Nowadays, a bridge is being built between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy through phenomenology. This can be attributed to the fact that phenomenology and analytic philosophy are rooted in common questions, that their paths have crossed again and again in various ways throughout their historical development, and partly to the similarity of their philosophical expectations. The article addresses the tidal relationship between the two philosophies through the question of "meaning" or “sense” while trying to clarify the background of the cooperation that has emerged in the field of philosophy of mind in recent years. The first part confronts the two philosophies, one centred on meaning and linguistic analysis, the other on the analysis of linguistic acts of consciousness in which meaning emerges, through the encounter between Frege and Husserl at the origin. Frege distinguishes between the sense (meaning) and the reference of an expression, and places sense in a third field that is neither psychic nor physical. The result of this semantic realism is the so-called linguistic turn. Sense, which is not sensible in itself, becomes accessible through its embodiment in language and through a linguistic analysis. Husserl, like Frege, recognises the objectivity of meaning, but still wants to consider it in relation to consciousness. Whereas Frege completely excludes meaning from consciousness and makes it accessible through linguistic analysis, Husserl places it within the intentional structure of consciousness. According to latter, despite meaning being embodied in language, it essentially manifests itself in linguistic acts of consciousness. Therefore, the way to make meaning explicit is not through linguistic analysis, but through an intentional analysis of these acts. From this historical encounter on the question of meaning, the paths of analytic philosophy and phenomenology begin to diverge. 

For the founders of analytic philosophy, as well as for other philosophers who followed them by staying within the framework of the idea of "linguistic turn" and a "linguistic" philosophy, sense is only a linguistic sense, i.e. meaning. However, Husserl claims that meaning is contained not only in linguistic acts but in all acts of consciousness. Therefore, the concept of meaning [Bedeutung] extends into a non-linguistic concept of sense [Sinn]. After the concept of intentionality entered the horizon of analytic philosophers, an interest in phenomenology gradually arose from this coast, and a Fregean interpretation of intentionality emerged. The second part begins by explaining this interpretation, where the act of expression serves as the role model for explaining the intentionality of all acts of consciousness. It then argues that this interpretation leads to the conception of meaning as a ready-made intermediary between the act and its object, completely different from both of them, thus failing to reflect the originality of the phenomenological concept of intentionality. However, the sense that is immanent to all acts of consciousness and with which objects are given to us is in fact a sense that has already been permeated by language. The objective of phenomenology, which conceives of intentionality as the constitutive correlation between consciousness and the world, is precisely to elucidate the constitution of this sense as meaning. 

The third and final part deals with the genetic relation that phenomenology claims to exist between a linguistic meaning and a pre-linguistic sense constituted in immediate experience. It also argues that a philosophy solely limited to a linguistic analysis must be complemented by a theory of experience. According to phenomenology, the sense with which the world and the things we experience are given to us is the product of a genetic process of construction that goes on from the lowest pre-linguistic levels of experience to the highest linguistic levels. This sense also has a pre-linguistic dimension, completely independent of language, which can never be reduced to concepts, and this pre-linguistic sense is the origin of linguistic meaning. Since there is a continuum between the linguistic/logical sphere and the pre-linguistic/pre-logical experience sphere, and since the former is grounded in the latter, a "linguistic" theory must always be complemented by a theory of experience. Phenomenology, as a philosophy that describes the essential structures of the correlation between consciousness and the world as well as their genetic constitution, can adequately undertake the task of presenting a theory of experience that precedes the question of meaning and can thus complement a philosophy of language. When analytic philosophy shifted its focus from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind, it too began to discuss issues which were familiar to phenomenology from the very beginning, such as intentionality, conceptual and non-conceptual mental contents, phenomenal consciousness, mainly aimed at understanding the relation between consciousness and the world. Therefore, it can be said that the reason for the vivid dialogue between analytic philosophy and phenomenology in recent years is because the interests of the two traditions overlap in this way. The talk of a "phenomenological turn" in analytic philosophy of mind and the circulation of the term "analytic phenomenology" are the clearest evidence of this.