Mehmet

Traditionally, Kantian thought is rooted in the notion that a priori concepts are fundamental, universal, and necessary preconditions for experience. These concepts are usually seen as independent of empirical influences, forming a core part of Kant’s epistemology as laid out in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, this article argues for a nuanced reinterpretation, challenging the conventional understanding by proposing an epigenetic model for the formation of a priori concepts. This approach not only revisits the core of Kantian epistemology but also brings in a dynamic perspective on how rationality and autonomy interact within the context of life.&nbsp;One of the key philosophical debates underpinning this re-evaluation is the opposition between preformationism and epigenesis, a contrast that Kant himself draws upon, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment. Preformationism suggests that all traits and structures are pre-determined, much like pre-written codes that only need to unfold over time. In contrast, epigenesis emphasizes a formative process, where structures are not pre-given but develop through interaction and adaptation. The article argues that a priori concepts can be better understood through an epigenetic framework, where they are not fixed and predetermined but rather self-generated through cognitive processes. This allows for a more flexible and evolving understanding of these concepts, resonating with the dynamic interplay between reason and experience.To support this interpretation, the article draws parallels with the biological concept of Bildungstrieb (formative drive), introduced by the German biologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Blumenbach’s theory was influential in the late 18th century and emphasized the capacity of living organisms to self-organize and develop autonomously. By drawing on this concept, the article suggests that rational concepts, much like living organisms, exhibit a form of self-organization. This interpretation positions a priori concepts not as rigid structures imposed upon experience but as emergent properties that arise from the interaction of the cognitive faculties. This approach is not merely metaphorical; it seeks to underline a genuine parallel between biological development and cognitive formation, suggesting that understanding the latter could benefit from insights gained from the former.&nbsp;Reflective judgment, as examined in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, serves as a central point in this argument. Unlike determinative judgment, which applies existing concepts to specific objects, reflective judgment is concerned with finding new principles that can unify diverse phenomena. The article posits that reflective judgment has an autonomous and creative role, capable of generating new principles that arise from engaging with the contingencies of life. This capacity for adaptation and responsiveness to the unexpected aligns with the epigenetic model, where concepts develop not in isolation but through an ongoing process of reflection and adjustment. In this way, reflective judgment embodies a form of self-organization that challenges the static, preformed nature of traditional a priori concepts.The article further builds on this reinterpretation by engaging with contemporary philosophical discussions, particularly the work of Catherine Malabou. Malabou’s interpretation of Kant introduces the idea of a "plastic" or flexible transcendental, suggesting that even the most fundamental structures of cognition can undergo transformation. This plasticity is likened to biological plasticity, where organisms can adapt to changing conditions. Malabou’s insights help to support the article’s claim that Kant’s transcendental framework should not be seen as a rigid, unchangeable system but as one that is capable of evolution and adaptation, particularly through the mechanism of reflective judgment. Thus, the transcendental is reimagined as a dynamic and living structure, open to change rather than confined to static, predetermined rules.In rethinking the transcendental through the lens of reflective judgment, the article also revisits Kant’s ideas on causality and contingency. Traditional Kantian causality is deterministic and operates according to universal laws. However, when applied to the realm of life, strict determinism falls short of capturing the adaptive, contingent nature of living beings. The article suggests that reflective judgment allows for a reconceptualization of causality that accommodates contingency, providing a framework that can account for the flexibility and unpredictability inherent in life processes. This form of "contingent causality" does not undermine the structure of reason but rather expands it, allowing for a richer understanding of how principles can emerge from experience without being entirely determined by it.&nbsp;Ultimately, the article argues that this reinterpretation has broader implications for how we understand the relationship between autonomy, rationality, and nature. If a priori concepts can be understood as emergent rather than pre-given, then rationality itself can be seen as a more fluid, adaptive, and creative force. This perspective contrasts sharply with more rigid, classical notions of rationality, where reason is viewed as a purely deterministic and inflexible system. By proposing that reason, much like life, has the capacity for self-organization and adaptation, the article suggests a new way of thinking about autonomy—one that emphasizes flexibility, responsiveness, and the ability to generate new principles rather than merely applying pre-existing ones.The implications of this argument extend beyond Kantian philosophy to contemporary debates in fields like philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and epistemology. By framing the transcendental in a way that allows for contingency and self-organization, the article opens up possibilities for dialogue with modern theories of complexity, emergence, and systems thinking. It challenges the idea that Kantian philosophy is inherently rigid or closed off from new interpretations, instead presenting it as a system that can accommodate growth, change, and adaptation. This reimagining of the transcendental as a living, evolving structure calls for a re-examination of classical concepts, such as rationality and reflection, and suggests that Kant's insights can still offer valuable frameworks for understanding the dynamic, contingent processes of life and cognition.In conclusion, this extended analysis repositions Kant’s transcendental philosophy not as a closed, static system but as an open, adaptive framework. By drawing on biological concepts and modern philosophical interpretations, it argues for a model where a priori concepts are seen as products of a formative process akin to the self-organization found in living systems. This perspective encourages a reevaluation of how we understand the interaction between reason and experience, offering a more nuanced, dynamic account of autonomy and rationality that remains relevant to contemporary philosophical discourse.

Rethinking Kant’s Transcendental Concept in the Context of Life and Reflective Judgment

By examining the historical treatment of consciousness and its inherent property and intentionality in the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna (Ibn Sinâ), this research aims to uncover the conceptual threads woven throughout these different intellectual traditions, rather than to pinpoint their origins. It is argued that while Ancient Greek and Islamic philosophy lacked clear terminology for consciousness and intentionality, these concepts are nevertheless discernible in their rich soul-based theories. Moreover, we argue that these early formulations may have laid the groundwork for later notions of consciousness and intentionality, culminating in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenologyOur research begins with a close reading of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thoughts on the soul; and by careful investigation on their perspectives in the hope to provide light on the function of consciousness in Ancient Greek thinking and identify potential connections to intentionality. Though these philosophers did not use modern terminology, a nuanced analysis uncovers remarkable parallels with contemporary concepts. We also analyze why these philosophers related consciousness with soul theories and how this association may have supplied early insights into intentionality, a term that would become critical in subsequent philosophical discourse.In general, although consciousness is the undisputed central concept of current research, ancient Greek philosophers’ understanding is important in terms of giving us an idea of what consciousness was at that time with discourses on the soul. Plato’s corpus describes consciousness as a non-spatial movement that encompasses all intellectual and emotional activity. Given Plato’s view of the soul as the root of all global occurrences and essentially conscious, we are able to contend that human actions such as thinking, volition, inquiry, and moral reasoning are akin to modern concepts of consciousness. When we examine the conscious activities of human beings in this mental movement from a contemporary perspective, it can be said to bear an indirect resemblance.Nonetheless, while tracing intentionality in Plato’s work presents challenges, it ought to suggest that it manifests in his treatment of knowledge or being as always “directed toward something” – a notion that aligns with later formulations of intentionality, even if not explicitly termed as such.&nbsp;Continuing with Aristotle’s views on consciousness, as found in his foundational work On the Soul (Peri Psûkhê, De Anima), it is first necessary to distinguish between potentiality and activity. According to Aristotle, the soul develops as the completion of a process that begins with potentiality and ends with activity. This process is essentially oriented toward achieving something similar to the deliberate nature of consciousness. This fundamental directedness is precisely why we examine Aristotle’s views on the soul in terms of consciousness and intentionality. From this perspective, we can define the soul by first differentiating between potentiality and activity and then questioning consciousness within this framework.We then turn to Avicenna, whose work on the nafs (soul) and consciousness serves as a bridge between Ancient Greek thought and later medieval and modern developments. We examine Avicenna’s Flying Man thought experiment and its relation to Aristotelian metaphysics as crucial for understanding his conception of consciousness. By placing Avicenna in this dialog with Aristotle, we will be able to show how his elaboration on the soul further develops and refines the concepts of consciousness and intentionality.&nbsp;One of the main motivations behind this study is the eventual recognition that Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s nineteenth-century and twentieth-century discussions of consciousness and intentionality are heirs to a long and rich philosophical tradition that we argue upon, from Ancient Greek to Islamic philosophy and further to modern phenomenology. This conception has consistently dealt with the relationship between consciousness and its intentionality to objects. By tracing this complex legacy, we aim to highlight the historical depth of these concepts and provide a philosophical framework for understanding their development.&nbsp;

