ABD’nin Körfez Monarşilerine Yaklaşımını Tarihsel Bir Açıdan Anlamak: Nixon Dönemi
Nur Çetinoğlu HarunoğluKatar’ın terörizme ve İran’ın bölgesel müdahalelerine destek olması gerekçelerinden kaynaklanan Körfez bölgesindeki 2017 krizi, Körfez monarşileri arasında önemli bir çatlağa neden olmuştur. Bir tarafta Suudi Arabistan, Bahreyn ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri hattı, diğer taraftan ise Katar’ın bulunduğu bu kriz karşısında Trump yönetimi, taraf almadan gerginliği barışçı şekilde yatıştırmaya çalışmıştır. Bu makalenin amacı, ABD’nin Körfez monarşileri arasında çıkan son krizde benimsediği yaklaşımın nedenlerini, tarihsel bir açıdan anlamaktır. Makalenin temel argümanı, ABD’nin 2017’deki Körfez krizinde benimsediği yaklaşımın, Britanya’nın Körfez’den çekilme kararı akabinde Nixon yönetimi tarafından Körfez monarşilerine yönelik benimsemiş olduğu yaklaşımın türevi olduğudur. Bu makale aynı zamanda bu yaklaşımın, ABD dış politikasında Körfez’e yönelik süreklilik arz eden bir davranış örneği olduğunu da savunmaktadır. Bu amaca hizmet edecek şekilde, çalışmada kullanılacak temel kaynaklar, Britanya’nın Körfez bölgesinden çekilme kararını takiben bağımsızlıklarını kazanan Körfez ülkeleriyle ilgili yapılan ABD iç yazışmaları olacaktır. Başkan Richard Nixon dönemine denk gelen bu dönemde ABD’nin Körfez monarşilerine yönelik nasıl bir yaklaşım benimsediği, bu yaklaşımın nedenlerinin ne olduğu ve günümüzle bağlantısının nasıl kurulabileceği çalışmanın temel sorularıdır.
Understanding The US’ Approach To The Gulf Monarchies From A Historical Perspective: Nixon’s Period
Nur Çetinoğlu HarunoğluThe 2017 crisis in the Gulf region, emanating from the claims of Qatar supporting terrorism as well as Iran’s regional interferences, created a critical split among the Gulf monarchies. The Trump administration, facing the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United-Arab Emirates line on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, refrained from taking sides and made efforts to appease the tension in a peaceful manner. The purpose of this article is to understand the reasons behind the US’ approach to the recent Gulf crisis from a historical perspective. The main argument of the article is that the recent US approach to the 2017 Gulf crisis is derived from the approach adopted by the Nixon administration in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. The article also argues that the above-mentioned approach constitutes an element of continuity in American foreign policy towards the Gulf. For this purpose, the basic sources used in this work are the declassified documents of American administration on the newly independent Gulf states in the wake of Britain’s decision to withdraw from the Gulf. The main questions of the article are what kind of approach the US adopted towards the Gulf in this period that coincides with President Nixon’s term, what were the causes of this approach and what kind of connection could be established between then and now.
The 2017 crisis in the Gulf region, emanating from the claims of Qatar supporting terrorism as well as Iran’s regional interferences created a critical split among the Gulf monarchies. The Trump administration, facing the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UnitedArab Emirates line on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, refrained from taking sides and made efforts to appease the tension in a peaceful manner. The purpose of this article is to understand the reasons behind the US’ approach to the recent Gulf crisis from a historical perspective. The main argument of the article is that the recent US approach to the 2017 Gulf crisis is derived from the legacy of the Nixon administration in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. Taking this argument one step further, the article also argues that the above-mentioned approach constitutes an element of continuity in American foreign policy towards the Gulf.
The policy of the Nixon administration towards the Gulf region is known as the “Twin Pillar policy”. This policy relied on a “balance” held between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia and Iran would be the two main surrogates of the US, keeping American interests safe in the region on one hand, and on the other, each would be used as a counterweight against the other. The already existing literature on Nixon’s Gulf policy analyses in particular this “Twin Pillar policy” based on Saudi Arabia and Iran. Notwithstanding this, the works on Nixon skip the US’ approach towards the newly independent sheikdoms in the wake of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. This article aims to fulfill the gap aforementioned. To do so, the article launches a wide exploration of the official documents of the American government released by the Foreign Relations of the United-States (FRUS) archives.
With this picture in the background, the article argues that the logic of “balance” existed not only in the “Twin pillar policy” launched vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also in the US’ approach to the Gulf monarchies, including the newly independent ones starting from the beginning of 1970s. The article reveals that this balance had indeed two main dimensions: the first dimension was the fact of the US using the Arab Gulf monarchies as a counterweight against the regional and/or global power seeking to dominate the Gulf. Therefore, the first dimension included the idea of using the Arab Gulf monarchies against Iran, which was the main regional Shia power seeking to dominate the Gulf; and that the USSR that was the main global power seeking to expand its influence into the region. The second dimension of the balance was the fact of the US keeping a balance of power directly within the Arab Gulf monarchies.
One should notice here that the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf in 1968 foreshadowed the end of the political and military landscape that was present in the Gulf for more than a century. Not coincidentally, the Nixon administration made efforts to replace the political and military structure left by Britain and sought a sustainable role for the US to meet American interests in the Gulf since the already-existing American policy towards the Gulf became untenable for America’s Cold War needs after 1968. Indeed, this new purpose for the US required close diplomatic contact not only with Saudi Arabia, but also with the newly independent sheikdoms of the region. These sheikhdoms were Qatar, Bahrain; and Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah – sheikdoms that would later become the United-Arab Emirates.
According to official writings within the Nixon administration from 1968 to1971, The US faced three main challenges in the Gulf: Arabian-Persian rivalry, territorial conflicts between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms and the reluctance of the Gulf sheikhdoms on the issue of whether to launch a political integration. President Nixon, in tandem with the suggestions of Kissinger, sought to apply an approach mainly based on a balance bearing two dimensions, as mentioned earlier: On the one hand, it sought to keep the region safe from both the Shia and Soviet influences and tried to use the Arab Gulf monarchies as a counterweight against them while keeping Iran as a crucial ally of the US. On the other, the US tried to stay neutral vis-à-vis the skirmishes within the Gulf monarchies. In effect, the American new-found activeness in the Gulf manifested itself as Nixon’s spearheading for peaceful solutions to the conflicts within the Arab Gulf monarchies since they were all strategically important for American interests. The US paid special attention to not alienating the newly independent sheikdoms while it also sought to keep Saudi Arabia as a conspicuous American ally in the region.
It is worth mentioning that the US’ Gulf approach launched in Nixon’s term remained as an essential component of US foreign policy in the Gulf in subsequent decades. In other words, the article reveals that the approach based on the two-dimension notion of “balance” remained the same: the US succeeded in using the Arab Gulf monarchies as a counterweight against the regional powers seeking to dominate the region (such as Iran particularly after 1979, and Iraq after 1990). In addition to this, the US was able to keep a balance within the Arab Gulf monarchies and, more precisely, refrained from taking sides in times of disagreements and/or conflicts, as was the case in 1995 when Qatar and Bahrain were on the threshold of a war. The unsteady relationship between the Gulf monarchies continues to today with the Trump administration. By analyzing the recent Gulf crisis of 2017, this article argues that the legacy of Nixon in the Gulf still remains, and it constitutes an element of continuity in American foreign policy. In addition, the omnipresent role of the US in the Gulf since 1968 tends to portray the US still as an indispensable partner for all Gulf monarchies, despite its European rivals.
