sudden rise and fall in Turkish-Egyptian relations since 2011 by focusing on four factors: shifts in the regional balance of powers, economic difficulties and opportunities, ideology and identity of political elites, and domestic political concerns and calculations. The article is divided into four sections. The first section sets out the historical background of Turkish-Egyptian relations since the 1920s and explains the article’s analytical framework by focusing on the four above mentioned factors in detail.
The second section aims to understand Turkey’s foreign policy opening toward Egypt following the 2011 revolt, along with Egypt’s positive reaction to this opening. The main motivation behind the policy of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government was to provide political and economic guidance to Egypt during the transition period, which would increase Turkey’s influence both in Egypt and the Middle East at large. Egypt’s positive reaction to Turkey was mainly related to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces’ unwillingness to alienate the Egyptian public, which held an exceptionally positive image of Turkey, and its need for economic support for the ailing economy.
The third section investigates the historic rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo during Morsi’s presidency between 2012 and 2013. During this period, Ankara and Cairo continued deepening their political and economic relations, while simultaneously exhibiting unprecedented harmony and cooperation in regional politics. The ideological affinity between AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood partly explains this rapprochement because the Brotherhood had generally been wary of supporting the Turkish/AKP model and/or Turkish influence in Egypt. Moreover, as Morsi struggled against social, military, and bureaucratic opposition to its short-lived rule in Egypt, Turkey was a useful ally. More precisely, the Morsi government’s rapprochement with Turkey was an act of balancing internal opposition with external support, which was the main factor for the historical rise in bilateral relations.
The third section sheds light on the deteriorating relations following the Egyptian military coup in 2013, primarily because of Ankara’s vocal and fierce criticism. Ankara’s reactions were mainly related to the loss of a useful ally in regional politics. Besides, due to their political experience, AKP officials feared the possibility of a similar coup in Turkey. However, a closer examination of Turkish domestic politics during this time reveals that the Turkish government’s harsh reaction to the Egyptian coup was also related to its discursive strategy to deal with rising opposition and ideological polarization after the Gezi Protests of 2013. To consolidate its domestic power base and legitimacy, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan identified himself with Morsi/the Muslim Brotherhood, while associating his domestic opponents with coup plotters in Egypt. This process made the line between domestic politics and foreign policy highly porous. Similarly, a growing ideological polarization between pro-Brotherhood and anti-Brotherhood forces in Egyptian politics has occurred, particularly since 2013. As Turkey openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood after the coup, the new Egyptian regime tried to consolidate its legitimacy by depicting Ankara as a foreign enemy and the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign-backed terrorist organization. Thus, the effective use of the diplomatic crisis by both countries for domestic ends is the main factor behind its extension. Therefore, any policy-recommendation that aims to normalize Turkish-Egyptian relations in the near future should consider this fact.
