Following the Battles of Kütahya-Eskişehir, the Turkish Army halted the Greek forces in the Polatlı-Haymana region, east of Sakarya. Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared, “There is no defense of the line. There is a defense of the surface. That surface is the entire homeland. The homeland cannot be abandoned unless every inch of the homeland is watered with the blood of its citizens.” The Turkish Army’s defense culminated in a 22-day battle, preventing the Greek forces from advancing further. This marked the end of Turkish defensive operations since 1683 and initiated the army’s preparation phase for an offensive.

On September 13, 1921, the Turkish Army underwent a reorganization. The 5th Cavalry Group was renamed the 5th Cavalry Corps, with the 14th Cavalry Division remaining under its command. From September 14 to 30, Greek commander Anastasios Papoulas realized that the 4th Greek Division was isolated in Afyonkarahisar and sent the 1st Corps to reinforce it. An army group consisting of four divisions and one regiment was established under General Yorgos Kondilis. On October 1, the Greek forces aimed to capture the hills dominating the Afyonkarahisar Plain. The Turkish 2nd and 5th Corps decided to attack the Greek forces from the southeast of Afyonkarahisar.

On September 30, 1921, the Turkish Army postponed the attack against the Greek forces in Afyonkarahisar, which had been there since September 24, to October 2, 1921. The Western Front headquarters, situated in the eastern part of Afyonkarahisar, was approximately 140 kilometers away from the 2nd and 5th Corps. This distance caused significant delays in troop communications. Furthermore, adverse seasonal conditions compounded these challenges, rendering the operation more difficult and leading to further delays. The 5th Corps and its affiliated 14th Division commenced the attack from the northeast of Afyonkarahisar on October 1. However, due to the 2nd Corps joining the attack on October 2, its impact was diminished, leading to the Turkish Army’s failure in the battle that concluded on October 8. Had the 2nd Corps acted on time, the Greek Army could have been defeated in Afyonkarahisar, eliminating the need for the subsequent Great Offensive and Pursuit Operation.

The 14th Cavalry Division, under the command of Mehmet Suphi Bey, participated in the attack with its three regiments. The division was in close contact with Greek forces during the Afyonkarahisar Battles. War reports indicate that the division tried to implement the orders received from the Corps and relayed them to the affiliated regiments. However, the delayed transmission of orders from the Western Front Command to the 5th Corps Command hindered the operation. Fahrettin Pasha, the 5th Cavalry Corps Commander, received orders late and subsequently sent delayed orders to Mehmet Suphi Bey. Despite this, Mehmet Suphi Bey issued orders in accordance with the Corps’ directives and the operation’s progress.

War reports from the 14th Division reveal that it received situation reports from its regiments and informed the Corps about the division’s general progress. These reports detailed the movements of Greek forces, areas of engagement, and casualties. The war report was maintained daily by the division, with at least two reports written each day.

The battle’s failure necessitated the preparation of the “Sad Offensive Plan”, followed by the “Kaf Defense Plan”. The Battle of Afyonkarahisar served as a rehearsal for the Great Offensive ten months later, providing valuable experience to the Turkish Army’s command level. Due to the lessons learned from the battles, it was decided to gather Turkish forces to the southwest of Afyonkarahisar. The shortcomings identified during the Battle of Afyonkarahisar were addressed. Consequently, leveraging the insights from this engagement, the offensive launched on August 26, 1922, proved to be triumphant.