Research Article


DOI :10.26650/SP2022-1110045   IUP :10.26650/SP2022-1110045    Full Text (PDF)

The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions

Melike YaşarSerap Akgün

Moral foundations theory posits six moral foundations that guide moral judgment, namely, care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty. The theory states that the violation of fairness promotes anger, while doing so for sanctity elicits feelings of disgust. Meanwhile, violation of care is associated with anger toward the perpetrator and compassion for the victim. Only a few empirical studies test the propositions of the theory on the relationship between the violation of moral foundation and emotions, which were conducted in western culture. The current study investigates the relationships between moral transgressions and emotions in a nonwestern culture. It also examined feelings toward perpetrators and victims in the face of moral violation. In the pilot study conducted to determine the relevant scenarios to be used in the research, 187 participants evaluated whether or not the behaviors described in 52 scenarios were morally wrong and to report their feelings in these situations. The main study analyzed the participants’ moral judgment, feelings toward moral violations, emotional reaction toward victims and perpetrators, and decisions on the punishment of perpetrators using the 12 moral violation scenarios identified in the pilot study. Toward this end, data were collected from 72 participants. To test whether the emotion experienced during the violation of one moral foundation is higher than that experienced in the violation of another, the study conducted a 2(gender) × 6(moral foundations) factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) of moral foundations that involved repeated measures. The result indicated that violations of the foundations of justice and care were morally viewed as more wrong than those of other foundations. However, the findings pointed out that emotions guide moral judgment, and feelings toward victims and perpetrators differ accorrding to the violated moral foundations.

DOI :10.26650/SP2022-1110045   IUP :10.26650/SP2022-1110045    Full Text (PDF)

Duyguların Ahlaki Temeller ile İlişkisi

Melike YaşarSerap Akgün

Ahlaki Temeller Kuramı bireylerin ahlaki bir olay hakkındaki yargılarını belirleyen altı ahlaki temel bulunduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bunlar; adalet, bakım verme, özgürlük, gruba sadakat, otoritelere itaat ve kutsallık (saflık) temelleridir. Adalet temelinin ihlali durumunda öfke, kutsallık temelinin ihlalinde iğrenme hissedileceği belirtilmektedir. Bakım temelinin ihlali faile öfke mağdura ise merhamet duyma ile ilişkilendirilmektedir. Kuramın ahlaki temel ihlallerinin duygular ile ilişkisi konusundaki önermeleri yalnızca Batı kültüründe yapılmış birkaç görgül çalışma ile test edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada batılı olmayan bir kültürde ahlaki temellerin ihlalinde, bireylerin hangi duyguları daha çok yaşayacakları sorusuna yanıt aranmıştır. Ayrıca ahlaki yargı ve duygular arasındaki ilişkilere odaklanan diğer çalışmalardan farklı olarak katılımcıların, ahlaki bir ihlal karşısında hissettikleri duyguların yanı sıra mağdura ve faile yönelik duyguları da incelenmiştir. Araştırmada kullanılan ahlaki ihlal senaryolarının belirlenmesi için yapılan ön çalışmada 187 katılımcıdan 52 senaryoda betimlenen davranışların ahlaki olarak yanlış olup olmadığını değerlendirmeleri ve bu durumda yaşayacakları duyguların neler olacağını yazmaları istenmiştir. Ana çalışmada ise ön çalışmada belirlenen 12 ahlaki temel senaryosu kullanılarak katılımcıların, ahlaki yargıları, ahlaki ihlal durumundaki duyguları, mağdura ve ihlali gerçekleştiren kişi ya da gruba karşı duygusal tepkileri ve ahlaki temeli ihlal eden kişinin cezalandırılmasına ilişkin görüşleri değerlendirilmiştir. Bu amaçla toplam 72 katılımcıdan veri toplanmıştır. Bir ahlaki temelin ihlali karşısında yaşanan duygunun bir diğerinin ihlalinde deneyimlenenden daha yüksek olup olmadığını test edebilmek için verilere 2 (cinsiyet) X 6 (ahlaki temel) faktörlü son faktörde tekrar ölçümlü çok değişkenli varyans analizleri (MANOVA) uygulanmıştır. Analiz sonuçları, adalet ve bakım temelleri ihlallerinin diğer temellerin ihlaline kıyasla ahlaki açıdan daha yanlış olarak değerlendirildiğini göstermiştir. Bununla birlikte bulgular, duyguların ahlaki yargılara rehberlik ettiğine ve ihlal edilen ahlaki temele, mağdura ve faile karşı hissedilen duyguların farklılaştığına işaret etmektedir.