Soul, Consciousness, and Intentionality: An Inter-Traditional Philosophical Investigation

Çağlar

For Nicolai Hartmann, there is a common argument shared by attempts that miss the constitutive priority of the relation of transcendence in all forms of epistemic phenomena. The line of thought, which is crystallized in the doctrine of transcendental idealism and which Hartmann calls the “correlativistic argument,” is as follows: It is impossible to separate the object from consciousness. Even physical things that exist independently of our cognition require the recognition of a subject. To the extent that Edmund Husserl's phenomenology follows this line of thought, it becomes the focus of Hartmann's criticism. However, Hartmann sees the relation of knowing as a more fundamental relation than the intentional relation that an act of representing, imagining, thinking or judging establishes with its object. The relation of knowing that constitutes knowledge is a relation of transcendence, and what is essential here is that the object cannot be consumed by its being an object for consciousness. The physical thing which the act of knowing intends and grasps, has a 'being' that is 'trans objective'. This thing is what it is irrespective of whether consciousness makes it an object or not. This point, emphasized by Hartmann, is supported by the naive consciousness of the natural attitude. Phenomenology, on the other hand, turns its back on the realism of the natural attitude, since it commits the error of confusing the object and the existent. However, ontology, whose subject matter is the study of the being as being, does not reduce the being to the given, the intended, the represented, because the being is never an object that must be considered in relation to a subject. A phenomenological ontology that examines beings in terms of their meaning for human beings makes all beings relative to human beings. For Hartmann, however, such an attempt ignores the problem of being. Hartmann attaches importance to the fact that the prereflective intentionality that dominates the natural attitude is directed not towards the subject, but towards what confronts the subject, what presents itself to the subject. For Hartmann, not only everyday life but also the sciences maintain natural realism. Both the natural sciences and the social sciences have a belief that the objects they deal with have a reality independent of us. On the other hand, Husserl introduces terms such as bracketing and reduction to denote the reflective attitude that goes backwards from what exists to their manifestation in consciousness. According to Husserl, phenomena are not recognized in the natural attitude. In order for phenomena to be recognized, it is necessary to reflect on their givenness. However, in Hartmann's eyes, reflecting on the givenness of things is not enough to reach the thing itself. Because it is impossible to align the thing with its givenness to consciousness. When we try to understand phenomena purely in terms of their being phenomena, it becomes clear that the object that appears in them is a purely intentional object, that is, it does not matter whether this object corresponds to an existent or not. In every knowledge, nonetheless, there is the consciousness that the object is more than what is known about it at that moment. When I take into account the trans objective side of the existent, I exhibit an activity of knowing that attempts to reach into its being initself and objectify it. Here, Hartmann states that consciousness performs a “transcendent act”. The objects to which transcendent acts are directed are independent of the acts directed at them, and do not owe their existence to those acts. On the other hand, Husserl argues that in some cases there is no distinction between the intentional object of representation and its external object. The recognition of the intentional object as the same as the external object is legitimate when it is possible to prove this through experience. On the basis of the consciousness world correlation advocated by phenomenology, it can be said that the existence of things cannot be conceived without an actual consciousness. Phenomenology does not doubt the existence of actual things, but wants to prove this existence for consciousness. In order to carry out the proving process, we must cease to presuppose the existence of the beings whose existence is to be proved and look for ways to justify this presupposition rationally and legitimately. Husserl argues that everything that exists can only be thought of as an intentional unity. The fact that the physical thing is always relative to consciousness in the relation of knowledge means that it can only be said to exist as a correlate of consciousness. For Husserl, the assumption of &nbsp;a being initself that cannot be experienced in principle is contradictory. There is no property of such an allegedly inexperienced being that cannot be attributed to it on the basis of experience.

Is Nicolai Hartmann’s Critique of Phenomenology Justified? A Comparison with  Edmund Husserl

Funda

The problem of evil, which has its roots in ancient thought, has been discussed by scholars throughout history, and solutions have been attempted to address the problem. Despite the evils occurring in the universe, thinkers have addressed the problem against or in favor of God’s existence. Some thinkers have argued that it is not possible to speak of a purely good God in the face of evil, while others have argued that the existence of evil does not contradict God's justice and power.&nbsp;Although it is accepted that it was first formulated as a philosophical problem by Epicurus (d. 270 BCE), the problem of evil points to an ancient issue of how the belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and good God can be related to the evils seen in the world. The problem of evil, one of the main topics of philosophy of religion today, has also been addressed by Islamic thought traditions, and efforts have been made to provide solutions compatible with Islam’s understanding of God.&nbsp;In this study, starting from the handling of the phenomenon of evil in Ancient Greek Philosophy, the definitions and types of evil by philosophers and the views of the three schools of Islamic thought, theology, philosophy and Sufism, on this issue are evaluated. Islamic thinkers, who generally have an optimistic attitude, have tried to justify that the existence of God and evil do not contradict, and have presented many examples and proofs on the subject. Ziyāeddin al-Kamālī, one of the representatives of the Jadīdist movement, whose views on the problem of evil have been tried to be conveyed with reference to his text God’s Justice. In God’s Justice, al-Kamālī, who approaches the problem of evil in an optimistic and constructive manner, emphasizes that the phenomenon of evil does not contradict God’s wisdom and justice and tries to produce solutions by giving examples from parables and verses. This article, which is based on an analysis of the problem of evil in Islamic philosophy and Kemālī's analysis of the problem of evil in particular, deals with the problem of evil in Islamic thought. Information about Kemâlî’s life and works is given. Then, based on al-Kamālī's Philosophy of Islam, Allah's Justice, his approach to the problem of evil is tried to be revealed. In Islamic thought, the problem of evil is addressed in the sciences of theology, philosophy, and mysticism. These schools have analyzed the problem of evil within a theoretical framework and have tried to explain it in relation to God’s justice and omnipotence. In theological tradition, evil is generally discussed within the framework of the hüsün kubuh debate. Muʿtazilite, Ashʿarī and Māturīdī theologians tried to justify mental evils such as natural disasters, diseases, murder, rape, torture, theft, etc. within the framework of divine justice. When we examine the problem of evil in the philosophical system, philosophers, based on their understanding of the theory of emanation, saw evil as the absence of goodness and tried to explain the types of evil from this perspective. When we look at Sufis, on the other hand, they dealt with evil within the framework of God and the world as in philosophy and theology and made sense of evil from the perspective of wahdat al-wujūd, which constitutes the center of Sufism’s understanding of existence. In this study, after drawing a general framework on this ancient issue, Ziyāeddin Kamālī (d. 1942), an important thinker of the movement known as "Jadidism" in modern Islamic thought, will try to reveal his views on the problem of evil in line with the short text he wrote to address this issue.

Zı̇yâeddin Al-Kamālī and His Approach to the Problem of Evil

Alper

My first aim in this study is to investigate what a distinction should be based on that would allow us to categorise philosophical works. First, I examine the distinction between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. One way of doing this is to compare these two traditions in terms of subject matter. Although in the first half of the 20th century analytic philosophy excluded some of the basic areas of philosophy, such as ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics, in the second half of the 20th century this changed. These areas are now seen as central to the analytic tradition. Something similar can be said if one compares the two traditions in terms of writing style, use of metaphor and thought experiment, and style of argument. I argue that neither of these gives us a proper criterion for making sense of the analytic-continental distinction, which means that this distinction is not comprehensive enough to categorise philosophical works. Second, I discuss the distinction between history of philosophy and systematic philosophy, which is often used in Türkiye to group faculty members in philosophy departments. This distinction is also not promising for categorising philosophical works, because it seems to assume that a nonhistorical work is systematic, or that a systematic work does not require historical discussion. The third distinction, between philosopher-based philosophy and problem-based philosophy, provides the desired comprehensiveness. In this distinction, the criterion is whether the philosophical work seeks to clarify the views of a philosopher or whether it seeks an answer to a philosophical problem on its own. The titles of the philosopher-based works are usually of the form “The concept/problem of x in philosopher A”. The content of the work forces the writer to refer to one or more philosophers (or philosophical schools) in the title. The problem-based works, on the other hand, do not essentially depend on the views of other philosophers.Using the distinction between philosopher-based and problem-based philosophy, I then examine the doctoral theses completed in Türkiye in the last 20 years. It is plausible to assume that the doctoral thesis is one of the most important (if not the most important) piece of writing in one’s academic career. In most cases, it determines later research interests. To carry out this examination of doctoral theses, I used the Council of Higher Education’s open thesis database. This research involved looking at the title, abstract and table of contents of the thesis. In some cases, it was necessary to read parts of the main text in order to categorise the thesis.&nbsp;This examination shows that philosopher-based theses have clearly dominated the philosophical scene in the last 20 years. However, this examination also shows that the number of problem-based theses has increased in the recent period. In order to evaluate this increase, I compare two approaches to doing philosophy. After discussing the contributions that both philosopher-based and problem-based studies can make to the philosophical development of the researcher, and the shortcomings that they can cause, I ask which of these two approaches is better suited to meet society’s expectations from academic philosophy. Failure to answer criticisms such as that philosophers only engage in abstract discussions or are stuck on figures from the past may result in philosophy losing its place in the academy. From this point of view, problem-based philosophy is better suited to making practical contributions to social needs. The recent growth of interest in social epistemology and the social philosophy of language are promising examples of how philosophy can respond to social needs.In sum, problem-based philosophy is better at showing non-philosophers why philosophical problems are important by addressing these problems on their own, rather than through the mediation of a particular philosopher. In this respect, it is positive that there is a growing interest in problem-based philosophy at the doctoral level in Türkiye.

