Forcing Bulgaria Into War: North Macedonia Operation of the Ottoman Special Organization (Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa) (1914-1915)
This article aims to clarify the grounds, aims, phases and results of the joint operation of Ottoman Special Organisation (OSO) (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) against the Serbian administration in North Macedonia as a reflection of the rapprochement between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria after the Balkan Wars. The article basically draws the following conclusions: 1- At the beginning, the main purpose of cooperation with the Bulgarians for the Committee of Union and Progress was to ensure the autonomy of Macedonia and the return of Western Thrace to Turkey. 2- Following the Turkish-German alliance, Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, took control of the operation and assigned it the functions of urgently forcing Bulgaria into war against Serbia, which was at war with Austria, and preparing the ground for a future Turkish-Bulgarian invasion of the region. 3- In the first phase of the operation, the propaganda activities of the OSO gangs to incite the Muslims of the region against the Serbian rule were successful, but this brought about a campaign of violence by the Serbs against the Muslim population. In addition, the Turkish gangs, which did not receive the expected support from the Bulgarians, who were experiencing political hesitations, were neutralized by the Serbian forces in a short time. 4- Despite the situation, Enver Pasha did not back down, he deployed new and larger gangs to the field, and with the Bulgarians developing a closer cooperation attitude, highly effective operations could be carried out together with the IMRO. 5- Although these operations played an important role in further distancing the Entente from Bulgaria, they were not enough to achieve Enver Pasha's goal of bringing Bulgaria into the war urgently.
Bulgaristan’ı Savaşa Zorlamak: Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın Kuzey Makedonya Harekâtı (1914-1915)
Bu makale Balkan Savaşları’nın ardından Osmanlı Devleti ve Bulgaristan arasında meydana gelen yakınlaşmanın bir yansıması olarak Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın İç Makedon Devrimci Örgütü ile Kuzey Makedonya’da Sırp yönetimine karşı giriştiği ortak harekâtın zeminini, amaçlarını, safhalarını ve neticelerini açıklığa kavuşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Araştırma neticesinde şu sonuçlara varılmıştır: 1- İlkin İttihat ve Terakki erkânı için Bulgarlarla iş birliğinin temel amacı Makedonya’nın muhtariyetini ve Batı Trakya’nın Türkiye’ye iadesini sağlamaktı. 2- Türk-Alman ittifakının ardından Harbiye Nazırı Enver Paşa harekâtın kontrolünü ele almış ve ona Bulgaristan’ı acilen Avusturya ile savaş hâlindeki Sırbistan’a karşı savaşa zorlama ve bölgeye yönelik müstakbel Türk-Bulgar işgaline zemin hazırlama işlevlerini yüklemiştir. 3- Harekâtın ilk safhasında Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa çetelerinin bölge Müslümanlarını Sırp yönetimine karşı kışkırtmaya yönelik propaganda faaliyetleri başarılı olmuş ama bu durum Sırpların Müslüman ahaliye yönelik şiddet kampanyasını beraberinde getirmiştir. Ayrıca politik tereddütler yaşayan Bulgarlardan beklenen desteği alamayan Türk çeteler Sırp kuvvetlerince kısa sürede etkisiz hâle getirilmiştir. 4- Ortaya çıkan tabloya rağmen Enver Paşa geri adım atmamış, sahaya yeni ve daha kalabalık çeteler sürmüş, Bulgarların daha yakın bir iş birliği tavrı geliştirmesiyle de İç Makedon Devrimci Örgütü ile birlikte son derece etkili operasyonlar yapılabilmiştir. 5- Bu operasyonlar İtilaf Devletleri’nin Bulgaristan’dan daha da uzaklaşmasında önemli rol oynasa da Enver Paşa’nın Bulgaristan’ı acilen savaşa sokma amacının gerçekleşmesine yetmemiştir.
