The Paradox of "Civil Servant Unionism" in Turkey: Strong Unionism or Dependant Unionism?
Banu Uçkan HekimlerUnions are one of the most important actors in labor relations, and union rights are a fundamental human right. These have been discussed in both industrial relations and labor law from the perspective of workers in particular, while mostly neglecting civil servants. However, when compared to the union density rate of workers (14.26% as of July 2022), the union density rate of civil servants is conspicuously higher (72.63% as of July 2022). However, to assess that an effective and strong civil servant unionism exists in Türkiye based solely on this high union density rate would be misleading. Ironically, implementations contrary to individual and collective union freedoms exist behind this high union density rate for civil servants. This contrariety between the union density rate and union freedom forms the basis of this paper. The study first discusses the development of civil servant unionism in Türkiye chronologically and then examines individual and collective union freedoms from the perspective of civil servants. Although de jure union security provisions do exist, the individual and collective union freedoms have sometimes been explicitly violated de facto and sometimes legal provisions per se have bypassed union security.
Türkiye’de Kamu Görevlileri Sendikacılığı Paradoksu: Güçlü Sendikacılık mı, Bağımlı Sendikacılık mı?
Banu Uçkan HekimlerÇalışma ilişkilerinin en önemli aktörlerinden birisi olan sendikalar ve temel insan hakları arasında yer alan sendikal haklar, Türkiye’de gerek endüstri ilişkileri gerekse iş hukuku alanında ağırlıklı olarak işçiler açısından ele alınmakta, kamu görevlileri genellikle göz ardı edilmektedir. HalbukiTürkiye’de işçilerin sendikalaşma oranı (Temmuz 2022 itibarıyla %14,26) ile karşılaştırıldığında kamu görevlilerinin sendikalaşma oranı dikkat çekici derecede yüksektir (Temmuz 2022 itibarıyla %72,63). Ancak yalnızca bu yüksek sendikalaşma oranına bakarak Türkiye’de etkili ve güçlü bir kamu görevlileri sendikacılığı olduğunu söylemek yanıltıcı olacaktır. Kamu görevlilerinin sendikalaşma oranlarının bu denli yüksek olmasının arkasında, ironik bir şekilde, bireysel ve kolektif sendika özgürlüğüne aykırı uygulamalar yer almaktadır. Kamu görevlileri açısından sendikalaşma oranı ile sendika özgürlüğü arasındaki bu tezatlık, makalenin çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Makalede öncelikle Türkiye’de kamu görevlileri sendikacılığının tarihsel gelişimi dönemler itibarıyla ve genel hatları ile ele alınmakta, sonrasında bireysel ve kolektif sendika özgürlüğü kamu görevlileri açısından değerlendirilmektedir. Uygulamada, yasal anlamda sağlanan güvencelere rağmen, bireysel ve kolektif sendika özgürlüğü kimi zaman açıkça ihlal edilmekte, kimi zaman da bizatihi yasal düzenlemeler yoluyla arkasından dolaşılan bu güvenceler by-pass edilmektedir.
While union rights have been generally considered from the workers’ perspective in Türkiye, the union rights of civil servants have been significantly neglected. The relatively low proportion of civil servants in the total employment and late unionization of civil servants in comparison with workers could be accepted as among the most important reasons for this negligence. While only 14.28% of paid and salaried employees are civil servants, 72.63% of them had unionized as of July 2022. While workers avoid unions or are forced not to become union members due to various socioeconomic reasons, particularly due to insufficient job security in Türkiye, such a high union density rate for civil servants requires a close examination regarding civil servants’ union rights.
Both the historical evolution and the context of civil servants’ union rights differ from that of workers. While the first legal framework on union rights for workers was drawn up in 1947, civil servants didn’t gain union rights de jure until 1965. Workers accessed the constitutional right to strike in 1961, while civil servants have only gained the right to organize and collectively
bargain so far. Furthermore, legal regulations have paved the way for union rights for workers; however, civil servants in particular have had de facto union rights since the 1990s. These days, some civil servant unions have close ties with political parties, but this relationship has injured both the individual and collective union freedoms of civil servants in Türkiye. The violation of civil servants’ union freedoms is strikingly in contrast with the high union density rate of civil servants, and this contrast is the main starting point of the paper.
Both the Constitution (Art.51/I) and the Civil Servant Unions and Collective Agreement Act No. 4688 (Art. 14/I; Art. 16/I) have provisions on individuals’ union freedoms, but most civil servants are unable to choose a union freely and have been forced to become members of a so-called eligible union that has hot connections with the governing political party. However, civil servants prefer to be members of a union that prioritizes their assignments and designations. The legitimacy of civil servant unions largely depends on their position and distance toward politics. The civil servant union Memur-Sen is a clear example that shows how unions in particular gain power in terms of their relationship with the ruling political party. Memur-Sen increased its membership 2500% since 2002, which is when the first statistics on civil servant unions were published. While Memur-Sen had 41,871 members in 2002, Türkiye Kamu-Sen had 329,065 members and KESK had 262,348. These membership numbers have grown respectively to 1,054,642, 526,684, and 150,338 as of 2022. Therefore, an asymmetric union membership growth has occurred among civil servants’ unions over the past 20 years. Until 20 years ago, Memur-Sen had been a very minor confederation and has since increased its membership exorbitantly by providing incentives and resources to the union through the government. Consequently, Memur-Sen has played a significant role in increasing the civil servant union density rate thanks to its symbiotic relationship with the ruling party. These days, more than half of all unionized civil servants are members of Memur-Sen.
Another important motivation for the high union density rate of civil servants is the collective agreement premium that has paved the way for a unionism that is supported financially by the state. In other words, the state finances the union membership fees of civil servants. Thus, union membership does not engender any costs for civil servants. As self-help organizations, unions should be independent from the state and employers; however, the collective agreement premium violates collective union freedoms and creates a symbiotic relationship between civil servant unions and the state. In addition, the state strikingly did not force unions to establish this relationship; Memur-Sen and Türkiye Kamu-Sen have consented and furthermore
demand this relationship, while KESK strongly resists it.
Having a centrist collective bargaining system whose representational structure is based on the majority instead of on a pluralism within the Civil Servant Unions Commission and giving the President a decisive role in the Civil Servants Arbitration Commission as a mandatory arbitration board resolves the collective disputes and strengthened the state’s direction of civil servant unionism. Therefore, the state has become a dominant actor that controls civil servant unions and determines all the procedures regarding collective bargaining and collective dispute resolution. This tendency has increased authoritarian corporatism and solidified pro-government union confederations.
