Discussions on Authority and Procedure in Withdrawal from International Treaties from the Perspective of International Law
Lider BalExamples and threats of withdrawing from international treaties have occupied the agenda of public opinion more than ever in recent years. South Africa’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court, the USA’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Agreement and withdrawal threat from the Paris Agreement, the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and Venezuela’s withdrawal from the American Convention on Human Rights are the first examples that come to mind. These unusual examples of treaty withdrawal involve states governed by authoritarian regimes, as well as treaties that concern individual civil rights and freedoms. Both cases have debated the appropriateness of withdrawal decisions and the compatibility of the methods used to make these decisions using values such as democracy and the protection of human rights. Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention by presidential decree and the claim that the country can withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights through the same method have caused legal debates and criticisms. Given the significance of the Istanbul Convention, particularly in terms of human rights law, and the international obligations arising from Türkiye’s membership in the Council of Europe, these issues also need to be evaluated from the perspective of international law. In light of Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, this study aims to examine the issues of authority and procedure regarding withdrawal from international treaties from the perspective of international law. For this purpose, examining the executive-centered approach of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would be appropriate first, followed by the new phenomenon based on the principles of separation of powers and democracy, which leads to questioning this approach at the international level, particularly in the context of human rights treaties.
Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Uluslararası Antlaşmalardan Çekilme Yetkisine ve Usulüne İlişkin Tartışmalar
Lider BalUluslararası antlaşmalardan çekilme örnekleri ya da tehditleri, son yıllarda hiç olmadığı kadar kamuoyunun gündemini meşgul etmektedir. Güney Afrika’nın Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi’nden çekilmesi; ABD’nin, Başkan D. Trump döneminde İran Nükleer Anlaşması’ndan çekilmesi ve Trump’ın Paris Anlaşması’ndan çekilme tehditleri; Birleşik Krallık’ın Avrupa Birliği’nden ayrılmak amacıyla kurucu antlaşmadan çekilmesi; Venezuela’nın İnsan Hakları Amerikan Sözleşmesi’nden çekilmesi ilk akla gelebilecek örneklerdir. Uluslararası antlaşmaların sona erdirilmesi bakımından sık karşılaşılabilir olmayan bu örneklerde otoriter yönetimlerin hakim olduğu devletlerin dahli ve/veya kişi haklarını ve özgürlüklerini ilgilendiren antlaşmalar söz konusudur. Her iki ihtimalde de çekilme kararlarının yerindeliği ve bu kararların alınma yöntemleri demokrasi ve insan haklarının korunması gibi değerlere uygunluğu bakımından tartışılmaktadır. Türkiye’nin İstanbul Sözleşmesi’nden Cumhurbaşkanı Kararı ile çekilmesi ve aynı yöntemle İnsan Hakları Avrupa Sözleşmesi’nden de çekilmenin mümkün olduğunun dillendirilmesi, diğer boyutlarının yanında, hukuki açıdan tartışmalara ve eleştirilere neden olmuştur. Daha çok anayasa hukukçularının dahil olduğu çekilme kararının alınmasında yetki ve usul tartışmaları, İstanbul Sözleşmesi’nden çekilmenin antlaşmalar hukuku bağlamında diğer taraf Devletler bakımından ve bölgesel örgütler çerçevesindeki etkileri nedeniyle uluslararası hukukçular açısından da ilgi çekicidir. Özellikle, Türkiye’nin üyesi olduğu Avrupa Konseyi’nin insan haklarının korunmasına dair temel belgeleri arasında sayılan İstanbul Sözleşmesi’nden çekilmesi, bu Örgüt’ün üye devletler bakımından bir yükümlülüğe dönüştürdüğü demokrasi ve insan haklarının korunması açısından değerlendirilmeye muhtaçtır. Türkiye’nin İstanbul Sözleşmesi’nden çekilmesi örneğinden hareketle uluslararası antlaşmalardan çekilme yetkisine ve usulüne ilişkin tartışmalara uluslararası hukuk açısından bakmayı amaçlayan bu çalışma, uluslararası hukukun yürütme merkezli yaklaşımını ve bu yaklaşımın sorgulanmasına neden olan değişimleri, özellikle insan haklarının korunmasına dair antlaşmalar bağlamında incelemektedir.
