The Shihāb family’s seizing the control of the Emirate of Jabal Shuf which was subsequent to the death of Ahmad Maʻn without leaving any successor in 1697 paved the way for regional power struggles. These struggles came to an end in favour of the Shihāb family. This happened in 1711 when the Battle of ʻAyn Dārā occured. Also the Ottoman government was not indifferent to the fact that Bashir Shihāb presided the Emirate of Jabal Shuf through the consents of Druzes and Maronites. The Ottoman government intervened in the initiatives which were disposed by the local powers through the agency of Husayn Maʻn who took various missions in the Palace. It decided to invest Haydar, another member of the Shihāb family, with the emirate instead of Bashir Shihāb.

Ottoman government tried to control local powers in the region through the muqataa system and intervened in local politics as seen in Emirate’s transition from Maʻnid to Shihâbs. . In this context, it is understood that the Ottoman government was successful in creating some local powers against the rising ones and activating them. It is possible to understand the support of the Ottoman government to the ʻAlam al-Din Family who challenged the power of the Shihābs in muqataas of Jabal Shuf in this context. Still, the Battle of ʻAyn Dārā was the final response of the Shihābs to the challenge of the ʻAlam al-Din Family. When the ʻAlam al-Din Family which received support from the governors of Damascus, was defeated in this battle, the Emirate of Jabal Shuf was completely seized by the Shihābs.

Within the period following the discharge of the ʻAlam al-Din Family with the help of the Battle of ʻAyn Dārā, the Shihāb leadership in the muqataas of Jabal Shuf gained validity through the assents of the Maronite Khāzin, Hubaysh and Dahdah families besides the ones of Druze, Nakd, ʻImâd, Janbalat, Abu’l-Lamʻ, Talhuk, and Raslān families. The Ottoman government also gave its consent for the Emirate to carry on administrative and fiscal control within the compass of the muqataa system. The governors of Sidon and Damascus, and the central senior accounting (Baş muhasebe kalemi) functionaries in this period, went on supervising both the pursuit of the annual tax debts of the muqataas which were dependent on the emirate in question and the collection of these muqatas’ share within the amount of the annual payment which was necesssary for the finance of the Hadj organization and which was supposed to be collected for the Damascus treasure. The Emirate of Jabal Shuf, in the respect of the Ottoman government, was nothing more than the totality of the Shuf Mountains which are located on the northeast of Sidon and the muqataas surrounding it. In the 18th century, the emirs who were the members of the Shihāb family took away the control of these muqataas from the governors of Sidon and for tax-farming gave them to their supporters, the Druze families. In the periods of Emir Bashir and Haydar, the Shihābs, while establishing their local rule, were on the prowl of taking precedence over schism which formerly provided a propitious basis for the challanges of the rival families.

The Shihâbs’ sphere of influence did not remain limited to the Jabal Shuf region. In the 18th century, there were times when they seized control within the muqataas of Jubbat Basharri which are located on the north of Jabal Lubnan, Jubayl which is on the northern coast too, and Batrun. It was seen that especially during the period of Emir Mulhim, the Shihâbs tried to extend their sphere of influence towards the interior regions of Jabal Lubnan, namely the Beqaa Valley. It was comprehended that in the south they had the intention of expanding their influence towards Jabal ʻAmil and Safad regions. Haydar Ahmad who committed to paper the history of the Shihâbs had some narrations in which the muqataas of Shumar and Tuffah were exposed as the regions under the control of Emir Mulhim. In this context, these narrations were remarkable in regard to being the ones which were oriented to the emphasis on the historical sphere of influence which was inherited from the Ma‘nids. But, we have compared the documents in the Ottoman archives and have run across the datas which are discordant with these narrations.On the other hand, there were internal and external obstacles in front of the Shihabs’ demand which was oriented to the expansion of the sphere of influence.  