An Overview of Recent Philosophical Works in Türkiye in the Light of the Distinction Between Philosopher-Based and Problem-Based Philosophy

Reason, Truth and Technology in Modern Societies in the Context of The Frankfurt School

Soheil

A Comparison between Locke’s and Mill’s Notions of Liberty

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Eylem

From within the phenomenological movement, criticism has often been directed at phenomenology’s commitment to Cartesian philosophy and its transcendental character. An example of such criticism has recently been presented by Claude Romano, who views transcendental phenomenology as a subjective philosophy and characterises his own phenomenology as “realist”. According to Romano, phenomenology should not and cannot be transcendental. I argue against Romano’s claim and defend that a transcendental phenomenology is possible and that phenomenology, if it is to be an original philosophy, must be transcendental. The first section is devoted to the claim that the Cartesian character of early Husserlian phenomenology and its transcendental turn resulted from taking scepticism seriously. Romano argues that what led Husserl to transcendental phenomenology was his belief that the task of philosophy is to ground the sciences in the face of scepticism and his assumption that there is an irreducible ontological distinction between consciousness and reality, based on this universal doubt. However, Romano stated that the sciences do not need philosophy to ground their truths; this is already an outdated idea. Secondly, the fact that we can doubt a singular perception does not make us doubt our perception and the existence of the world as a whole. On the contrary, any illusion is possible only on the basis of the continuity and permanence of a structurally coherent world. If the sciences can solve all their problems without the help of philosophy, and if a universal doubt is already impossible, then phenomenology does not have to be a transcendental philosophy based on the cogito. Moreover, Romano argues that transcendental phenomenology is not even possible, since it tries to bring together three incompatible theses –realism, dualism, and transcendentalism. In the following sections, I will attempt to explain why Romano’s criticisms are unjustified. The second section is devoted to showing how the theses that Romano claims incompatible can be reconciled and together make a transcendental phenomenology possible. Phenomenology claims to overcome the traditional distinction between appearance and reality through its own notion of phenomena. In this approach, what manifests itself is the thing itself, there is no reality behind its manifestation to which we have no access. Phenomenological intentionality, on the other hand, is to be understood as a mutually constitutive relation or correlation between consciousness and the world on the basis of a factual contact between a sufficiently developed organism and the Earth. Correlation itself precedes consciousness and the world, both of which become what they are by differentiating from each other and within themselves through various syntheses. Taking all this into account, it is possible for phenomenology to be both “realist” and transcendental, and at the same time to recognise the ontological difference between consciousness and worldly objects. The third section deals with the universal epoché that reveals the consciousness-world correlation beyond the idea of a limited epoché that leads to pure and absolute consciousness. In this way, consciousness is only one of the constitutive elements of a transcendental sphere in which we can consider the mutual constitution of consciousness and the world at different levels. The fourth section argues that Husserl’s main interest in scepticism has to do with the historical role assigned to scepticism, depending on the original idea of philosophy as a universal, rigorous and first science. According to Husserl, true philosophy begins as a theory of knowledge in the face of sceptical attacks about the possibility of knowledge, and then necessarily develops into an ontology understood as the science of being. Just as philosophy undertakes the task of grounding scientific knowledge in terms of its possibility, it also undertakes the task of revealing the conditions of possibility for the existence of the world and of the objects, which the sciences take as given from the outset. Thus, philosophy will precede and ground all other sciences, both epistemologically and ontologically. The final section shows that transcendental phenomenology, with its own method and theme, is the only genuine philosophy capable of overcoming scepticism and realising the original idea of philosophy. For phenomenology opens a transcendental sphere with the universal epoché which is imposed by scepticism. By describing the essential structures of correlation operating in this sphere, it can elucidate the conditions of possibility of all beings and their knowledge, and thus epistemologically and ontologically ground all sciences. In conclusion, for Husserl, taking scepticism seriously is not a Cartesian project and ideal, but a matter directly related to what philosophy is and should be at its origin. Phenomenology’s originality depends on its transcendental character, as long as it is not understood as an idealist position against realism, but as a position that investigates the conditions of possibility of objects and their objective knowledge in their relation to subjectivity in the face of all forms of objectivism.

Must Phenomenology be Transcendental?

Following advancements in physics, 19th-century thinkers strongly endorsed the idea of the scientific method as the only path to attaining knowledge. This view, which has significant philosophical implications, was termed scientism in the 20th century. Beyond epistemology, it fosters materialistic attitudes toward ontological, axiological, and religious understandings. The proponents of scientism argued that non-natural scientific disciplines should also be scientized. One method of elucidating scientism is to evaluate the epistemological foundations underlying this perspective. The uniqueness of scientism, which includes ontological and axiological attitudes as well as social, political, moral, and religious interpretations, lies in its proposed solution to the epistemological problem of knowledge. Scientism, as a materialistic approach, presupposes material reality. This makes epistemic concerns about the possibility of true knowledge comprehensible. The term ‘epistemic concern’, as used in this article, goes further from the question of the nature of knowledge to worries about the reliability of the elements used in the justification of propositions. Epistemological scientism seeks to address these concerns by identifying reliable basis for propositions while avoiding metaphysical assumptions. The scientific method is considered reliable because it is rooted in material reality, and the processes of forming scientific propositions are regarded as reliable because of their connection to reality. In addressing epistemic concerns, scientism adopts an externalist approach, emphasizing the importance of psychological processes triggered by external stimuli in the formation of knowledge rather than focusing on subjects’ access to cognitive elements. In other words, proponents of scientism overlook epistemic norms, principles, and standards, focusing instead on the reliable or warranted outcomes of experiments. Because the norms employed in traditional epistemology are not based on empirical evidence. In the context of the question of what can truly be known, epistemic concerns emerge from the expectation that knowledge should have an objective external foundation. The epistemic regress problem presents challenges in justifying metaphysical propositions through appeals to a priori principles. Consequently, the scope of genuine knowledge is often considered to be limited to material reality, which can be apprehended through perception and objective experimentation. Within this framework, the resolution of epistemic concerns is sought through the establishment of a reliable, logically structured process for acquiring knowledge, rather than solely addressing the conditions under which the subject is justified. In summary, this reliable knowledge acquisition method aligns with the scientific method as a means of attaining understanding. This perspective establishes methodological boundaries for disciplines beyond the natural sciences, influencing philosophy, humanities, and social sciences. This article examines the foundations of these limitations and draws philosophical conclusions using a philosophical analysis method. For this reason, it begins by emphasizing scientism, highlighting its central role in the problem of knowledge. It argues that scientism is fundamentally rooted in an epistemic concern, which arises from the question, “How can we know that we know?”. This concern represents the quest for a solid foundation to support the reliability of knowledge acquisition processes. Since the core elements of human beliefs—such as perception and sensation—are derived from reality and objectivity, reliability is considered a characteristic of empirical investigation. The relationship between the ontology of scientism and the externalist approach of epistemological scientism has a central position in this analysis. Therefore, after the general epistemological analysis, epistemological scientism and epistemological naturalism are evaluated in the context of externalism. This evaluation&nbsp;focuses on three key challenges facing scientistic epistemology: normativity, metaphysical judgments, and a priori propositions. This article explores these issues within the context of externalism and analyzes their implications for addressing epistemic concern. In conclusion, this paper argues that externalist stance and epistemological scientism, as a kind of it, do not effectively address the issues surrounding epistemic concern. This is because the norms of knowledge and rationality cannot be overlooked in the externalist framework. Additionally, both the presence of metaphysical presuppositions in scientific practice and theory and the role of a priori knowledge must be acknowledged. These factors pose significant challenges to defending scientism and the externalist position in the context of epistemic concern. Since the initial problem of epistemic concern remains unresolved, scientism will continue to encounter logical difficulties.