The First Balkan War resulted in the loss of the last lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans (Albania, Macedonia). But not only that, the whole of Western Thrace and a very important part of Eastern Thrace had also fallen into the hands of Bulgaria. Especially the loss of Edirne and Kırklareli was seen as a disaster among the Muslim subjects of the Empire. However, the fact that Bulgaria, which could not achieve the expected gains from the First Balkan War, entered into a conflict with its former allies Serbia and Greece in order to force a new partition in the Balkans and was additionally attacked by Romania, was perceived as an opportunity by the Ottoman-Islamic public opinion to at least take back Edirne and Kırklareli from the Bulgarians. The Ottoman army, mobilised especially with the efforts of Enver Bey, recaptured Edirne, Kırklareli and Dimetoka from the Bulgarians on 21-23 July 1913 almost without encountering any resistance.
Signed on 10 August 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest ended the war between Bulgaria and the other Balkan states. With this treaty, the Bulgarians had to say goodbye, at least for the time being, to their dream of possessing Macedonia, while they had to cede Dobrudja to Romania. The most unacceptable loss for the Bulgarians was North Macedonia. According to the compromise they had reached with the Serbs before the Balkan Wars and under the guarantee of the Russians, most of North Macedonia would belong to Bulgaria if the war was won. However, the Serbs, who actually fought the Ottoman armies in North Macedonia during the war and occupied the region step by step, did not comply with this agreement and annexed the region, while Russia did not react to this. For the Bulgarians, who had been fighting for the autonomy of North Macedonia or its annexation to Bulgaria for a very long time, especially through the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), by resorting to terrorist methods against the Ottoman administration and the Muslim population, this was a real devastation. In the words of British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, the Bulgaria was ‘sore, injured and despoiled of what she believed belonged to her' and ‘any future Balkan peace was impossible as long as the Treaty of Bucharest remained'.
However, the Bulgarians, realising that it would not be possible even in the distant future to fight against the Serbs, Greeks and Romanians at the same time, considered it necessary to achieve their ambitions gradually and in stages. In order to achieve these ambitions, they also found it necessary to form an alliance with the Ottomans and to obtain at least the neutrality of the Romanians.
The Bulgarian government was initially very keen and in a hurry to establish an alliance with the Ottoman Empire. So much so that the Sublime Porte was encouraged to conduct the alliance negotiations in parallel with the peace negotiations. As a result, peace was achieved with the Treaty of Constantinople dated 29 September 1913. Eastern Thrace remained with the Turks and Western Thrace with the Bulgarians. In the meantime, the 'Provisional Government of Western Thrace', which had been formed in Western Thrace with the efforts of an irregular force that could be considered as the nucleus of Ottoman Special Organisation (OSO) (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) under the leadership of Süleyman Askerî Bey, was to be disbanded. Following the treaty, diplomatic relations between the two countries were re-established.
However, the issue of alliance could not be concluded so quickly. The initial eager attitude of the Bulgarians gave way to a more cautious and procrastinating approach. They stalled the Turkish side by constantly amending their territorial demands. Moreover, despite the Treaty of Constantinople, they displayed an attitude towards the Western Thrace Turks that caused the reaction of the Porte. As a result, they were not in a position to start a war immediately, and the Bulgarian government avoided actions that might arouse suspicion in the Serbian, Greek and Romanian governments.
On the other hand, the leaders of IMRO thought differently from the Bulgarian Government and wanted immediate action, especially for Macedonia. In this direction, they were working to create a ground where they could carry out activities in Macedonia. If the Macedonian Turks, along with the Serbs and Greeks who dominated the region, were to turn against them, their ability to act would be greatly restricted. In this direction, the leaders of IMRO made contact with the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and negotiations were held in Istanbul in October and November 1913. As a result, a compromise was reached on the basis of the autonomy of Macedonia and a protocol was signed. According to the agreement, Western Thrace would be left to the Ottoman Empire if Bulgaria gained an exit to the Aegean Sea via Kavala. The parties confirmed that the Turkish and Bulgarian Macedonian committees were ready to work together for the autonomy of Macedonia by resorting to all legal and illegal methods.