EXTENDED ABSTRACT


In recent years, interdisciplinary and intercultural studies on moral psychology have been increasing, and various approaches have emerged. One of such approaches is moral foundations theory (MFT), which constitutes the theoretical basis of this study. According to MFT, six moral foundations (i.e., care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty) determine the decisions of an individual in the face of an incident (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007). MFT specifies that if the care foundation is violated, then individuals tend to feel anger toward the perpetrator but compassion or mercy toward the victim; if the fairness foundation is violated, then anger is directed toward the perpetrator; lastly, if the sanctity foundation is violated, individuals tend to feel disgust (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007). However, only a few empirical studies have tested the propositions of the theory regarding the relationship between the violation of moral foundations and emotions and mostly in western culture (e.g., Landman and Hess, 2018). To address this reserach gap, the current study aimed to test the relationships between moral transgressions and emotions, as outlined in MFT, in a nonwestern culture. Furthermore, the literature has observed that emotions related to moral transgressions are viewed as a single dimension (e.g., Kollareth and Russel, 2017; Molho et al., 2017). However, in many instances of moral violations, emotions not only about the situation but also toward the victim and perpetrator are experienced (DeScioli and Kurzban, 2009). Therefore, this study examines emotions directed toward the victim and perpetrator in the face of moral transgressions.

Methods

To determine scenarios of moral violations, a pilot study was conducted on 187 undergraduate students. The participants were presented with 52 scenarios and instructed to rate whether or not the behaviors depicted in the scenarios were morally wrong and to report the emotions they experienced in these situations.

The main study was conducted with the participation of 72 undergraduate students. The participants were presented with 12 scenarios of moral violation, which were identified in the pilot study. After reading, the participants evaluated the scenarios using a five-point Likert- type scale in terms of whether or not the behavior of the transgressor was morally wrong. Subsequently, they rated the intensity of various emotions (e.g., anger, sadness, disgust, shame, fear, compassion, contempt, guilt, astonishment, and feeling good or bad) experienced in response to these scenarios. In addition, the participants rated their feelings toward perpetrators (e.g., anger, sadness, disgust, fear, shame, compassion, contempt, pity, and admiration) and victims (e.g., anger, sadness, shame, fear, compassion, contempt, guilt, and pity) separately. Lastly, they indicated their opinion on whether the perpetrator should, in any way, be punished or not punished.

To test the differences in emotional responses to moral violations, victims and perpetrators, the study conducted several 2(gender) × 6(moral foundations) multivariate analyses of variance with moral violations serving as the repeated measures and 11 emotions as the dependent variables.

Results

Analysis revealed that the participants evaluated care violations as more wrong than those of the other moral foundations. In line with this result, the participants reported that transgressors of care, fairness, and sanctity foundations should be punished harsher than those of liberty, loyalty, and authority foundations. In addition, the study found that individuals who violated the foundations of liberty should be punished more than those who violated the foundations of loyalty and obedience. The results regarding emotions indicated that the participants experienced feelings of anger, sadness, shame, and compassion more intensively toward the care violation compared with those of the other moral foundations.

In addition, the intensity of feelings of the participants toward victims significantly expressively changed according to which moral foundation is violated [Wilks’ λ = .25, F(30, 1382.95) = 18.97, p < .001, partial ɳ2 = .24].). According to the results, the compassion of the participants toward victims of care violation was stronger than those of the other moral foundations. Furthermore, the level of pity was stronger in the case of care violation compared with violations of fairness, authority, loyalty, and liberty. The sadness expressed by the participants for victims of violations of the foundations of care, sanctity, and liberty was higher than that for violations of the foundations of fairness, loyalty to the group, and obedience to authority.

The intensity of the feelings of the participants toward perpetrators significantly changed according to the violated moral foundation [Wilks’ λ = .15, F(40, 1497.90) = 20.62, p < .001, partial ɳ2 = .31]. The results demonstrated that the feelings of the participants toward perpetrators of care violation were anger and contempt. Moreover, the feeling of fear in the case of sanctity violation was stronger than that in the violations of the other moral foundations. The study also observed that the level of disgust felt toward the perpetrators of care and sanctity violations was higher than that experienced in violations of the foundations of fairness, liberty, loyalty to the group, and obedience to authority. In contrast, disgust experienced in the violation of obedience to authority was significantly lower than those in violations of the other foundations.

