Rusya, Osmanlı ve İran Arasındaki Rekabette Bir Tebaa: XIX. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Kafkasya’daki Ermenilerin Durumu (1801-1849)
Bu çalışma jeopolitiğin önemli bileşenleri olan coğrafya ve demografiye vurgu yapmaktadır. Üç emperyal gücün -Rusya, Osmanlı ve İran- Kafkasya vilayetlerindeki savaş sonrası demografik dalgalanmaları yönlendirme iradesi ve becerisi onların stratejik anlamda güçlü ve zayıf yönlerinin açığa çıkmasına da sebep oldu. İran ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu sınırları içindeki Ermenilerin 1826-1828 Rusya-İran ve 1828-1829 Rusya-Osmanlı savaşları sonrasında Rusya tarafından Kafkasya’da yeni ele geçirilen bölgelere kitlesel göçü, Rusya’nın kolonizasyon siyasetinde ve bölgede Rusya hâkimiyetinin pekiştirilmesinde önemli bir dönüm noktasıydı. Türkmençay ve Edirne Antlaşmaları, yaklaşık 150.000 Ermeni’nin Rusya İmparatorluğu topraklarına göç etmesiyle sonuçlandı. Bu durum büyük kriz dönemlerinin yerel halklar üzerinde hangi seviyede demografik sonuçlar doğurabileceğinin bir örneği olarak da ele alınabilir. Bilhassa Kırım Savaşı sonrasında ‘demografik muharebe’ olarak da adlandırılan oldukça geniş çaplı göç olaylarının en yakın öncülü olarak gerçekleşen Ermeni nüfusun bu kitlesel hareketi önceki yüzyıllarda imparatorluklar tarafından ele alınan paradigmaların değişmekte olduğunun da bir yansımasıdır. Önceki yüzyıllardaki örneklerine kıyasla Ermenilerin imparatorlukların merkez ve taşrasındaki malî, iktisadî ve ticarî alandaki etkinliği ve önemi, Rusya İmparatorluğu’nun güneye doğru ilerleyişi ve Kafkasya’da artan askerî prestiji ile değişmeye başladı. Bu süreç Osmanlı ve İran idarî merkezlerinin Ermeni cemaatine olan bakışını gözden geçirmesine sebep olurken aynı zamanda Rusya’nın sınır bölgelerindeki güvenlik kaygısını azaltmak ve daha idare edilebilir bir demografik yapı inşa etme kaygısını da beraberinde getirdi.
A Subject Between Russian, Ottoman and Iranian Rivalry: The Situation of Armenians in the Caucasus in the First Half of the XIXth Century (1801-1849)
This paper emphasises geography and demography as important components of geopolitics. The willingness and ability of the three imperial powers - Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Iran - to manage the post-war demographic fluctuations in the Caucasus provinces revealed their strategic strengths and weaknesses. The mass immigration of Armenians from the borders of Iran and the Ottoman Empire into Russia’s newly captured territories in the Caucasus following the Russo-Iranian War of 1826-1828 and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829 was an important turning point in Russia’s colonisation policy and the consolidation of Russian dominance in the region. The Treaties of Turkmenchay and Adrianople resulted in the immigration of approximately 150,000 Armenians to the territory of the Russian Empire. This can be taken as an example of the extent to which periods of great crisis can have demographic consequences on local populations. This mass movement of the Armenian population, which was the closest precursor to the large-scale immigration events, also referred to as ‘demographic warfare’, especially in the aftermath of the Crimean War, is also a reflection of the changing paradigms that had been handled by the empires in previous centuries. The financial, economic and commercial influence and importance of Armenians in the centre and provinces of the empires began to change with the Russian Empire’s southward advance and growing military prestige in the Caucasus. While this process caused the Ottoman and Iranian administrative centres to reconsider their attitude towards the Armenian community, it also brought with it Russia’s concern to reduce security concerns in the border regions and to build a more manageable demographic structure.
This work examines the Caucasus as both a periphery and a centre of interaction between three competing empires —Russia, the Ottomans, and Iran—each seeking to shape the region to serve their strategic ambitions. While the mountainous terrain provided a stronghold against Russian influence, the presence of Christian communities like Armenians and Georgians played a key role in imperial struggles. While Russia’s military successes in the early XIXth century initially fostered positive perceptions among Armenians in Tbilisi and Karabakh, attitudes varied in regions with stronger trade and cultural ties to Iran and the Ottoman Empire. When Russia’s influence declined, religious leaders like the Armenian catholicos played a greater role in shaping allegiances through religious rhetoric. During the Russian-Iranian (1826-1828) and Russian-Ottoman (1828-1829) wars, Russia’s advances were welcomed by some Armenians in frontier regions. The Treaties of Turkmenchay and Adrianople allowed non-Muslims to migrate under Russian protection and sell their property. Russia viewed Christian Armenians and Georgians as potential allies in governing the region’s large Muslim population.