However, it took time for this compromise to be reflected on the field. The reason for this was the cautious and indecisive attitude of the Radoslavov Government. However, Austria's declaration of war against Serbia was seen as an opportunity for IMRO and it was thought that the time for the Macedonian operation had come. Meanwhile, the Turkish side, which had concluded a secret alliance agreement with Germany on 2 August 1914, wanted this operation to be launched immediately in order to bring Bulgaria into the war and thus support the Central Powers. OSO, to which the armed groups that would participate in the operation on behalf of the Turkish side would be affiliated, was officially formed on 4 August 1914. After that, the necessary instructions were given to the Turkish gangs that would participate in the Macedonia operation and their dispatch to Bulgaria began. Turkish and Bulgarian gangs gathered in Ustrumca in August and September and started to enter Serbian Macedonia. The aim was to incite the Muslim and Bulgarian population there to revolt against the Serbian rule in North Macedonia and to sabotage the bridges over the Vardar River in order to break the communication between the Serbs and the Entente states. The propaganda-oriented activities of the Turkish gangs during this period were quite effective. The propaganda in question was supported by the narrative that the Turkish and Bulgarian armies would enter the region in a short time and expel the Serbs from the region. During this period, many Muslims living in Serbian Macedonia were recruited into the organisation. However, the indecisive attitude of the Bulgarian government prevented the IMRO from giving strong support to the Turkish gangs in the region. In the face of the activities of the Turkish gangs, the Serbian administration started to use violent methods against the Muslim population of the region and also neutralised the Turkish gangs in a short period of time. During this period, many Muslim peasants were forced to leave their lands and seek refuge in Bulgaria. Although the Turkish embassy in Sofia objected to the continuation of the operation in the face of this outcome, the Minister of War Enver Pasha, on the contrary, wanted the activities of the Turkish gangs to gain momentum and the Bulgarians to be encouraged. He believed that joint gang activities would encourage the Bulgarian government to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers.
In 1915, new gangs affiliated to OSO were sent to the region. Some of the Muslims who had taken refuge in Bulgarian lands also joined these gangs. The leadership of the IMRO also decided to take a more active stance. The number and intensity of joint actions gradually increased and especially effective acts of sabotage were carried out against railway bridges. The Serbs gradually began to lose the initiative in the region. On 2 April 1915, a mixed Turkish-Bulgarian force of 1000-1500 men, supported by the Austrian Intelligence Service, carried out a large-scale action. In this action, known as the "Valandovo incident", a battalion of Serbian soldiers in Valandovo suffered heavy casualties and the railway bridge near Udovo was blown up. After the incident, the gangs retreated back to Bulgaria.
After the Valandovo incident, the Entente Powers accused the Bulgarian government of supporting the aggressors. The Bulgarian government denied this, but Bulgarian public opinion reacted strongly against the centres that were trying to drag the country into the war. Turkish gangs withdrew from Bulgaria to Turkey. Then the Serbs started a new wave of violence against Muslims in the region. In the following months, the failures of the Entente on the fronts, especially at Gallipoli, were important data for Bulgaria's final decision. The Entente's promises to Bulgaria of gains in Macedonia, Greece and Romania if it joined the war on their side were also more miserly than those of the Central Powers'. Finally, on 6 September 1915, Bulgaria signed treaties of alliance and friendship with Germany and AustriaHungary, as well as secret military agreements that envisaged Bulgaria's immediate action against Serbia. One of the incentives for the Bulgarians to enter into these treaties was that the Ottoman Empire had agreed to cede to the Bulgarians a piece of territory on the banks of the Maritsa river, including Dimetoka and Karaagac, in a treaty signed on the same day. In October, Bulgaria finally declared war on Serbia, ending its neutral position and taking its place on the side of the Central Powers.
