Spinoza and the Reality of Time
Çağlar KaracaSpinoza is often labeled a philosopher who believed that time was unreal. This article addresses Spinoza’s views on time, emphasizing that the concepts he mooted on the topic and his general conceptualization of time must be carefully examined. The paper also attends to the historical contexts of Spinoza’s ideas on time, for instance, the debates on infinity, causation, God, and Cartesian philosophy prevailing in that era. Finally, Spinoza’s philosophy of time is examined against modern beliefs such as Laplacian determinism and the block universe theory. Arguments favoring the unreality of time are generally based on questioning our daily perceptions of time. Spinoza emphasized that everything should be conceptualized in relation to the eternal. According to him, eternity is timeless in itself, but it entails sempiternity. Spinoza defined duration as an activity akin to the eternal nature of being. Duration is not temporal per se. Rather, time is created by delimiting duration through quantitative comparisons. Spinoza’s time is perspectival: it emanates from a specific relationship between human beings and the universe. His view of timelessness based on causal necessities connotes the block universe theory. However, Spinoza criticized the mechanistic conception, —an underlying theme of the block universe theory— for deeming causal relations as external. Instead, he offered an ontological unification of the eternal being and physical necessity.
Spinoza ve Zamanın Gerçekliği
Çağlar KaracaSpinoza genellikle zamanın gerçekdışı olduğunu düşünen bir filozof olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu makale Spinoza’nın zamanla ilgili yaklaşımını ele almakta, bu kapsamda öncelikle onun bu konuda geliştirdiği kavramların ve genel olarak zaman anlayışının dikkatli bir şekilde analiz edilmesi gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Bunun yanında, Spinoza’nın zamanla ilgili düşüncelerinin tarihsel bağlamına, örneğin sonsuzluk, nedensellik, Tanrı ve Kartezyen felsefe ile ilgili tartışmalara odaklanmaktadır. Son olarak, Spinoza’nın zaman felsefesini Laplaceçı determinizm ve blok evren teorisi gibi modern görüşlerle karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirmektedir. Zamanın gerçekdışı olduğu yönündeki argümanlar genellikle gündelik zaman algımızın sorgulanması üzerine inşa edilmektedir. Spinoza, tüm varlıkların ebedî olanla ilişkisi içerisinde kavranması gerektiğini vurgulamıştır. Ona göre ebediyet özünde zamansızdır, ancak zamandaki öncesiz ve sonrasız olma durumunu gerektirir. Spinoza, süreyi varlığın ebedî doğasına benzer bir etkinlik olarak tanımlamıştır. Süre başlı başına zamansal değildir, ancak sürenin niceliksel karşılaştırmalar yoluyla sınırlandırılması sonucunda zaman ortaya çıkar. Spinoza’nın zamanı perspektife bağlıdır; bizle evren arasındaki ilişkiden doğar. Onun zorunluluğa dayanan zamansızlık düşüncesi blok evren teorisini çağrıştırır. Ne var ki Spinoza —blok evren teorisinin altında yatan düşüncelerden biri olan— mekanistik anlayışı nedenselliği dışsal olarak ele almakla eleştirmiş, bunun yerine ebedî olanla fiziksel zorunluluğun ontolojik bütünleşmesini önermiştir.
Physicists and philosophers have questioned the reality of time in varied ways. It may appear absurd to claim that time is unreal, but what is questioned is our daily perception of time. McTaggart’s paradox represents a well-known argument for the unreality of time. McTaggart defined two different conceptions of time: the A-series and the B-series. The Aseries plots events as future, present, or past. Future events first become present, and then past, denoting a constant change in temporal representations. Therefore, the A-series notion is self-contradictory. The B-series conception positions events in relation to each other as either earlier or later. McTaggart argued that the reality of time should depend on the A-series and concluded that time is unreal because this representation is self-contradictory.
McTaggart mentioned Spinoza among philosophers who thought time was unreal.1 However, Spinoza’s stance toward the reality of time is debatable. In any case, Spinoza’s justifications for questioning our perception of time differed substantially from present-day ideas on this topic. This article addresses Spinoza’s view on time, emphasizing that his general understanding of time and the varied concepts he mooted in this context should be carefully scrutinized. The present paper also attends to the historical contexts of Spinoza’s ideas on time, for instance, the then-prevailing debates on infinity, causation, God, and the Cartesian philosophy of nature. Finally, the study examines Spinoza’s philosophy of time against modern notions such as Laplacian determinism and the block universe theory that was postulated in congruence with determinism.
According to Alexandre Kojève, although Spinoza successfully developed the ideal of the whole, his theory lacked the essential element of time. McTaggart and Kojève are not the only scholars who believe that Spinoza rejected the reality of time. Spinoza emphasized that everything should be conceptualized sub specie aeternitatis, or viewed in relation to the eternal. On the other hand, his understanding of infinity was not based on what is temporal: he stated clearly that the eternal being should not be defined in relation to duration or time. Eternity has been defined in two discrete ways throughout the history of philosophy. First, the Aristotelian definition asserts an eternity with no beginning or end in time (sempiternity). Second, the Platonist definition states that eternity characterizes that which is unchanging and timeless (e.g., Plato’s theory of forms). Spinoza’s conception appears to approximate the opinion of timeless infinity because he insisted that the eternal being is beyond time. Yet, Spinoza did not posit an ontological distinction between the finite world and the eternal being that transcends our world. In this sense, his consideration of the eternal is said to entail sempiternity.
Duration (Lat. duratio) forms a crucial concept in Spinoza’s view of time. Spinoza associated duration with eternity and substance, describing it as an “indefinite continuation of existence.” (E2D5) Duration is the persistence of finite things; thus, it refers to an activity similar to the eternal existence of being rather than a temporal period. Duration is not temporal per se. Rather, time is created by delimiting duration through quantitative comparisons. Hence, time results from the way we cognize and determine phenomena, even though substance is unbounded and infinite in all ways. From the modern epistemic viewpoint, Spinoza’s time is perspectival: it emanates from the specific relationship between human beings and the universe.
At first glance, Spinoza’s timeless understanding of the infinite resembles Laplacian determinism and approximates the block universe theory, which suggests that the universe is fixed in four dimensions. However, Spinoza’s ontology differed in an essential aspect: it did not depend on a mechanistic natural philosophy according to which causal relations are external. Conversely, Spinoza unified God as the immanent cause and transient causation, proposing that the substance causes itself. Therefore, Spinoza criticized Cartesian philosophy, which deemed that movement and matter were detached from each other. Spinoza’s critique also indicated the metaphysical unification of the eternal being and physical necessity.