After the victory of ʻAyn Dārā, the Shihābs gave their all to putting an end to the faction struggle and establishing a local potency based on the supremacy of a sole and well-attended faction. But, the efforts of the Shihabs could not prevent the emergence of some new schism between Druze families which went under the names of Canbalātiyyah and Yazbakiyyah. It is possible to say that the Canbalātiyyah, one of the aforesaid factions, became an effective local power in the region after a while besides the Shihābs. It is understood that the emirs of the Shihāb family had to stand up for one of these factions and used up their own energies within the everlasting factional struggles. This situation generated a significant internal obstacle in front of the targets which are oriented to the extension of their sphere of influence.

The governors of Damascus constituted another obstacle in front of the Shihābs who aimed at extending their influence over the Bilâd al-Shâm. The Shihābs experienced a struggle of influence with the governors who were the members of ʻAzm Family over the Beqaa Valley and the Baalbek muqataa. The period in which this struggle escalated was the one when Emir Mülhim and As‘ad Pasha clashed. It was seen that during the period of Gurji Osman Pasha who was the former enfranchised slave of As‘ad Pasha, the relations between the government of Damascus and the Shihābs evolved into an alliance from the struggle of influence as a matter the periodical conditions. Emir Yusuf, in his struggle for becoming the emir of Jabal Shuf, obtained the support of both Gurji Osman Pasha and his son Muhammad Pasha, the governor of Tripoli. Emir Yusuf, thanks to this support and by obtaining the tax farmings of Jubayl, Batrun and Jubbat Basharri muqataas in 1763, took a significant step in becoming the emir of Jabal Shuf. Meanwhile, it is necessary to say that Emir Yusuf, in his struggle for becoming the emir, was strongly supported by the Maronite families.

It is possible to encounter, in the Ottoman archival records, with the datas which talk about that within the scope of muqataa system, a superior-subordinate relationship was conducted between the governors of Sidon and the Shihābs who clashed with the governors of Damascus for influence. It is understood that the governors of Sidon exploited the Shihāb emirs as the agents for collecting the taxes of Druze and Maronite peasants who lived on with garden-farming in the highlands. It is possible to say that on this topic the Shihābs adopted some much more agreeable manners than the ones that the Maʻnids who held local power in the previous century, had done. Besides, the governors of Sidon occasionally got help from the military power of the Shihāb emirs in their disciplining campaings against the Shia families in Jabal ʻAmil, on the south.

It can be said that Safed and its surroundings were included in the regions which the Shihāb emirs wanted to dominate. But, in the 18th century a new local power which was not encountered in the previous century emerged. This was the Zayâdınah Family. It was seen that between Zâhir al-Omar, the famous leader of this family and the Shihābs some strategies were followed. They were like the mutual remote monitoring of the movements, one side taking defensive precautions in the case of another side’s engagement with an offensive attitude and its attack on a close location, and the participation of one side to an action which a third part entered at the expense of another side (For example, the Shihābs supported the governors of Damascus in their actions at the expense of Zâhir al-Omar).

Another one of the Shihābs’ significant rivals in the struggles of influence was Metâvile. The Shihāb emirs who in the north obtained an ultimate successs in putting across their influence to Jubayl, Baturn and Himâdis who lived in Jubbat Basharri could not expose the same success against the ones from the Harfush family, the local powers of the Beqaa Valley. It is possible to say that the Shihāb emirs who adopted an attitude which was based on the conflict with the families of Ali al-Sagir, Munkar and Saʻb who lived in the south, Jabal ʻAmil, put across their influence especially in the region which included the Tuffâh muqataa which is located on the south of the Shuf Mountains in the process until the 1740s. In the following period, the aforesaid Shia families who lived in Jabal ʻAmil region, appealed to the support of Zâhir al-Omar, the sheik of Safed against the attacks of Shihābs which were oriented to suppression. Especially, in the late 1760s and the first half of 1770s, it was seen that an alliance was established between Zâhir al-Omar and the Metâviles of Jabal ʻAmil against the alliance which was created between Yusuf, the Shihāb emir and Gurji Osman Pasha, the governor of Damascus.