The study evaluated the intensity of feelings of the participants when faced with violations of moral foundations and observed anger toward a fairness violation: anger and sadness toward care and liberty violations; and anger, sadness, and astonishment toward loyalty violation surpass all other feelings. The study noted that in case of a violation of sanctity, the levels of intensity of anger, disgust, and astonishment surpass those of shame, fear, compassion, guilt, worry, and pity. For a violation of authority, the level of intensity of sadness surpasses those of feelings of disgust, shame, fear, compassion, contempt, guilt, astonishment, and pity.

Discussion

The results indicated that anger was experienced the most intensively in the violation of care followed by violations of fairness, liberty, and sanctity, and the least intensively in violations of loyalty and obedience. Anger felt toward perpetrators presented the same pattern. These findings were inconsistent with the proposition that fairness violations specifically elicit anger. Seemingly, anger was the most intensively experienced emotion across moral transgressions (Table 1). The feeling of disgust was reported to be experienced more intensively in the case of care and sanctity violations compared with violations of the other moral foundations. Core disgust may be experienced in violations of sanctity, while sociomoral disgust may be experienced in violations of care.The results regarding the most experienced emotions toward violations of moral foundations revealed that the strongest emotions in the violation of sanctity are disgust and astonishment, while anger is the strongest or one of the two strongest emotions in violations of other moral foundations (Table 4).

In the face of a moral violation, feelings toward perpetrators and victims would differ. Therefore, this study separately examined emotions toward perpetrators and victims, in addition to emotions related to a situation. The findings supported the suggestion of MFT that individuals tend to feel anger toward perpetrators and compassion toward victims of care violation. From this perspective, the study infers that these results introduce new information to the literature and should be tested through further studies. 

The study identified two important findings. First, as posited by MFT, individuals feel anger toward harm and injustice and disgust in the violation of sanctity. However, the study disagrees that specialized emotions exist for each of the foundations. For example, anger is intensely experienced toward not only fairness violation but also care, liberty, and sanctity violations. In addition, sadness and anger was expressed in the violation of the foundations of fairness. Similarly, in case of violation of the sanctity, in addition to disgust, feelings of astonishment, and anger were experienced more than other emotions. Second, the emotions experienced in violation of moral foundations include those related to the situation, victim, and perpetrator, evaluating these emotions separately will contribute to a clear understanding of the relationships between moral foundations and emotions.

One of the limitations of this study is its inability to use different scenarios of violations of moral foundations (i.e., fairness, care, liberty, loyalty to the group, obedience to authority, and sanctity) that were found to be equally wrong. The reason why an emotion is experienced more intensely across violations may be the perceived severity of the violation instead of the moral foundation violated. Another limitation is that the study was conducted on a sample of students. Using different samples, violations of loyalty to the group and obedience to authority may be evaluated as more wrong and lead to stronger emotions. Additionally, studies on the relationship between the violation of moral foundations, emotions, and intuition are relatively scarce. Thus, new studies in this field will contribute to a better understanding of the nature of this relationship.


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Yaşar, M., & Akgün, S. (2023). The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions. Studies in Psychology, 43(3), 429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


AMA

Yaşar M, Akgün S. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions. Studies in Psychology. 2023;43(3):429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


ABNT

Yaşar, M.; Akgün, S. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions. Studies in Psychology, [Publisher Location], v. 43, n. 3, p. 429-466, 2023.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Yaşar, Melike, and Serap Akgün. 2023. “The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions.” Studies in Psychology 43, no. 3: 429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


Chicago: Humanities Style

Yaşar, Melike, and Serap Akgün. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions.” Studies in Psychology 43, no. 3 (Apr. 2024): 429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


Harvard: Australian Style

Yaşar, M & Akgün, S 2023, 'The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions', Studies in Psychology, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 429-466, viewed 28 Apr. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Yaşar, M. and Akgün, S. (2023) ‘The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions’, Studies in Psychology, 43(3), pp. 429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045 (28 Apr. 2024).


MLA

Yaşar, Melike, and Serap Akgün. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions.” Studies in Psychology, vol. 43, no. 3, 2023, pp. 429-466. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045


Vancouver

Yaşar M, Akgün S. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions. Studies in Psychology [Internet]. 28 Apr. 2024 [cited 28 Apr. 2024];43(3):429-466. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045 doi: 10.26650/SP2022-1110045


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Yaşar, Melike - Akgün, Serap. The Relationship Between Moral Foundations and Emotions”. Studies in Psychology 43/3 (Apr. 2024): 429-466. https://doi.org/10.26650/SP2022-1110045



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Submitted27.04.2022
Accepted05.06.2023
Published Online08.12.2023

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