Greece’s Mistakes in the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation According to the Reports of the Investigative Committee of the Greek Parliament: “Fakelos Kyprou (Cyprus File)”
Since its establishment, Greece has pursued an expansionist policy that exceeded the elements of national power, and these expansion efforts have been stopped twice in history: the first of which was the Turkish War of Independence, and the second was the Cyprus Peace Operation. As a result of the political crisis in Greece after the first phase of Cyprus Peace Operation, the government was transferred from military to civilian administration which leaded by Konstantinos Karamanlis.. Subsequent to this transition, an investigative commission, established by the Greek Parliament, embarked on a comprehensive study to ascertain the reasons behind Greece's missteps in Cyprus and the reasons behind the failure to anticipate or prevent a Turkish operation. The findings of this study were subsequently made available to the public in 2018. The present study aims to examine Greece's military missteps during the Peace Operation by leveraging the studies published by the Greek Parliament under the title "Φακελος κυπρου-Fakelos Kiprou" ("Cyprus File") and relevant literature in Greek.
Yunan Meclisi Araştırma Komisyonu Raporlarına Göre Yunanistan’ın 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı’ndaki Hataları: “Fakelos Kiprou (Kıbrıs Dosyası)”
Yunanistan kurulduğu andan itibaren milli güç unsurlarını aşan şekilde yayılmacı bir politika izlemiş, bu genişleme çabaları tarihte iki kez durdurulmuştur, bunlardan birincisi Kurtuluş Savaşı, ikincisi ise Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı’dır. Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı’nın 20-22 Temmuz 1974 tarihlerinde icra edilen ilk safhası, Yunanistan’da siyasi krize neden olmuş ve bu kriz neticesinde 24 Temmuz 1974 tarihinde yönetim askerlerden Konstantinos Karamanlis’in başbakanlığında oluşturulan sivil idareye devredilmiştir. Bu süreç sonrasında Yunanistan Meclisi tarafından kurulan soruşturma komisyonu, Yunanistan’ın Kıbrıs’taki hataları ve bir Türk harekâtının niçin öngörülemediği/engellenemediği sorularına cevap aramak için yoğun çalışmalar yürütmüş, 2018 yılında bu çalışmaların kamuoyuyla paylaşılmasına karar verilmiştir. Çalışmada ağırlıklı olarak Yunan Parlamentosu’nun “Φακελος Κυπρου-Fakelos Kiprou” “Kıbrıs Dosyası” ismiyle yayımladığı bu çalışmalardan ve Yunanca konuya ilişkin literatürden faydalanılarak Yunanistan’ın, Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı’ndaki askeri hatalarının incelenmesi amaçlanmıştır.
The primary focus of this study is the investigations which conducted by the Greek Parliament's commission of inquiry following the Cyprus Peace Operation. In the aftermath of this operation, which proved to be a significant setback for Greece, the question that Greek officials are attempting to address is as follows: What factors did Greece fail to anticipate in Türkiye's intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and what were the underlying reasons for its inability to prevent the Turkish operation?
In 1975, Greece initiated a preliminary investigation in an attempt to address this question; however, due to the prevailing political circumstances of the era, this endeavour remained unfinished.Subsequently, in 1986, a parliamentary investigation committee was established with the objective of ascertaining the errors that had occurred. The committee's comprehensive investigations spanned a duration of two and a half years, concluding on 31 October 1988. The committee held a total of 154 sessions to investigate the mistakes made in Cyprus from the coup attempt against Makarios on July 15, 1974 until Turkey's intervention in the island. In addition, the committee conducted faceto-face interviews with 86 people, mostly high-ranking military officers, who played a role in the political, military and diplomatic events of the period.
The results of the Committee's investigations were disseminated to the public in Greek in 2018. The study's primary focus is on the deficiencies in the decisions made by Greece's senior state and military officials prior to and during the peace operation. In this context, the committee reports emphasise the lack of initiative on the part of senior military officers due to the presence of inaccurate intelligence data.
In the Committee reports, it is stated that an effective counter-intervention could not be carried out due to Turkey's geographical proximity to Cyprus and the range problems of the armed forces of Greece at that time. Furthermore, it was emphasised that the Greek National Guard army units lacked preparation due to the internal conflict on the island. Additionally, although a possible Turkish intervention had been expected since 1964, the plans developed in this direction were incomplete and unrealistic.
Whilst examining the committee reports as part of the study, it became evident that there were notable discrepancies in opinion amongst Greece's senior military leaders, in addition to deficiencies within the crisis management apparatus. It was noted that substantial deliberations took place between the commanders of the Greek Naval and Air Forces and the Greek Chief of General Staff concerning intervention on the island. Furthermore, there was a recurring emphasis on discordant directives, particularly with regard to the deployment of submarines and fighter jets to the region.
A further issue that emerged from the Committee's investigation pertains to the fact that, since the night of July 18, 1974, Greek intelligence officers, particularly those stationed in Cyprus who were proficient in Turkish, reported heightened Turkish activity to their superiors in Nicosia and to the Greek General Staff in Athens. However, the leaders of the Greek junta in power in Athens disregarded these warnings and concluded that Turkey was preparing a routine exercise, that it was merely bluffing Greece, and that the Western powers would never permit the Turks to intervene on the island.
Despite the efforts of the committee reports to maintain objectivity in their treatment of military missteps, a discernible bias and a certain degree of historical inaccuracy were evident in their accounts. For instance, EOKA, a terrorist organisation that sought to massacre the Turkish population on the island, was presented in the committee reports as an organisation operating for independence. Similarly, Colonel Grivas, a founder of EOKA and responsible for the massacre of many Turks, is unilaterally described in the report as an important freedom fighter of the Greek nation.
In the context of this study, the analysis will encompass the examination of committee reports on the subject, a novel approach in the context of Turkish academia.The study will draw upon a range of sources to enrich its analysis, including committee reports, the memoirs of Greek senior officials from the period, and Greek literature on the subject. The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the errors committed by Greece in relation to Cyprus, a matter that continues to be a significant point of contention between Turkey and Greece despite the passage of over five decades since the Peace Operation. A thorough examination of the committee reports reveals that Greece has learned from past missteps and has since 1993 developed a military strategy focused on providing support to Southern Cyprus.
