Research Article


DOI :10.26650/arcp2019-5103   IUP :10.26650/arcp2019-5103    Full Text (PDF)

About Popper's Requirement of Consistency

Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre

Popper restricted his definition of falsifiability to consistent theories through what we may call his requirement of consistency. His main argument was that an inconsistent theory does not distinguish the sentences that corroborate it from those that contradict it, for all sentences follow from it. I propose to replace this requirement by the more basic requirement that the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of a theory do not overlap. This results not only in an unrestricted definition of falsifiability but also in some inconsistent theories being falsifiable whenever that inconsistency is not located among its observational statements. Although this assumes a restriction of the principle of explosion or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ), it does not depend on any particular system or approach of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I propose to define the class of potential refuters of a theory, which is obtained by subtracting the class of potential corroborators from the class of potential falsifiers. Given that, by definition, the classes of potential refuters and corroborators of a theory do not overlap, it immediately follows that some observationally inconsistent theories are refutable in this sense. This establishes the bases for a new and more general formal theory of falsifiability of scientific factual/empirical theories.

DOI :10.26650/arcp2019-5103   IUP :10.26650/arcp2019-5103    Full Text (PDF)

Über Poppers Forderung nach Widerspruchlosigkeit

Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre

Popper beschränkte seine Definition der Falsifizierbarkeit auf konsistente Theorien, was wir als seine Forderung nach Widerspruchlosigkeit bezeichnen können. Sein Hauptargument war, dass eine inkonsistente Theorie die Sätze, die sie bestätigen, nicht von denen unterscheidet, die sie widersprechen, denn alle Sätze folgen daraus. Ich schlage vor, diese Forderung durch die grundlegendere Forderung zu ersetzen, dass sich die Klassen der Bestätigungs- und Falsifikationsmöglichkeiten einer Theorie nicht überschneiden. Dies führt nicht nur zu einer uneingeschränkten Definition der Falsifizierbarkeit, sondern auch dazu, dass einige inkonsistente Theorien falsifizierbar sind, wenn diese Inkonsistenz nicht in den Beobachtungsaussagen enthalten ist. Obwohl dies eine Einschränkung des Explosionsprinzips oder ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ) voraussetzt, hängt es nicht von einem bestimmten System oder Ansatz parakonsistenter Logik ab. Schließlich schlage ich vor, die Klasse der Widerlegungsmöglichkeiten einer Theorie zu definieren, die erhalten wird, indem die Klasse der Bestätigungsmöglichkeiten von der Klasse der Falsifikationsmöglichkeiten abgezogen wird. Da sich die Klassen der Widerlegungs- und Bestätigungsmöglichkeiten einer Theorie definitionsgemäß nicht überschneiden, folgt unmittelbar, dass einige beobachtend inkonsistente Theorien in diesem Sinne widerlegbar sind. Dies legt die Grundlagen für eine neue und allgemeinere formale Theorie der Falsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlicher faktischer / empirischer Theorien.


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References

  • da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso. Ensaio sobre os fundamentos da lógica 2nd ed. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1994. google scholar
  • Hempel, Carl Gustav. “The irrelevance of the concept of truth for the critical appraisal of scientific theories.” In Selected Philosophical Essays, herausgegeben von Richard Jeffrey, 75–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. google scholar
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  • Priest, Graham. Doubt Truth to be a Liar. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. google scholar

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APA

Bartolo Alegre, L. (0001). About Popper's Requirement of Consistency. Archives of Philosophy, 0(51), 31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


AMA

Bartolo Alegre L. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency. Archives of Philosophy. 0001;0(51):31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


ABNT

Bartolo Alegre, L. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency. Archives of Philosophy, [Publisher Location], v. 0, n. 51, p. 31-36, 0001.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Bartolo Alegre, Luis Felipe,. 0001. “About Popper's Requirement of Consistency.” Archives of Philosophy 0, no. 51: 31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


Chicago: Humanities Style

Bartolo Alegre, Luis Felipe,. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency.” Archives of Philosophy 0, no. 51 (Dec. 2024): 31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


Harvard: Australian Style

Bartolo Alegre, L 0001, 'About Popper's Requirement of Consistency', Archives of Philosophy, vol. 0, no. 51, pp. 31-36, viewed 23 Dec. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Bartolo Alegre, L. (0001) ‘About Popper's Requirement of Consistency’, Archives of Philosophy, 0(51), pp. 31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103 (23 Dec. 2024).


MLA

Bartolo Alegre, Luis Felipe,. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency.” Archives of Philosophy, vol. 0, no. 51, 0001, pp. 31-36. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103


Vancouver

Bartolo Alegre L. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency. Archives of Philosophy [Internet]. 23 Dec. 2024 [cited 23 Dec. 2024];0(51):31-36. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103 doi: 10.26650/arcp2019-5103


ISNAD

Bartolo Alegre, Luis Felipe. About Popper's Requirement of Consistency”. Archives of Philosophy 0/51 (Dec. 2024): 31-36. https://doi.org/10.26650/arcp2019-5103



TIMELINE


Submitted11.11.2019
Last Revision08.12.2019
Accepted15.12.2019

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