Legal Status of Animals with Regards to the Distinction between Persons and Things
Our need for using and controlling animals has traditionally led to the classification of animals as things, namely as objects, and not subjects of rights. Nevertheless, consequently to the development of scientific data as to animal sentience, our relationship with animals has evolved in parallel to our awareness regarding their peculiarities as living beings, and legal norms have begun to reflect this evolution. Rules that target protection of animals for the sake of their own interests and expose them to a different regime than other things have gradually expanded and animals have been dragged to a sui generis legal status. Comprehension of the legal effect of such rules and determination of the direction in which the animal law should proceed requires re-evaluation of the legal status of animals with regards to the distinction between persons and things, one of the summa divisio of our private law system. Exposure of the legal landscape regarding animals in modern law systems and quest of the most appropriate solution will lead to the interrogation upon the traditional relationship between the concepts of subject and object of rights, which may have importance also with respect to other living beings, embryos, corpses or artificial intelligence.
Kişi ve Eşya Ayrımı Bağlamında Hayvanların Hukuki Statüsü
Hayvanları kullanma ve kontrol etme yönündeki ihtiyaçlarımız, onların öteden beri eşya olarak, başka bir deyişle hakların öznesi değil, konusu olarak sınıflandırılmalarına sebep olmuştur. Bununla beraber, hayvanların hissetme yetisine ilişkin bilimsel verilerin gelişmesi ile, hayvanlarla ilişkilerimiz onların da birer canlı varlık olmaları bilincine paralel olarak evrilmiş, hukuk kuralları da bu evrimi yansıtır hale gelmiştir. Hayvanları kendi menfaatleri için koruma amacını güden ve onları diğer eşyalardan farklı bir hukuki rejime tabi tutan normlar, hukuk sistemlerinde gittikçe daha fazla yaygınlık kazanmakta, hayvanlar, kendine özgü bir hukuki statüye doğru itelenmektedir. Gerek yapılmış olan düzenlemelerin hukuki etkisinin anlaşılması, gerekse hayvan hakları hukukunun ne yönde evrilmesi gerektiği sorusunun cevaplandırılması, hayvanların hukuki statüsünün, özel hukuk sistemimizin temel ayrımlarından biri olan kişi ve eşya ayrımı çerçevesinde yeniden değerlendirilmesini zorunlu kılmaktadır. Hayvanların statüsü açısından çağdaş sistemlerde oluşan hukuki tablonun ortaya konulması ve en yerinde olan çözümün arayışı, bizi, diğer canlı varlıklar, embriyo, kadavra, yapay zeka gibi sorunsallar açısından da önem taşıyan, hak öznesi ile hak nesnesi arasındaki geleneksel ilişkiyi de sorgulamaya götürecektir.
Our need for using and controlling animals has traditionally led to the classification of animals as things, namely as objects, and not subjects of rights. Nevertheless, consequently to the development of scientific data as to animal sentience and animal cognition, the anthropocentric approach that considers the human being as the center of the universe has begun to fade away. Our relationship with animals has evolved in parallel to our awareness of their quality of living beings, and law has begun to reflect this evolution through creation of rules, which designate animals as the aim of the legal protection, and not merely as instruments at the service of human beings. Comprehension of the legal effect of such rules and determination of the direction in which the animal law should proceed requires re-evaluation of the legal status of animals with regards to the distinction between persons and things, one of the summa divisio of our private law system The concessions that human beings are willing to make for the benefit of animal welfare are determined differently depending on the needs and values of each society, leading to a high level of diversity in legal steps taken by different countries. Studying Swiss, German and French laws which share similar principles with our private law system and which have taken concrete steps for improvement of legal status of animals, one can observe that some of the rules relating to animal protection aim primarily to protect the animal owners’ interests and as such, do not depart from the tradition which classify animals as objects of rights. Nevertheless, some other rules aim to protect animals for their own interests, and impose restrictions to human behavior exclusively to this effect. In this regard, besides detailed regulations issued under the form of animal protection laws, as is the case in our legal system, amendments of more fundamental nature in different areas of civil law are noteworthy. In particular, exclusion of animals from the category of things in civil codes and the development of “animal dignity” concept reflect a paradigm shift based on the prioritization of animals’ inherent value. Norms aiming at their protection for their own interests and exposing them to a specific legal regime drive animals towards to a sui generis legal status. In some countries, the aim of protection of animals for their own sake has also become a constitutional principle and consequently, legislative, executive and judicial organs have been entrusted with the duty of ensuring the continuity of this evolution. In the presence of such legal limits to human behavior for the protection of animals’ interests, it seems difficult to continue to classify animals as mere things. Once this point accepted, one can observe three groups of propositions of solution. Some scholars defend the classical understanding of the distinction between persons and things and the classification of animals under the second category, but consider animals as a special category of things. Others who underline insufficiencies of the distinction between persons and things argue that animals are neither things nor persons, and thus constitute an intermediate category between persons and things. Finally, scholars who attach personhood to the fact of having legally protected interest argue that the conditions for animals to be accepted as persons or as quasi-persons are satisfied. Accordingly, animals must enjoy a “technical” legal personhood, adapted to their needs, and an efficient tutorship mechanism, enabling them to use the rights attached to such personhood. It has been argued that it would be contradictory to accept animals as something other than things, as long as they remain objects of property right. However, pretending that beings protected by the legal system directly for their own interests do not enjoy any rights also leads to a contradiction. Accepting that a being has its own interest worthy of protection amounts to the recognition of this being as an objective in itself as long as such interests are at stake, rather than as a tool for satisfaction of others’ interest, which is the fate of things. Legal repercussions of our relationship with animals lead to the recognition of animals partially as objects and partially as subjects of rights and demonstrate that the relationship between the categories of persons and things, accepted to be mutually exclusionary, has become questionable in face of some modern classification problems. Interrogations upon the intransigent character of such distinction and to what extent intermediary layers can be acceptable bear importance not only for the status of animals, but also for the proper legal integration of some other beings which have gained new meanings in modern societies, such as plants, other components of environment, human corpse or artificial intelligence.