A Critical Evaluation on the Epistemological Externalist Ground of Scientism in the Context of Epistemic Concern

Fatma

This article analyzes the truth conditions of hypothetical propositions (qaḍiyya sharṭiyya) in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s logic system and whether these propositions are truth functional or not. Truth functional compound propositions contain truth functional logical connectives and their truth values are determined based on the truth values of their components. On the other hand, non-truth-functional compound propositions are propositions whose truth values are not determined according to the truth values of their components. al-Rāzī’s theory of hypothetical propositions falls under propositional logic, as it examines new propositions formed by combining others through logical connectives and analyzes the relations between their components. However, does this theory also belong to truth functional propositional logic, which is the most comprehensive branch of propositional logic? This question, which points to the purpose of the article, is addressed in the context of conditional propositions (qaḍiyya sharṭiyya muttasila) in the first section and disjunctive conditional propositions (qaḍiyya sharṭiyya munfaṣila) in the second section. In these two chapters, first, the types of conditional and disjunctive conditional propositions according to al-Rāzī are briefly explained, followed by al-Rāzī’s explanations of the truth conditions of each of these propositions. In the first section, the problem is examined in two sub-sections for implicative (luzūmiyya) and coincidental (ittifāqiyya) conditional propositions.According to al-Rāzī, implicative conditional propositions may be either true or false when the truth values of their antecedents and consequents are true and true, false and false, or false and true, respectively. The fact that the truth value of implicative conditional propositions may also be false when their components have these truth values distinguishes implicative conditional propositions from material conditionals. This is because material conditionals are necessarily true when the components have these truth values. The reason of this difference between implicative conditional propositions and material conditionals is the relation of implication (luzūm) that must exist between the antecedent and consequent in implicative conditional propositions. In other words, according to al-Rāzī, implicative conditional propositions mean that the antecedent necessarily entails its consequent and as a result, an implicative conditional proposition cannot be true if the antecedent does not necessarily entail the consequent even if they are both true. According to al-Rāzī coincidental conditional propositions are truth functional because they do not carry the meaning of implication. However, they also do not have the meaning of material implication, as a coincidental conditional proposition with a false antecedent and a false consequent is false.al-Rāzī categorizes disjunctive conditionals into three types: (i) Real disjunctive conditionals (ḥaqīqiyya): According to al-Rāzī, real disjunctive conditionals are propositions in which one component is contradiction of the other. Since it is impossible for two mutually contradictory propositions, such as p and not p, to be true at the same time, one of the components of real disjunctive conditional propositions must be true and the other false. (ii) Mani‘at al-jam‘ disjunctive conditionals are propositions in which one of the components has a narrower scope than the contradiction of the other. (iii) Mani‘at al-ḥuluv disjunctive conditionals are propositions in which one component has a broader scope than the contradiction of the other. In mani‘at al-jam‘ disjunctive conditionals, all components can be false but cannot all be true. Conversely, in mani‘at al-ḥuluv disjunctive conditionals, all components can be true but cannot all be false. In conclusion, according to al-Rāzī, the meanings of disjunctive conditional propositions are determined by the law of non-contradiction. Therefore, the truth values of the components of disjunctive conditional propositions are not the only condition for determining the truth values of these propositions. When determining the truth value of these propositions, we consider not only the truth values of the components but also whether the conflict (ʿinād) relationship mentioned by al-Rāzī exists between the components. This shows that the types of disjunctive conditional propositions are also not truth functional.

Truth Conditions of Hypothetical Propositions According to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Ahmet

Migration, one of the predominant issues of our contemporary world, is a human movement that, despite its disruptive nature, plays a foundational role in the formation of human culture. Before the entrenched concepts of society, state, citizenship, and homeland, there lies migration, whose problematic status in today’s world needs to be critically questioned. This study draws an analogical relationship between migration, often perceived as a problem to be eradicated, and the passive and reductionist material approaches in classical materialist views. This relationship is highlighted through the ideas of Georges Bataille, emphasizing the cyclical nature of dualistic approaches such as problem-solution and cause-effect. Consequently, Bataille’s notion of base materialism, which focuses on the irreducible aspects of matter, allows for considering migration not as an external threat but as an integral part of internal, or homogeneous, human culture. Approaching migration movements through Bataille’s base materialism necessitates focusing on the formless aspect of matter, contrary to the matter-form dualism. Explicitly, the term “base” in Bataille’s materialism, which includes meanings of baseness and vileness, should be understood as a counteraction against the conceptual idealism in classical materialist views. Bataille illustrates the foundational function of the human toe dipped in mud to emphasize the grounding role of matter, in contrast to the overemphasis on the head, symbolizing reason and authority in modern civilization. This perspective critiques the tendency to disregard foundational but lowly perceived elements that significantly contribute to human culture and civilization. This study examines migration through the lens of Bataille’s base materialism, exploring concepts such as irreducibility, logical difference, baseness, and active matter. The primary objective is to investigate what insights and conclusions might be derived when Bataille’s perspective is applied to migration, particularly through the example of refugees. By employing Bataille’s ideas, this study argues that base materialism provides a conducive framework for understanding migration movements as a foundational element rather than merely a problem to be solved. Bataille’s dualistic and relational dialectical dynamic (homogeneous/heterogeneous, mana/taboo, etc.) aims to reveal a similar dualistic relationship between the nation-state and migration. The prevalent understanding of migration as a problem is often one-sided, focusing on migration itself. From a broader perspective, the notion that a solution requires a problem is explored through the dialectic relationships of form and matter, master and slave, as interpreted by Bataille as an alternative to Hegelian idealism. Staying true to this perspective, the cyclical nature of reconciliation is examined through the homogeneous/heterogeneous dichotomy, emphasizing the political nature of the problem itself. This suggests that migration can be seen as a form of self-critique of the nation-state and society. In the homogeneous system where matter is grounded by form, the dialectical relationship between these concept pairs implies that the solution does not create the problem. This draws attention to the possibility of using the problem as a rational tool of homogeneous power in the practical derivatives of the heterogeneous. This can be understood as an alternative interpretation of the state’s self-identity in Hegelian philosophy when re-examined through Bataille’s concept pairs of heterogeneous/homogeneous. When these concepts are applied to the terms nation-state and migration, the state rationalizes its existence around the nation, functionalizing the nation as its meaning (elevated heterogeneity/sacredness). Thus, while the state regulates its taboos that threaten its homogeneity through laws, elevated national values manifest as right-wing heterogeneity. The state’s ideals, established for grounding homogeneous productivity, are violated by left-wing, base heterogeneity. However, homogeneity creates the extreme or wasteful heterogeneous elements it designates as threats. Reducing everything to productivity and economic utility also determines which elements are considered threats based on homogeneous functionality. The tension between the nation-state’s homogeneity and migration is framed by identifying migration as a crisis and a threat, stemming from state-originated decisions. The state creates migration as a threat while integrating this base, left-wing heterogeneity into the right-wing heterogeneity it justifies. This duality reveals the tension between the elevated heterogeneity of the right-wing and the unassimilable base heterogeneity of the left-wing. Thus, the issue of migration, particularly through refugees, signifies the irreducible and sensitive left-wing heterogeneity that the homogeneous system cannot assimilate. In this context, the relationship between causality dissolves, and one does not become the problem or solution of the other. The fixed ideal perspective of seeing migration as a problem is a judgment of the abstraction method emphasized in base materialism. Therefore, approaches proposing the solution of migration as a problem by the nation-state resemble the dynamic of abstracting and subjugating the impossible in idealist/materialist presuppositions. Bataille’s perspective, free from fixed constants, highlights the transformative aspect of threats in coexistence, showing that migration cannot be merely dismissed as a surplus needing elimination, reform, or integration.

