İbn Sînâ ve Fahreddin er-Râzî’ye Göre Tümel Önermenin Öznesi
Fatma KaraismailBu makale, İbn Sînâ’nın (öl. 428/1037) kendisinden önceki mantık geleneğinden farklılaştığı en önemli noktalardan birisi olan mutlak ve modal önermeler hakkındaki görüşlerini anlamak için kritik bir konumda bulunan tümel yüklemli önermenin öznesine dair açıklamalarını, onun etkili yorumcusu ve eleştirmeni Fahreddin er-Râzî’nin (öl. 606/1210) yorumları eşliğinde ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. İbn Sînâ el-Muhtasaru’l-evsat ve eş-Şifâ: el-Kıyâs’ta tümel yüklemli önermenin öznesinin beş özelliğine yer vermektedir. Tümel yüklemli önermenin öznesine dair ilk defa İbn Sînâ tarafından ortaya konulan bu özellikler incelendiğinde onların en temelde İbn Sînâ’nın hakikî önerme anlayışı, yüklemleme teorisi ve mutlak ve modal önerme yorumuna dayandığı görülür. Bu özelliklerin ve ortaya çıkma nedenlerinin ayrıntılı olarak incelenmesi ve bu özelliklere dair İbn Sînâcı mantıkçıların yorum, katkı ve eleştirilerinin tespit edilmesi İbn Sînâcı mantık geleneğinin önerme anlayışının belirlenmesi açısından son derece önemlidir. Bu amaçla bu makalede İbn Sînâ’nın burada ifade ettiği özne yorumuna nasıl ulaştığı ve bu yaklaşımın yüklem açısından karşılık geldiği noktalar aydınlatılarak İbn Sînâ’ya göre tümel önermelerin özneleri bakımından analizi özlü bir şekilde sunulmuştur. Bu yapılırken İbn Sînâ’nın genel çerçevesini çizdiği önerme anlayışını şerh, tashih, yeniden tasnif ve zaman zaman da eleştirilerle daha yetkin bir hâle getirmede çok önemli bir role sahip olan Râzî’nin yorumları dikkate alınmış ve böylece hem Râzî’nin bu kritik meselede İbn Sînâ karşısındaki konumu belirginleştirilmeye hem de konunun Râzî sonrası İslam mantık geleneğindeki tezahürlerinin başlangıç noktaları gün yüzüne çıkartılmaya çalışılmıştır.
The Subject Term of Universal Proposition According to Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
Fatma KaraismailThis article examines Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1037) views on the subject term of universal categorical proposition as well the comments of his influential interpreter and critic Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) regarding this subject term. In al-Mukhtaṣar al-awsaṭ and al-Shifā’: al-Qiyās, Ibn Sīnā explained the five characteristics of the subject term of universal categorical proposition. When examining these characteristics of the subject term of universal categorical proposition as first put forth by Ibn Sīnā, it is clearly seen that they are mainly based on Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of essentialist (ḥaqīqī) proposition, predication theory, and the absolute and modal proposition interpretation. Examining these characteristics and their roots in detail and determining the interpretations, contributions, and criticisms of Avicennian logicians about these conditions is essential for being able to identify conception of the proposition of the Avicennian logic tradition. For this purpose, this article concisely presents the analysis of universal propositions in terms of their subject terms by explaining how Ibn Sînâ had obtained this interpretation of the subject term. While doing this, the article considers Rāzī’s comments, which had a vital role in making Ibn Sīnā’s understanding of the proposition more competent through commentary, correction, reclassification, and criticism. Thus, this paper clarifies Rāzī’s position on this critical issue and illuminate the starting points of the appearances of the subject in the post-Rāzī Islamic logic tradition.
Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) dramatically differed from his predecessors on issues such as types of modal propositions, contradiction, conversion and contraposition, categorical syllogism and modal syllogism with his understanding of absolute and modal propositions. Ibn Sīnā’s unique system of proposition and syllogism dominated the course of Islamic logic studies. Meanwhile, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) followed Ibn Sīnā and the Avicennian logician Sahlān al-Sāwī (fl. 540/1145) in these matters and transformed the system whose foundations Ibn Sīnā had laid into a more complete and perfect system through commentary, correction, reclassification, and criticism from time to time. This article presents Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of the subject term of universal propositions, which is critical for understanding his conception of propositions, and one of the most important points where he differed from the logical tradition that had preceded him, together with al-Rāzī’s commentaries on this topic. The analysis of the subject term of universal propositions is extremely important, as it is closely related to Ibn Sīnā’s theory of predication and to his understanding of absolute and modal propositions. In this respect, a detailed analysis of the meaning of the subject term of universal categorical propositions according to Ibn Sīnā and the main factors that had led Ibn Sīnā to reach this interpretation of the subject term are very essential for determining the understanding of propositions in the Avicennian logical tradition. To this end, the article presents the meaning of the subject terms of universal categorical proposition according to Ibn Sīnā and explains the factors that played an important role in the formation of Ibn Sīnā’s completely unique conception of the subject term. In so doing, the article also considers al-Rāzī’s interpretations and thus clarifies his position with respect to Ibn Sīnā on this critical issue.
Ibn Sīnā explained five characteristics of the subject term of universal categorical proposition. His explanations in the context of the expression “uttered to the universal” (maqūl ‘alā kull) are based on Aristotle’s explanations of the meaning of the expression “uttered to the universal” (tò katà pantòs katēgoreîsthai). In the context of this expression, Alexander Aphrodisias (d. 3rd century) and Fārābī (d. 339/950) also have explanations about the meaning of universal categorical proposition. However, Ibn Sīnā was the first to include these five characteristics of the subject term of universal categorical proposition in this context. The first of these features is the meaning of the universal quantifier, and the second is about the essence (aldhāt) of the subject in a universal categorical proposition. According to Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, the expression “every J” does not mean “all Js” in the external world or “universal J”, but every J that can be characterized as J if it exists in the external world. This interpretation of the subject term of universal categorical proposition forms the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s essentialist understanding of propositions.
As the third characteristic of the subject term of universal categorical proposition, İbn Sīnā stated that the expression “every J” can refer to every individual whose essence is J, as well as to individuals qualified by J. This characteristic of the subject term is based on the two types of predications according to İbn Sīnā. The last two of these properties are about the relation of the subject term to the essence of the subject. Accordingly, the relation of the subject term to the essence of the subject can be continuous or discontinuous, because according to Ibn Sīnā’s unique interpretation of the general absolute proposition, the predicate in a general absolute proposition can be predicated of the essence of the subject either continuously or discontinuously. Therefore, according to him, the same property applies to the relation between the subject term and the essence of the subject. Finally, Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī stated “every J” to refer to those who are actually (bi-l-fi‘l) Js. This is perhaps the most controversial issue in Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī’s explanations for the subject term of universal categorical proposition.
