Democracy and Representation: Interpreting the Paradox Through Rousseau
Metin ÖzkanThis study aims to examine the problem of “creating” citizen envisagement within a democracy. Its reference point for this is based on the ruler-governed construct within the framework of the occurrence of modern State phenomena in the utmost rulership form as considered through the theoretical perspective of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The fact that the people who are the sovereign force with regards to the policies they are engaged in are not in a position of decision-making, which is a benchmark of constitutionalism in representative democracy and thus brings about the controversy as to whether or not these representative regimes are legitimately democratic. After the English, American and French Revolutions, the paradoxical co-occurrence of representation and democracy, which can be seen when they are considered simultaneously, can be seen to resemble the Roman God Janus with its cynically retro- and forwardlooking faces. It is possible to analyze the paradoxical co-occurrence of representation and democracy with reference to the notion of a “Modern Janus” because the ground of legitimacy in the conception of representative democracy is not only based on an abstract fiction of national unity for the presently existing public, but also because this base is constructed through the practice of representation. When the fiction of representative democracy in the relationship between the ruler and ruled is traced theoretically, it becomes apparent how and under which conditions the occurrence of the paradox to be analyzed in the context of the notions of democracy and representation emerges. The paradoxical association of representation and democracy will be analyzed in reference to Rousseau’s Social Contract through the suggestion that such representative democracy is a Modern Janus, which on the one hand regards individuals as a subject while also objectifying them on the other hand.
Demokrasi ve Temsil: Paradoksu Rousseau Üzerinden Okumak
Metin ÖzkanBu çalışmanın amacı, modern devlet olgusunun belirmesi ekseninde yöneten-yönetilen kurgusunun dayandığı demokrasi anlayışındaki yurttaş tahayyülünün, en üst iktidar formunda “var edilmesi” sorununu Jean-Jacques Rousseau’nun teorik çizgisinde incelemeye tabi tutmaktır. İngiliz, Amerikan ve Fransız devrimleriyle görünür olan temsili demokrasilerde meşruiyet kıstası olarak egemenliğin sahibi halkın kendisini ilgilendiren siyasal süreçlerde karar verici pozisyonda olmayışı, temsili rejimlerin gerçekte “demokratik” olup olmadığına yönelik tartışmaları da beraberinde getirir. Demokratik devrimlerin ardından temsil ile demokrasinin eşanlı/eşzamanlı düşünülmesi ekseninde görünür olan paradoksal birliktelik, döngüsel olarak bir yüzüyle geçmişe diğer yüzüyle geleceğe bakan Roma tanrısı Janus’a benzetilebilir. Temsili demokrasi anlayışında meşruiyet zemininin, mevcuttaki halk adına soyut bir kurgu olan ulusal “bir”liğe dayanması ve bu dayanak noktasını temsil pratiği aracılığıyla inşa etmesi demokrasi ve temsil paradoksal birlikteliğini, “Modern Janus” kavramından hareketle analiz etmeyi mümkün hale getirir. Temsili demokrasinin yöneten-yönetilen ilişkisindeki kurgusu teorik düzlemde takip edildiğinde ise demokrasi ile temsil kavramları bağlamında analiz edilebilecek paradoksun nasıl ve hangi şartlarda ortaya çıktığını belirgin hale getirecektir. Bu haliyle temsili demokrasinin bir yüzüyle bireyi özneleştiren diğer yüzüyle de nesneleştiren “Modern Janus” olduğu iddiasıyla çalışmada, Rousseau’nun Toplum Sözleşmesi ekseninde, temsil ve demokrasi olgularının paradoksal birlikteliği analiz edilecektir.
Simultaneous thinking of democracy and representation makes their paradoxical union apparent. This paradox can be better understood when the different (and even contradictory) historical origins of these two concepts are considered. The concept of democracy has its origins in Ancient Greece. The original Athenian democracy, which did not include a representative relationship and had a direct and participatory structure, simply meant the administration of people of similar status and small settlements. Ancient Greek democracy, which had an extremely limited content in terms of modern concepts, excluded representation on both the conceptual and practical levels. The history of representation as a concept and practice with its political content begins in the Late Middle Ages. During this period, there is no relationship between the idea of democracy and representation. In this process, monarchies used their representation practices via hierarchical governance as a basis for legitimacy while making decisions on important issues concerning royal interests and administrative control. The process that shapes the union between representation and democracy becomes evident in the historical background of the British, American, and French revolutions. In this framework, the first and second parts of the study will analyze the representative nature of the idea of democracy, which has been (re-)visible since the 17th century.
After the democratic revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, modern democracies have become fundamentally representative democracies, regardless of how they are defined in terms of governmental form vis-à-vis the modern-nation State. Therefore, it would not be wrong to think of democracy simultaneously alongside representation or in direct relation to representative government. Indeed, it seems axiomatic that under modern theoretical and practical conditions only representation can make democracy possible. Therefore, it is important to analyze the role played by representation in terms of its union with democracy.
The evolution of democratic thought into popular/national sovereignty (as manifested within the French Revolution) means a limited conception of democracy in terms of the use of sovereignty. Representation, however, offers legitimacy to this limitation. In modernrepresentative democracies, the fact that the people who have sovereignty are not the decision-makers in political processes brings with it debates about whether representative regimes are truly “democratic.” In the forms of government, the representatives are in the position of deputy who “generate” the current demands of the represented in politics. Ultimately, if democracy is “the rule of the people, by the people, for the people,” the people must both determine and implement the laws. However, in representative regimes both functions are ultimately fulfilled by a minority (representatives), even if they come from within the “people” based on a political principle (election). This situation, presented by the democratic doctrine, brings together the identity and representation principles of the rulers and the ruled, causing a paradoxical union to emerge.
The paradoxical union of democracy and representation as expressed above can be compared to the Roman God Janus, who looks at the past with one side and the future with the other. The fact that legitimacy, a key tenet of modern-representative democracies, is based on national unity, which is itself an abstract construct on behalf of the people, makes it possible to analyze the paradoxical union of democracy and representation from the concept of a “Modern Janus.” Following the aforementioned democratic revolutions, an understanding of “democracy,” which subjects the individual to the principles of equality and freedom, is the first face of a Modern Janus. The fact that the will of the majority becomes the basis of legitimacy in relation to the understanding of representation becomes the second face of a Modern Janus, one that objectifies the individual.
The aim of this study is to examine the modern ruling-ruled construct that can be analyzed within the framework of the subject-object dichotomy in the theoretical line of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Genevan thinker has continued to be debated to this day with reference to his theories that many (for example, Bertrand Russell) have regarded as a threat to representative democracy. The prediction that certain forms of representative government will inevitably exclude the public from the public sphere and thereby create a new type of oligarchy seems to justify Rousseau. This is because the independence of the representative from the represented except for a political principle reveals the subjectobject dichotomy. Within this context, while seeking answers to questions, such as what is the reason for the existence of the State and how is people’s obedience/consent to political power based upon it, it is not coincidental that the idea of “democracy without representation” that Rousseau considered remains relevant.
Rousseau’s views on citizenship, legitimacy, the General Will, democracy, and representation in The Social Contract provide an important theoretical ground for current debates, particularly those focusing upon the crisis of representation and legitimacy in the theory of democracy. As a result, this study will discuss the paradoxical union between the first face (the sovereignty of the people) and the second face (the representation of the people) of a Modern Janus, based on Rousseau’s political doctrine, and how this opens up a debate regarding the possibility of “democracy without representation.”