A Bataillean Perspective on Migration and the Nation-State: The Politics of Active Matter as an Irreducible Force

Kutlu

Value in Marx: A Reading of the Grundrisse

Osman

On the Philosophical Roots of the Naïve and Axiomatic Set Theories: Determinatio est Negatio

Arman

Singular Predication and the Syllogism

Arif

Hegel in Jena: Dialectics of Time

@JOURNAL_BOX_CURRENT

Muhsin

Prof.

Art as a Procedure of Signification

Zeynep

Assist. Prof.

From the Logos of the Natural World to the Logos of the Aesthetical World: Cézanne’s Listening Eyes

@JOURNAL_BOX_FEATURED

Güncel

Art As A Relational “World” and The Deterioration of The Object in The New Aesthetic Experience

Adnan

The Meaning of Life as a Work of Art

@JOURNAL_BOX_MOSTREAD

Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi has been the scholarly publication of Istanbul University, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy since 1945. It is an open access, peer-reviewed, journal published two times a year in June and December. As of 2024, the print version has been stopped. The journal has become an online-only publication.

Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi aims to contribute to dissemination of knowledge in the field by publishing original research, translation and book review articles in Turkish, English, German and French.

Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi has a scope that covers all areas of philosophy. The target group of the Journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.

All expenses of the journal are covered by the Istanbul University. Processing and publication are free of charge with the journal. There is no article processing charges or submission fees for any submitted or accepted articles.

Cengiz

Prof. Dr.

ERIH PLUS

TR Dizin

DOAJ

SOBIAD

The Philosopher’s Index

Gale Cengage

@METRIC_VOLUMES

@METRIC_ISSUES

@METRIC_ARTICLES

@METRIC_OPENACCESS

Archives of Philosophy

@INFO_TAB_ABOUT

Editor in Chief

Co Editor in Chief

Editorial Management Board Member

Editorial Assistant

English Language Editor

Publicity Manager

Editorial Board Member

Advisory Board Member

@INFO_TAB_BOARDS

Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi has been the scholarly publication of Istanbul University, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy since 1945. It is an open access, peer-reviewed, journal published two times a year in June and December.Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi aims to contribute to dissemination of knowledge in the field by publishing original research, translation and book review articles in Turkish, English, German and French.Archives of Philosophy - Felsefe Arkivi has a scope that covers all areas of philosophy. The target group of the Journal consists of academicians, researchers, professionals, students, related professional and academic bodies and institutions.And French.

Aim & Scope

TÜBİTAK ULAKBİM TR DizinDOAJ (Directory of Open Access Journals)ERIH PLUSGale CengageThe Philosopher’s IndexSOBIAD

Indexing and Abstracting

The journal is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and pays regard to Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing published by the <a href="https://publicationethics.org/" target="_blank">Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE)</a>, the <a href="https://doaj.org/apply/transparency/#principles-of-transparency-and-best-practice-in-scholarly-publishing" target="_blank">Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)</a>, the <a href="https://oaspa.org/" target="_blank">Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA)</a>, and the <a href="https://www.wame.org/" target="_blank">World Association of Medical Editors (WAME)</a> on <a href="https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing" target="_blank">https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing</a> The subjects covered in the manuscripts submitted to the Journal for publication must be in accordance with the aim and scope of the Journal. Only those manuscripts approved by every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.Changing the name of an author (omission, addition or order) in papers submitted to the Journal requires written permission of all declared authors.Plagiarism, duplication, fraud authorship/denied authorship, research/data fabrication, salami slicing/salami publication, breaching of copyrights, prevailing conflict of interest are unethical behaviors. All manuscripts not in accordance with the accepted ethical standards will be removed from the publication. This also contains any possible malpractice discovered after the publication. Plagiarism Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. If plagiarism/self-plagiarism will be found authors will be informed. Editors may resubmit manuscript for similarity check at any peer-review or production stage if required. High similarity scores may lead to rejection of a manuscript before and even after acceptance. Depending on the type of article and the percentage of similarity score taken from each article, the overall similarity score is generally expected to be less than 15 or 20%. Double Blind Peer-Review After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by the editors-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope. The editor provides a fair double-blind peer review of the submitted articles and hands over the papers matching the formal rules to at least two national/international referees for evaluation and gives green light for publication upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees’ claims.

Policies

The journal is an open access journal and all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Except for commercial purposes, users are allowed to read, download, copy, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the <a href="https://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read" target="_blank">BOAI</a> definition of open access.The open access articles in the journal are licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.en" target="_blank">CC BY-NC 4.0</a>) license.

All expenses of the journal are covered by the Istanbul University. Processing and publication are free of charge with the journal. There is no article processing charges or submission fees for any submitted or accepted articles.

Authors publishing with the journal retain the copyright to their work licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" target="_blank">CC BY-NC 4.0</a>) (<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/" target="_blank">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</a> ) and grant the Publisher non-exclusive commercial right to publish the work. CC BY-NC 4.0 license permits unrestricted, non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Editor should consider publishing correction if minor errors that do not effect the results, interpretations and conclusions of the published paper are detected. Editor should consider retraction if major errors and/or misconduction that invalidate results and conclusions are detected.Editor should consider issuing an expression of concern if there is evidence of research or publication misconduct by the authors; there is evidence that the findings are not reliable and institutions of the authors do not investigate the case or the possible investigation seems to be unfair or nonconclusive. The guidelines of <a href="https://publicationethics.org/resources/flowcharts/complete-set-english" target="_blank">COPE</a> and <a href="https://www.icmje.org/recommendations/" target="_blank">ICJME</a> are taken into consideration regarding correction, retractions or expression of concern.RetractionJournal follows <a href="https://publicationethics.org/sites/default/files/retraction-guidelines-cope.pdf" target="_blank">COPE’s Retraction Guidelines</a> in case of retraction. The editor has the right to retract an article if: <ul><li>There is clear evidence that the findings are unreliable; either as a result of a major error (e.g. miscalculation or experimental error), or as a result of fabrication (e.g. of data) or falsification (e.g. image manipulation).</li><li>It contains plagiarised content. </li><li>It has been published elsewhere without proper attribution. </li><li>It contains material or data without authorisation for use.</li><li>There is copyright infringement or there is some other serious legal issue.</li><li>It reports unethical research. </li><li>There is evidence that the peer-review process is compromised or manipulated.</li><li>The author(s) failed to disclose a significant competing interest (also known as a conflict of interest) that, in the opinion of the editor, would have unduly influenced the interpretation of the work or the recommendations of the editors and peer reviewers.</li></ul>In case of retraction the following steps are followed:<ul><li>Retraction notice including article title is published in a subsequent issue of the journal. The retraction notice is paginated and listed in the table of contents. </li><li>A link is provided between the retraction notice and the original article in the electronic version. </li><li>The online article is preceded by a page containing the retraction notice; the reader can then proceed to the article itself.</li><li>The original article remains unchanged, except for a watermark on the .pdf on each page stating that it has been &#34;retracted”.</li></ul>Article Removal for Legal ReasonsIn the following circumstances, except the metadata (title and authors), the text of the article is removed and a page informing that the article has been removed for legal reasons replaces the article. <ul><li>The article is found to be defamatory or to infringe the legal rights of others, and retraction is not deemed to be an adequate solution.</li><li>The article has been, or is reasonably likely to be the subject of a court order.</li><li>There is a significant risk to public health. </li></ul>

To guarantee that all papers published in the journal are maintained and permanently accessible, articles are stored in Dergipark which serves as a  national archival web site and at the same time permits LOCKSS to  collect, preserve, and serve the content.Additionally, authors are encouraged to self-archive the final PDF version of their articles in open electronic archives with  that conform to standards of Open Archives Initiative (<a href="https://www.openarchives.org/" target="_blank">https://www.openarchives.org/</a>). Authors should provide a link from the deposited version to the URL of IUPress journal website.