By the late XIXth century, demographic shifts became a strategic tool in imperial conflicts. Migrations became more systematic, leading to what can be described as "demographic warfare," with both non-Muslims and Muslims relocating between Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian territories. The mass migration of Iranian and Ottoman Armenians to the Russian Caucasus was a gradual process, encouraged—and at times coerced—by local Armenian clergy and Russian military officials, some of whom were of Armenian descent. Unlike the forced deportations of Armenians by Shah Abbas I in the XVIIth century, this migration occurred as a post-war movement. Following the Treaties of Turkmenchay and Edirne, an estimated 150,000 Armenians left Iranian and Ottoman territories, settling in newly acquired Russian regions such as Revan, Nakhchivan, Akhalkalak, and Akhaltsyhe. There was a significant divide between the educated, affluent Armenian elites in the imperial capitals and the majority of Armenians—peasants, artisans, and small farmers —living in Anatolia and the South Caucasus. Many rural Armenians did not even speak Armenian, sharing little with the urban elite beyond their religion. To maintain influence over this dispersed population, Armenian elites relied on economic, financial, and religious networks. This arrangement also benefited the Iranian and Ottoman authorities, as they could use the elites to manage and appease the Armenian population in the provinces, particularly during periods of unrest.
The 1813 Treaty of Gulistan brought several key khanates, including Derbent, Baku, Ganja, and Karabakh, under Russian control, while Revan and Nakhchivan remained under Iran. Russia’s growing military prestige was particularly welcomed by Armenians in Tbilisi and Karabakh. In Tbilisi, the headquarters of the Caucasus Independent Corps, Armenians benefitted from cultural and intellectual opportunities, while in Karabakh, Russia relied on the Armenian elite, the maliks, to govern the region despite their fragmented leadership. Their political and military struggles with the local khans were driven more by local interests than by ethno-national conflicts. Armenians around the Caspian Sea, engaged in trade, maintained ties with both Russia and Iran, while those in Revan and Nakhchivan remained distant from Russian influence. In regions where Russia’s military presence was strong, Armenians aligned with Russian interests. However, in areas where Russian influence weakened, alternative powers filled the vacuum, shaping the pragmatic choices of Armenian elites and rural populations. Religious rhetoric also played a role in shaping Armenian loyalties, especially during crises.
Karabakh was divided into mountainous and lowland regions. The mountainous areas, controlled by Armenian lords, provided a military advantage, and Russian studies indicated that Armenians were the majority in these areas, while Muslims dominated the plains. Under Safavid rule, Karabakh maliks enjoyed privileges, which were later renewed by Nadir Shah after they resisted the Ottomans. As Russia expanded into Georgia, the maliks saw its growing power and sided with Russia against Iran during the Russo-Iranian War (1804–1813), seeking military protection amid shifting regional dynamics. The Aras River Valley and the Ararat Plain were key agricultural and trade centres in the South Caucasus, serving as an important corridor for the Ottomans, Iranians, and Russians. The Khanate of Revan, home to the Armenian Catholicosate of Echmiadzin, remained under Iranian influence, allowing Armenians in Revan and Nakhchivan to maintain their religious and cultural identity while having relatively strong ties with Iran.
In the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian community was disorganized at the start of the XIXth century. However, the wealthy Armenian amiras in İstanbul held significant influence, both within the Armenian Patriarchate and in the Ottoman administration. The Russo-Ottoman War (1828-1829) highlighted the Patriarchate's role in influencing the Armenian population, many of whom viewed Russia positively, causing concern for the Ottoman authorities. The Armenian Church had a long tradition of lay participation in leadership, which in the early XIXth century resulted in control by the affluent Armenian elite in İstanbul. The amiras’ loyalty to the Ottoman regime contrasted with the weaker influence of the Patriarchate over Armenians in the eastern frontier provinces.
In the 1840s, Russian authorities sought greater control over the South Caucasus. In 1840, the Armenian province was dissolved and merged into the Georgian-Imeret province, with all administration conducted in Russian. This reorganization failed to stabilize the region. In 1845, Emperor Nicholas I appointed Prince Mikhail Vorontsov as governor-general to improve governance by involving local elites. In 1846, he divided the South Caucasus into four provinces along ethno-religious lines. In 1849, to strengthen Russian control, he created a fifth province—the Yerevan province—by separating Armenian-majority areas from neighbouring provinces, though its southern half remained predominantly Muslim.
In 1845, Emperor Nicholas I appointed Prince Mikhail Vorontsov as governor-general of the Caucasus to address unrest in the region. Vorontsov aimed to integrate local elites into the administration and in 1846 convinced the tsar to divide the South Caucasus into four provinces along ethno-religious lines. Seeking Armenian support, he later reestablished an Armenian province. On 9 June 1849, he created the Yerevan province by separating it from Tbilisi province and incorporating the predominantly Armenian Aleksandropol region. This new province was larger, had improved transport links, and had an Armenian-majority north, while the south remained Muslim-majority.
