How Does Aristotle’s Categories Criticize the Theory of Forms?
Zeynep DuranAristotle’s Categories posits two kinds of ontological predications and two corresponding distinctions of being. Aristotle distinguishes substances from nonsubstances by accidental predication (being in a subject), particulars from their universals by essential predication (being said-of a subject). These distinctions provide two fundamental principles regarding Aristotle’s ontology: (1) Being is said in many ways, and (2) being is always being something. In this respect, Categories has the claim of explaining both the essences and accidents of things and thereby solving the related problems of predication. Accordingly, although no direct reference can be found in the text itself, scholarly opinion has concluded Categories to offer two fundamental critiques of Platonic Forms: (1) The theory of Forms fails to explain the accidental features of things by assuming one kind of being, and (2) the theory of Forms fails to explain the essential natures of things because of its relational account of predication. This paper argues that the critical relationship between Categories and the Platonic Forms can be explicitly read in a passage in Book A of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (990b22-991a3). When considered in light of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on it in particular, one notices that the counterarguments directed against the theory of Forms in the passage assume the doctrine of categories and make precisely two criticisms as ascribed in the literature. Furthermore, one can infer from the passage some ontological difficulties that the Platonic Forms has to face while Categories avoids. This article aims to contribute to the scholarly idea of reading Categories against Plato’s theory of Forms by providing this passage as textual evidence. To this end, I will first explain Aristotle’s theory of predication as introduced in this treatise and then analyze the aforementioned passage.
Aristoteles’in Kategoriler’i Formlar Teorisini Nasıl Eleştirir?
Zeynep DuranKategoriler’de, iki tür ontolojik yüklemleme ilişkisi ve karşılık gelen iki temel varlık ayrımı karşımıza çıkar. Aristoteles, bir taşıyıcı içinde olma ifadesiyle tözleri ilineklerden, bir taşıyıcı için söylenir olma ifadesiyle de tümelleri, özleri bakımından aynı olan tikellerinden ayırır. Anılan ayrımlar bize Aristoteles’in varlık görüşündeki iki temel prensibi verirler: Var olan çok anlamlıdır ve her zaman belirli bir şeydir. Bu bakımdan Kategoriler, şeylerin hem özlerini hem de ilineklerini açıklama ve böylece ilgili yüklemleme problemlerini çözme iddiasına sahiptir. Bu doğrultuda, metnin kendisinde doğrudan bir atıf bulunmasa da literatürde Kategoriler’in Platoncu formlara yönelik iki temel eleştiri getirdiği sonucuna varılır: (1) Formlar teorisi var olanları tek anlamlı varsayarak şeylerin ilineksel özelliklerini açıklamakta başarısız olur; (2) formlar teorisi ilişkisel bir yüklemleme modeli kabul ettiğinden şeylerin özlerini açıklamakta başarısız olur. Bu yazı, Kategoriler ve Platoncu formlar arasındaki bu eleştirel ilişkinin Metafizik’in A kitabında yer alan bir pasajda (990b22-991a3) açıkça görülebileceği iddiasını taşır. Bilhassa Afrodisyaslı Aleksandros’un şerhi ışığında ele alındığında, pasajda formlar teorisine yöneltilen karşıt argümanların kategoriler kuramını varsaydığı ve argümanlar ile tam da literatürde konu edilen iki eleştirinin yapıldığı görülür. Bunun devamı olarak pasajdan, Kategoriler’in kaçındığı fakat formlar teorisinin yüzleşmek zorunda olduğu bazı ontolojik zorlukları çıkarsamak da mümkündür. Bu yazı ile, anılan pasaj bir kanıt olarak sunulmakta ve böylece Kategoriler’de formlar teorisinin örtük bir eleştirisi bulunduğu yönündeki literatür okumalarına katkıda bulunulması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunun için önce Aristoteles’in bu metinde ortaya koyduğu yüklemleme kuramı açıklanmakta ve ardından anılan pasaj analiz edilmektedir.
Aristotle’s Categories is widely accepted for positing a predication theory of being. He constructs his theory by assuming two fundamental ideas: being is said in many ways and being is always being something. Accordingly, he distinguishes substances from non-substances, as well as universals (eidē [species] and genē [genera]) from particulars. Therefore, the way substantial beings are differs from the way non-substantial beings are; with particulars being the essential instances of their species and genera within the same ontological categories. While non-substances are predicated of substances by accidental predication (being in a subject), universals are predicated of particulars by essential predication (being said-of a subject).
Although Categories does not mention Plato or doctrine of Forms, this elaborated theory has been considered within the scholarly literature to reflect Aristotle’s anti-Platonic understanding of reality and to provide better answers to certain ontological problems that the theory of Forms (TF) fails at answering. As such, the charges in Categories that are deemed to address TF are as follows: TF cannot explain both the essential and accidental features of things. Moreover, it fails to answer how one thing can have many names, and is closely associated with the notion of bare substratum.
In this paper, I defend that this philosophical exegesis can be explicitly read in a passage in Metaphysics1 in which Aristotle criticizes TF. When read in light of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ detailed commentary,2 the passage offers an exceptional opportunity to see how the ideas in Categories can be applied to a critique of TF, thus lending textual evidence to this scholarly reading within the contemporary literature.
In this passage I refer to, Aristotle conceives the TF and propounds its deficiencies by assuming the predication theory in Categories: Although Platonists commit themselves to the existence of Forms of both substantial and non-substantial things, their very ideas and principles, together with the necessity of logic, preclude the existence of Forms of non-substances. If TF is true, then, there should only be essential participation (predication). Because Forms are substances, there should be substantial things only. Therefore, TF provides no account regarding the being of nonsubstances and thus contradicts itself. As a result, one can conclude that, unlike Categories and its elaborate explanation on this issue, TF is unable to explain how accidental beings are and, thereby, is bound to turn things into a bundle of substances (the question of how can one thing have many names).
Subsequently, the passage in Metaphysics aims to show how TF also fails to account for the essence of things. Although TF limits itself to the existence of the Forms of substances only, it also fails to provide a persuasive relation between the two separate realms where Forms and particulars dwell. If things participate in Forms in an essential way, then the well-known thirdman problem occurs. Hence, if TF is true, things cannot possess essences. In other words, unlike the essential particulars (primary substances) of Categories, the participants in TF are merely contingent things. This conclusion supports the idea that TF is associated with the problematic notion of the bare substratum (the substratum theory of concrete particulars). Said another way and in light of this argument, TF is unable to provide an adequate justification for refusing the substratum theory that states concrete particulars to be the sum of a bare substratum and their extrinsic properties.
The passage this study addresses suggests Aristotle’s conception of concrete particulars to have determined his critique of TF. His terminology and how he deals with the problems further support this impression. Alexander of Aphrodisias’ detailed arguments patently clarify that the two charges against TF in Metaphysics stem from the account in Categories. By analyzing this passage, I aim to contribute to the contemporary readings concerning the critical relationship between Plato’s TF and Aristotle’s Categories.