The Artificial Intelligence Policy, prepared in light of developments in artificial intelligence (AI) and practices in scholarly publishing, sets out the editorial and ethical principles that authors, reviewers, and editors should follow when using such technologies. The following sources have been considered in the preparation of the AI policy:Committee on Publication Ethics <a href="https://publicationethics.org/guidance/cope-position/authorship-and-ai-tools" target="_blank">(COPE) - Authorship and AI tools</a>; International Committee of Medical Journal Editors <a href="https://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-role-of-authors-and-contributors.html#four" target="_blank">(ICMJE) - Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Assisted Technology; World Association of Medical Editors  (WAME) Chatbots, Generative AI, and Scholarly Manuscripts</a><a href="https://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-and-responsibilities/defining-the-role-of-authors-and-contributors.html#four"></a>AI-assisted technologies (such as large language models [LLMs], chatbots, or image generators) can develop and produce a wide variety of content, including text, images, audio, and synthetic data. When used ethically and safely, these capabilities can increase productivity and foster innovation, but when used without human guidance, they pose risks such as inaccurate and biased results, omissions and errors in citations, deficiencies in protecting privacy and intellectual property rights, and potential violations of authors' and publishers' rights. IUPress adopts the following core principles to avoid these risks in the use of AI:  <ul><li>Details of any AI used in the production of content (including but not limited to text, figures, images, and code) must be declared and clearly explained in the appropriate section of the paper (as an acknowledgement and/or in the methods section). </li><li>No AI tool may be listed as an author in any scientific paper. </li><li>Authors are responsible for the accuracy, completeness, and originality of their work, even if AI is used in any way; they are responsible for the proper referencing and attribution of others' ideas, data, words, or other materials. </li><li>Reviewers and editors must not upload submitted work, in whole or in part, to any generative AI application.</li></ul>In the editorial processes of IUPress publications, tools are available to assist editors in identifying AI-generated content. On the other hand, it is common to use AI tools that provide suggestions for improving and enhancing readability, language, and grammar, and such AI tools can be used in IUPress publications under the supervision of editors and authors.

Artificial Intelligence Policy

<ul><li>Authors are required to declare if they have used AI-assisted technologies (such as large language models [LLMs], chatbots, or image generators) in the creation of their submitted work. </li><li>Authors should explain, both in the cover letter and in the appropriate section of the submitted paper (as a footnote and/or in the methods section), which AI tool and which version of it they have used and for what purpose. </li><li>Authors should also indicate how they used the AI tool and how they assessed the validity of the results obtained using this technology, and what aspects of the paper, manuscript content, data or supporting files were influenced by the use of the AI tool or were generated by AI.</li><li>It is the authors' responsibility to ensure the accuracy, validity and appropriateness of content and citations generated by AI-assisted technologies and to eliminate potential errors, inconsistencies and biased results. </li><li>Authors should always check the original sources to eliminate possible plagiarism, recognising that there is a potential for plagiarism in texts produced with AI-assisted technologies. They should confirm that they have checked and that the sources are original.  </li><li>AI-assisted tools (such as ChatGPT) cannot be listed as authors because they cannot be responsible for the accuracy, integrity, and originality of the work, and these responsibilities are essential to authorship. Therefore, authors are responsible for all material involving the use of AI-assisted technologies. Authors should ensure that all statements in the article that state the hypotheses, interpretations, conclusions, limitations, and implications of the study represent their own opinions.  </li><li>Studies created by authors using AI tools in the following ways, which substitute for the basic researcher's and author's responsibilities, violate the principles of scientific publishing and publication ethics, and such studies are not eligible for inclusion in publications: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Generation of text or code without rigorous review, </li><li>Generation of synthetic data to replace missing data without a robust methodology, </li><li>Creation of any inaccurate, synthetic content, including abstracts or supplementary materials, </li><li>Creation and manipulation of images and figures (pictures, graphs, data tables, medical images, image snippets, computer codes and formulae) or original research data (enhancing, hiding, moving, removing or adding a particular feature within an image or figure) using AI.</li></ul></ul>

It is essential to maintain confidentiality in the peer review process and not to share or use the reviewed work in this process. <a href="https://publicationethics.org/sites/default/files/ethical-guidelines-peer-reviewers-cope.pdf" target="_blank">(COPE – Ethical Guidelines for Peer Reviewers</a>)<ul><li>Reviewers should not upload a manuscript or part of a manuscript submitted to them for review to generative AI tools or large language models to assist in the review, evaluation or decision-making process, as uploading content to such AI tools by reviewers violates the authors' privacy and property rights.  </li><li>Reviewing a scientific paper is a responsibility that can only be undertaken by human beings. The critical thinking and original evaluation required for peer review is beyond the scope of this technology, and there is a risk that the technology will produce inaccurate, incomplete or biased conclusions about the paper. The peer review report and decision letters should reflect the personal assessment of the reviewers and editors of the submitted content. The reviewer is responsible and accountable for the content of his/her report. </li><li>AI tools may be used in a limited way to improve the quality of the language of the peer review report (for translation or language editing) in the context of peer review. If such use is made, the reviewer must declare the use when submitting the report. </li><li>Reviewers who suspect inappropriate or undisclosed use of generative AI in a submission should report their concerns to the editor.</li></ul>

Editors are obliged to ensure that the confidentiality of the manuscripts submitted to the journal is maintained during the evaluation process, and it is essential that the peer-reviewed work is not shared or used outside the parties involved in that process. (COPE - Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors) <a href="https://publicationethics.org/files/Code_of_conduct_for_journal_editors_Mar11.pdf" target="_blank">(COPE – Code of Conduct and Best Practice Guidelines for Journal Editors)</a>.<ul><li>Editors should not upload a submitted article, or any part of it, to generative Artificial Intelligence tools or Big Language Models to assist in the review, evaluation or decision-making process, as this may violate authors' privacy and property rights. </li><li>Managing the editorial review of a scientific article implies responsibilities that can only be attributed to humans. Generative AI or AI-assisted technologies should not be used by editors to assist in the evaluation or decision-making process of an article, as the critical thinking and original evaluation required for this task is beyond the scope of this technology and there is a risk that the technology will produce inaccurate, incomplete or biased conclusions about the article. The editor is responsible and accountable for the editorial process, the final decision and its communication to the authors.</li><li>Editors should not use generative AI tools to compose decision letters or abstracts of unpublished research. </li><li>Editors may use generative AI tools to help find appropriate reviewers.</li><li>If editors suspect the use of generative AI in a submitted manuscript or a submitted referee report, they should conduct an editorial review of the matter and consider the policy.</li></ul>

<div style="text-align: left;">Archives of Philosophy – Felsefe Arkivi is committed to upholding the highest standards of publication ethics and pays regard to Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing published by the <a href="https://publicationethics.org/" target="_blank">Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE)</a>, the <a href="https://doaj.org/apply/transparency/#principles-of-transparency-and-best-practice-in-scholarly-publishing" target="_blank">Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)</a>, the <a href="https://oaspa.org/" target="_blank">Open Access Scholarly Publishers Association (OASPA)</a>, and the <a href="https://www.wame.org/" target="_blank">World Association of Medical Editors (WAME)</a> on <a href="https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing" target="_blank">https://publicationethics.org/resources/guidelines-new/principles-transparency-and-best-practice-scholarly-publishing</a></div>All submissions must be original, unpublished (including as full text in conference proceedings), and not under the review of any other publication synchronously. Authors must ensure that submitted work is original. They must certify that the manuscript has not previously been published elsewhere or is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere, in any language. Applicable copyright laws and conventions must be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) must be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement. Any work or words of other authors, contributors, or sources must be appropriately credited and referenced.Each manuscript is reviewed at least two referees under double-blind peer review process. Plagiarism, duplication, fraud authorship/denied authorship, research/data fabrication, salami slicing/salami publication, breaching of copyrights, prevailing conflict of interest are unnethical behaviors.All manuscripts not in accordance with the accepted ethical standards will be removed from the publication. This also contains any possible malpractice discovered after the publication. In accordance with the code of conduct we will report any cases of suspected plagiarism or duplicate publishing.