Türkiye’s withdrawal by presidential decree from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, commonly known as the Istanbul Convention, has been widely debated at the national level. These debates have focused particularly on what legal procedures and competent authority are needed to withdraw from international treaties and the legal consequences for the national legal order of a potential unlawful withdrawal. When considering that every denunciatory act has legal effects on the other parties to a treaty, sometimes within the framework of international organizations and judicial mechanisms, and even on individuals in the international arena, discussions regarding Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention inevitably fall within the scope of international law.
In light of Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, this study aims to examine the issues of authority and procedure regarding international treaty withdrawal from the perspective of international law. Firstly, a crucial question arises as to who has the competency to declare a withdrawal as the will of a State. In principle, the issue of which persons and/or bodies have the competency to withdraw from international treaties is a matter that international law leaves to the national preference of each state. For pragmatic reasons and in order to create legal predictability, however, international law has adopted a presumption of representation in favor of certain persons. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), heads of state, heads of government, and ministers for foreign affairs are accepted as representing their state for the purpose of performing all acts in relation to a treaty. This presumption of representation in favor of these persons who exercise executive power in the national arena has resulted in the executive-centered approach of international law in state representation.
This executive-centered approach in international law has not found the same favorable reception in the national sphere due to the principles of separation of powers and democracy. The idea that the executive branch is the only authority that can declare the will of the state at the international level has been criticized within the national arena, especially with the progressive confirmation of the role of the legislative branch regarding the conclusion and denunciation of treaties. These developments at the national level can be described as the democratization of treaty-making power and also have effects on the international legal order, at least within the framework of international organizations and state practices at the regional level.
In this regard, the Council of Europe, of which Türkiye is a member, and the Istanbul Convention, which constitutes a core human rights instruments, are important examples. Democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are considered the core values of the Council of Europe. Protecting and promoting them are the main purpose of the Council and all its instruments and doing so requires respect for the principles of separation of powers and democracy. Therefore, these principles are no longer solely a concern of national law, as they have transformed into international obligations for the Member States of the Council of Europe.
These obligations of member states undoubtedly have legal consequences in terms of which legal procedures exist and who has the competent authority to withdraw from an international treaty. The most evident example of this can be seen within the framework of human rights treaties. These treaties contain provisions on the fundamental rights and freedoms that are regulated and protected usually at the constitutional level and are considered legislative in nature.
Therefore, just as the approval of the legislature is required when concluding such treaties, in the case of withdrawal, the legislature should assume a similar role. This practice is known as the symmetrical model and has been legally adopted in the majority of the Council of Europe’s Member States. From this clear trend toward parliamentary involvement in withdrawal decisions, one should interpret the symmetrical model as a normal practice, a violation of which could be qualified as manifest for all States acting in good faith as per Article 46 of the VCLT.
Moreover, human rights treaties are considered a distinct category of international treaties and create particular legal consequences that also affect the possibility and process of a Member State’s withdrawal. The specificity given to withdrawing from such treaties is much more visible in regional legal systems, such as the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe, which transformed the principle of democracy into an organizational obligation and created effective legal mechanisms for the protection of human rights.
In conclusion, Türkiye’s withdrawal by presidential decree from the Istanbul Convention appears legally incontestable from the point of view of classical international law of treaty, which prioritizes the presumption of representation. However, a trend is found opposite this classical view. Indeed, with the approach regional organizations have taken, particularly concerning human rights treaties, prioritizing the presumption of representation might change in a way where the principles of democracy and the rule of law should also be taken into account. Therefore, the legal effects of Türkiye’s withdrawal should be evaluated by taking into account its organizational obligations arising from the Council of Europe’s membership and regional states’ practices on how to conclude and denounce such treaties.
