İki Savaş Arası Dönemde Ege’de Yunan-İtalyan Tehdidi ve Savaş Gerilimi (1924-1926)
Çağla Derya TağmatBirinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda yeni bir denge oluşturulmaya çalışılmış, Türkiye de Lozan Antlaşması ile yeni kurulan düzen içinde kendine bir yer edinmiştir. Türkiye, Lozan Antlaşması sonrasındaki yaklaşık yedi yılı, bu antlaşmanın etkisinde geçirirken, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün barışçıl dış politikası sayesinde son kalan pürüzleri de ortadan kaldırmayı başarmıştır. Bu pürüzlerden en önemlilerinden biri olan Türkiye-Irak sınırı sorunu, başka bir deyişle Musul sorunu, 1925 ve 1926 yıllarına damga vurmuştur.
Benito Mussolini, yayılmacı politikası çerçevesinde 1925 yılında On İki Ada üzerinden Anadolu ile ilgili planlar yaparken, aynı dönemde Yunanistan’da gerçekleştirdiği askeri müdahale ile iktidarı ele geçiren ve Türk düşmanlığı ile bilinen General Theodoros Panagalos da Mussolini ile iş birliği yaparak Anadolu üzerindeki emellerini gerçekleştirmek için fırsat kollamıştır. Bu durum, İngiltere’nin de Türkiye’nin elini zayıflatmak için bu iki ülkeye destek vermesiyle bir gerilim haline dönüşmüştür.
Bu çalışmada Yunan ve İngiliz kaynakları çerçevesinde Ege’de beliren tehdit ile Yunanistan, İtalya ve İngiltere’nin Türkiye karşısında takındığı tutum analiz edilecektir.
The Greek-Italian Threat During the Inter-War Period and the Tensions in the Aegean (1924-1926)
Çağla Derya TağmatThe attempt was made to create a new balance at the end of World War I, and Türkiye gained a place in the newly established order through the Treaty of Lausanne. While spending about seven years afterward under the influence of this treaty, Türkiye succeeded in eliminating the last remaining problems thanks to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s peaceful foreign policy. As one of the most significant of these problems, the Türkiye-Iraq border issue (i.e., the Mosul question) left its mark in 1925 and 1926.
While Benito Mussolini was making plans for Anatolia over the Dodecanese Islands in 1925 within the framework of his expansionist policy, General Theodoros Panagalos, who had seized power with the military intervention he carried out in Greece during the same period and was known for his hostility towards Turks, also waited for an opportunity to realize his ambitions in Anatolia by collaborating with Mussolini. This situation turned into a tension, as Britain supported these two countries to weaken Türkiye’s hand.
This study will analyze the threat in the Aegean and the attitudes of Greece, Italy, and Britain towards Türkiye within the framework of Greek and British sources.
The Italo-Turkish War started with an attack by Italy in 1911. It started a period of wars for the Ottoman Empire in the 20th century, shook its dominance in the Mediterranean, and was important in terms of Italy taking its place among the other states of England and France who were colonizing North Africa. At the end of the war, Italy had taken the Dodecanese Islands hostage in addition to Tripoli, thus extending its rule to the Aegean and capturing strategically important islands there.
During World War I, Italy demanded a portion of Anatolia through the secret treaties signed with the Allied Powers. However, Italy was unable to get what she wanted at the Paris Peace Conference that had convened at the end of the war, which led Italy to make bilateral agreements with Greece. At the Lausanne Conference held after the Turkish War of Independence, the secret diplomacy of Greece regarding the Dodecanese Islands yielded no results. In 1923, Mussolini showed his stance in the Mediterranean by invading Corfu, and relations between the Greece and Türkiye deteriorated. Meanwhile, Mussolini’s statements that armed the islands against Türkiye in 1924 after Lausanne had caused Türkiye to take some precautions. The War Games organized by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in İzmir in 1924 was also a result of this attempt.
The start of Turkish-British negotiations in 1924 regarding Mosul and the resultant stalemate caused Britain to put Italy into action. Britain wanted Türkiye to remain weak in terms of the Mosul issue by having it fear Italy with regard to the Aegean and thus entered a process of rapprochement with Italy. In 1925, the anti-Turkish General Theodoros Pangalos, who had come to power through a military coup in Greece, entered the process of rapprochement with Italy and found the appropriate opportunity to become a partner in this plan to realize his ideas about Anatolia. Thus, the two dictators accelerated their diplomatic visits by concentrating on an operation plan to be carried out in İzmir regarding the Dodecanese Islands.
This threat had emerged from Britain in the background while appearing to have emerged between Italy and Greece; it caused Türkiye to take measures against an attack from the Aegean. The 1926 agreement between Türkiye and Britain regarding Mosul and the overthrow of General Pangalos by coup in the same year caused Italy to soften its policy toward Türkiye, and tensions ended before a war could start. Another important point regarding Italy and Greece’s development of policies against Türkiye under the patronage of Britain was that their fascist governments were at work in these two countries. For Pangalos and Mussolini, who had united on common grounds in the context of expansionist foreign policy, they had resultantly viewed Türkiye as a geography where they could realize the goals they had been unable to achieve during the National Struggle. However, the fact that the targets of both countries involved Western Anatolia created questions about what kind of division they could envisage in the event of a possible attack. Because this attack did not take place, predicting how they would have divided the spoils within the framework of a consensus is difficult. However, Pangalos being a Mussolini fan and Mussolini’s uncompromisingly harsh image does pave the way for predictions more or less.
However, the aggressive foreign policies were in fact generally the product of restless domestic policies. This is not difficult to see in the examples of Italy and Greece. Neither country’s expectations were satisfied after World War I. While Greece had problems arising from the population exchange, Italy had difficulties coping with the economic and social chaos World War I had brought about. Still, while both were victors in the war, being victorious does not seem to always bring an environment of peace and development.
Pangalos’ rapprochement with Italy in terms of foreign policy during the year he was in power had important consequences for Greece. The tense relations, especially due to the Corfu crisis, were replaced by a friendly process, and Greece gained a friend, at least until 1940. Still, his attempt at friendship was a product of his opposition to Türkiye, which he had defined as an enemy. Because of this, after Pangalos lost power in 1926, Greece would enter a normalization process and start to take concrete steps to resolve its problems with Türkiye.