Ethics

Archives of Philosophy – Felsefe Arkivi adheres to the highest standards in research ethics and follows the principles of international research ethics as defined below. The authors are responsible for the compliance of the manuscripts with the ethical rules.- Principles of integrity, quality and transparency should be sustained in designing the research, reviewing the design and conducting the research.- The research team and participants should be fully informed about the aim, methods, possible uses and requirements of the research and risks of participation in research.- The confidentiality of the information provided by the research participants and the confidentiality of the respondents should be ensured. The research should be designed to protect the autonomy and dignity of the participants.- Research participants should participate in the research voluntarily, not under any coercion.- Any possible harm to participants must be avoided. The research should be planned in such a way that the participants are not at risk.- The independence of research must be clear; and any conflict of interest or must be disclosed.- In experimental studies with human subjects, written informed consent of the participants who decide to participate in the research must be obtained. In the case of children and those under wardship or with confirmed insanity, legal custodian’s assent must be obtained.- If the study is to be carried out in any institution or organization, approval must be obtained from this institution or organization.- In studies with human subject, it must be noted in the method’s section of the manuscript that the informed consent of the participants and ethics committee approval from the institution where the study has been conducted have been obtained.

It is authors’ responsibility to ensure that the article is in accordance with scientific and ethical standards and rules. And authors must ensure that submitted work is original. They must certify that the manuscript has not previously been published elsewhere or is not currently being considered for publication elsewhere, in any language. Applicable copyright laws and conventions must be followed. Copyright material (e.g. tables, figures or extensive quotations) must be reproduced only with appropriate permission and acknowledgement. Any work or words of other authors, contributors, or sources must be appropriately credited and referenced.All the authors of a submitted manuscript must have direct scientific and academic contribution to the manuscript. The author(s) of the original research articles is defined as a person who is significantly involved in “conceptualization and design of the study”, “collecting the data”, “analyzing the data”, “writing the manuscript”, “reviewing the manuscript with a critical perspective” and “planning/conducting the study of the manuscript and/or revising it”. Fund raising, data collection or supervision of the research group are not sufficient roles to be accepted as an author. The author(s) must meet all these criteria described above. The order of names in the author list of an article must be a co-decision and it must be indicated in the <a href="https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/45E23644BDEE41E09BB14937398BF28A" target="_blank">Copyright Agreement Form.</a> The individuals who do not meet the authorship criteria but contributed to the study must take place in the acknowledgement section. Individuals providing technical support, assisting writing, providing a general support, providing material or financial support are examples to be indicated in acknowledgement section.All authors must disclose all issues concerning financial relationship, conflict of interest, and competing interest that may potentially influence the results of the research or scientific judgment. When an author discovers a significant error or inaccuracy in his/her own published paper, it is the author’s obligation to promptly cooperate with the Editor-in-Chief to provide retractions or corrections of mistakes.

Editor-in-Chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors. He/She provides a fair double-blind peer review of the submitted articles for publication and ensures that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential before publishing.Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the contents and overall quality of the publication. He/She must publish errata pages or make corrections when needed.Editor-in-Chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers. Only he has the full authority to assign a reviewer and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.Reviewers must have no conflict of interest with respect to the research, the authors and/or the research funders. Their judgments must be objective.Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author’s side.A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees must be ensured. In particular situations, the editor may share the review of one reviewer with other reviewers to clarify a particular point.

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by editor-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope.The editor hands over the papers matching the formal rules to at least two national/international referees for double-blind peer review evaluation and gives green light for publication upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees’ claims.

Peer Review

Only those manuscripts approved by its every individual author and that were not published before in or sent to another journal, are accepted for evaluation.Submitted manuscripts that pass preliminary control are scanned for plagiarism using iThenticate software. After plagiarism check, the eligible ones are evaluated by editor-in-chief for their originality, methodology, the importance of the subject covered and compliance with the journal scope.  Editor-in-chief evaluates manuscripts for their scientific content without regard to ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, citizenship, religious belief or political philosophy of the authors and ensures a fair double-blind peer review of the selected manuscripts.The selected manuscripts are sent to at least two national/international external referees for evaluation and publication decision is given by editor-in-chief  upon modification by the authors in accordance with the referees’ claims.Editor in chief does not allow any conflicts of interest between the authors, editors and reviewers and is responsible for final decision for publication of the manuscripts in the Journal.Reviewers’ judgments must be objective. Reviewers’ comments on the following aspects are expected while conducting the review.-    Does the manuscript contain new and significant information?-    Does the abstract clearly and accurately describe the content of the manuscript?-    Is the problem significant and concisely stated?-    Are the methods described comprehensively?-    Are the interpretations and consclusions justified by the results?-    Is adequate references made to other Works in the field?-    Is the language acceptable?Reviewers must ensure that all the information related to submitted manuscripts is kept as confidential and must report to the editor if they are aware of copyright infringement and plagiarism on the author’s side.A reviewer who feels unqualified to review the topic of a manuscript or knows that its prompt review will be impossible should notify the editor and excuse himself from the review process.The editor informs the reviewers that the manuscripts are confidential information and that this is a privileged interaction. The reviewers and editorial board cannot discuss the manuscripts with other persons. The anonymity of the referees is important.

LanguageThe journal accepts articles in Turkish, English, German and French.Manuscript Organization and FormatAll correspondence will be sent to the first-named author unless otherwise specified. Manuscpript is to be submitted online via <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/login" target="_blank">http://dergipark.gov.tr/login</a> that can be accessed at <a href="http://felsefearkivi.istanbul.edu.tr" target="_blank">http://felsefearkivi.istanbul.edu.tr</a>.It must be accompanied by a <a href="https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/F68E9850D23E44B6AAAA4F21F3ED2805" target="_blank">title page</a> specifying the article category (i.e. research article, review etc.) and including information about the manuscript (see the Submission Checklist), and cover letter. Manuscripts should be prepared in Microsoft Word 2003 and upper versions. In addition, <a href="https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/45E23644BDEE41E09BB14937398BF28A" target="_blank">Copyright Agreement Form</a> that has to be signed by all authors must be submitted.1. The manuscripts should be in A4 paper standards, written in Times New Roman font style in 12 font size, line spacing of 1.5 and “justify align” format. Footnotes must remain within these limits and be written in 10 font size.2. The manuscripts should contain mainly these components: title, abstract and keywords, sections of article, references and tables and figures. 3. Before the introduction part, there should be an abstract of 200-250 word range. Underneath the abstract, 5 keywords that inform the reader about the content of the study should be specified. 4. Research article sections are ordered as follows: “Introduction”, “(at least two) Text Titles” “Conclusion” and “References”.5. A title page including author information must be submitted together with the manuscript. The title page is to include fully descriptive title of the manuscript and, affiliation, title, e-mail address, postal address, phone, fax number of the author(s) and ORCIDs of all authors (see The Submission Checklist). 6. Authors are responsible for all statements made in their work published in the Journal; Istanbul University has no responsibility in this regard. 7. The author(s) can be asked to make some changes in their articles due to peer reviews.

Author Guidelines

Although references to review articles can be an efficient way to guide readers to a body of literature, review articles do not always reflect original work accurately. Readers should therefore be provided with direct references to original research sources whenever possible. On the other hand, extensive lists of references to original work on a topic can use excessive space on the printed page. Small numbers of references to key original papers often serve as well as more exhaustive lists, particularly since references can now be added to the electronic version of published papers, and since electronic literature searching allows readers to retrieve published literature efficiently. Papers accepted but not yet included in the issue are published online in the Early View section. Citing a “personal communication” should be avoided unless it provides essential information not available from a public source, in which case the name of the person and date of communication should be cited in parentheses in the text. For scientific articles, written permission and confirmation of accuracy from the source of a personal communication must be obtained. Reference Style and FormatArchives of Philosophy – Felsefe Arkivi uses Chicago Manual of Style as reference style. Please use this link for more details: <a href="https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html" target="_blank" style="font-size: 10pt;">https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html</a>Accuracy of citation is the author’s responsibility. All references should be cited in text.Examples:FN: First note, SN: Subsequent note, B: BibliographyBookFN Ayhan Bıçak, Tarih Felsefesinin Oluşumu (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2004), 280.SN Bıçak, Tarih Felsefesinin Oluşumu, 25.B Bıçak, Ayhan. Tarih Felsefesinin Oluşumu. İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2004.FN J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism. For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1973), 9.SN Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism. For and Against, 82.B Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard. Utilitarianism. For and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1973.FN Stanley M. Honer, Thomas C. Hunt and Dennis L. Okholm, Invitation to Philosophy. Issues and Options (Belmont: Wadsworth Pub Co.,1999), 20.SN Honer, Hunt and Okholm, Invitation to Philosophy, 35.B Honer, Stanley M., Hunt, Thomas C. and Okholm, Dennis L. Invitation to Philosophy. Issues and Options. Belmont: Wadsworth Pub Co.,1999.FN Frank Cunningham et al., Philosophy: The Big Questions (Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Scholars Press, 2003), 15.SN Cunningham et al., Philosophy, 30.B Cunningham, Frank, LaLonde, Daniel, Neelin, David and Peglar, Kenneth. Philosophy: The Big Questions. Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Scholars Press, 2003.Authors who do not have surnames (i.e. Kung Fu Tse), should be listed according to their first names. For example, Kung Fu Tse should enter the bibliography under the letter K. Authors with surnames are listed after their surnames (i.e. Popper, Karl).Translated BookFN Nigel Warburton, Felsefe Okuma Rehberi, trans. Ahmet Fethi Yıldırım (İstanbul: Alfa, 2016), 8-9.SN Warburton, Felsefe Okuma Rehberi, 12.B Warburton, Nigel. Felsefe Okuma Rehberi. Translated by Ahmet Fethi Yıldırım. İstanbul: Alfa, 2016.Chapter of an Edited BookFN Cengiz Çakmak, “Kader İnsanı Suçla Yargılar: ‘Kader ve Karakter’ Üzerine Değiniler”, in Dar Kapıdaki Mesih: Walter Benjamin ve Politik Felsefesi, ed. M .Ertan Kardeş (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2017), 79.SN Çakmak, “Kader İnsanı Suçla Yargılar: ‘Kader ve Karakter’ Üzerine Değiniler”, 83.B Çakmak, Cengiz. “Kader İnsanı Suçla Yargılar: ‘Kader ve Karakter’ Üzerine Değiniler.” in Dar Kapıdaki Mesih: Walter Benjamin ve Politik Felsefesi. Edited by M .Ertan Kardeş, 79-87. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2017.Preface, Introduction, Etc. of a BookFN Hakkı Hünler ve Solmaz Zelyüt Hünler, preface to Alasdair MacIntyre’ın Ethik’in Kısa Tarihi  (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2001), XVII.SN Hünler ve Zelyüt Hünler, preface, XVI.B Hünler, Hakkı ve Zelyüt Hünler, Solmaz. Preface to Alasdair MacIntyre’ın Ethik’in Kısa Tarihi, I-XXIV. İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2001.E-BookFN Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics [Part I] July 2, 2019, http://www.gutenberg.org/9/1/919/, 1.E.2.SN Spinoza, The Ethics [Part I], 1.E.9.B Spinoza, Benedict de. The Ethics [Part I]. July 2, 2019. <a href="http://www.gutenberg.org/9/1/919/">http://www.gutenberg.org/9/1/919/</a>.For books consulted online, cite the URL or the name of the database. If no page numbers are available, cite a section or chapter title.Journal ArticleFN Cengiz Çakmak, “Asadan Böceğe: Politik Yargı ve Felsefe,” Felsefe Arkivi 43 (2015), 17.SN Çakmak, “Asadan Böceğe,” 17-18.B Çakmak, Cengiz. “Asadan Böceğe: Politik Yargı ve Felsefe.” Felsefe Arkivi 43 (2015): 17-23.Translated Journal ArticleFN Reinhard Kleinknecht, “Olay ve Gerçeklik Zamanı,” trans. M. S. Genç, Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi 11 (2007), 20.SN Reinhard, Kleinknecht, “Olay ve Gerçeklik Zamanı,” 22.B Kleinknecht, Reinhard. “Olay ve Gerçeklik Zamanı.” Translated by M. S. Genç. Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi 11 (2007): 17-44.Online Journal ArticleFN Ahmet Emre Dağtaşoğlu, “Antik Yunan Felsefesinde “Fantasia”nın Epistemolojik Rolü,” flsf (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi) 17 (2014 Bahar): 266. June 24, 2019.SN Dağtaşoğlu, “Antik Yunan Felsefesinde,” 266-268.B Dağtaşoğlu, Ahmet Emre. “Antik Yunan Felsefesinde “Fantasia”nın Epistemolojik Rolü.” flsf (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi) 17 (2014 Bahar): 266-287. June 24, 2019.For articles consulted online, cite the URL or the name of the database. If available, specify the DOI (Digital Object Identifier) number.Thesis or DissertationFN Ali Suat Gözcü, “Zaman Sorunu: Şimdici ve Ebediyetçi Anlayışları”, (PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2016), 28.SN Gözcü, “Zaman Sorunu: Şimdici ve Ebediyetçi Anlayışları”, 40.B Gözcü, Ali Suat. “Zaman Sorunu: Şimdici ve Ebediyetçi Anlayışları.” PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2016.Encyclopaedia EntryFN Ahmet Cevizci, “Mutluluk,” Felsefe Sözlüğü, (İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2010), 1130.SN Cevizci, “Mutluluk,” 1131.B Cevizci, Ahmet. “Mutluluk.” Felsefe Sözlüğü: 1130-1131. İstanbul: Paradigma Yayınları, 2010.Book ReviewFN Aruz İbişi Temelli, “Siyaset Felsefesi,” rewiev of Siyaset Felsefesi, by Luc Ferry-Alain Renaut. Kutadgubilig, Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları, 29 (2016), 370.SN İbişi Temelli, “Siyaset Felsefesi,” 371.B İbişi Temelli, Arzu. “Siyaset Felsefesi.” Rewiev of Siyaset Felsefesi, by Luc Ferry-Alain Renaut. Kutadgubilig, Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları, 29 (2016): 369-374.Website ContentFN Carl Tollef Solberg ve Espen Gamlund, “How Should We Evaluate Deaths?”, Practical Ethics, July 3, 2019, http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2019/05/guest-post-how-should-we-evaluate-deaths/SN “How Should We Evaluate Deaths?”B Solberg, Carl Tollef ve Gamlund, Espen. “How Should We Evaluate Deaths?” Practical Ethics. July 3, 2019, http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2019/05/guest-post-how-should-we-evaluate-deaths/News or Magazine ArticleFN Takiyettin Mengüşoğlu, “Eğitimde Tarihi Çevre ve İnsan,” Cumhuriyet, December 14, 1971, 2.SN Mengüşoğlu, “Eğitimde Tarihi Çevre ve İnsan,” 2.B Mengüşoğlu, Takiyettin. “Eğitimde Tarihi Çevre ve İnsan.” Cumhuriyet, December 14, 1971.Online News or Magazine ArticleFN “What Consent? Hungary, Poland &amp; Czech Republic Deny Sealing Migrant Deal with Merkel”, Russia Today, June 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/431382-hungary-poland-czech-migrants/" target="_blank">https://www.rt.com/news/431382-hungary-poland-czech-migrants/</a>SN “What Consent?”B “What Consent? Hungary, Poland &amp; Czech Republic Deny Sealing Migrant Deal with Merkel”, Russia Today, June 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/431382-hungary-poland-czech-migrants/" target="_blank">https://www.rt.com/news/431382-hungary-poland-czech-migrants/</a>

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Ensure that the following items are present:● Cover letter to the editorü  The category of the manuscriptü  Confirming that “the paper is not under consideration for publication in another journal”.ü  Including disclosure of any commercial or financial involvement.ü  Confirming that the references cited in the text and listed in the references section are in line with Chicago Manual of Style.ü  Confirming that last control for fluent English was done.ü  Confirming that journal policies detailed in Information for Authors have been reviewed.● <a href="https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/45E23644BDEE41E09BB14937398BF28A" target="_blank">Copyright Agreement Form</a>● Permission of previous published material if used in the present manuscript● <a href="https://cdn.istanbul.edu.tr/file/JTA6CLJ8T5/F68E9850D23E44B6AAAA4F21F3ED2805" target="_blank">Title page</a>ü  The category of the manuscriptü  The title of the manuscriptü  All authors’ names and affiliations (institution, faculty/department, city, country),e-mail addressesü  Corresponding author’s email address, full postal address, telephone and fax numberü  ORCIDs of all authors.● Main Manuscript Documentü  The title of the manuscriptü  Abstract (250 words)ü  Key words: 5 -10 wordsü  Acknowledgement (if exists)ü  Acknowledgements, grant supports, conflicts of interest should be indicatedü  Referencesü  All tables, illustrations (figures) (including title, description, footnotes)