Plea-Bargaining in German Criminal Procedure Law
Ali Emrah BozbayındırPlea-bargaining has been the most controversial issue for German criminal jurisprudence for the last thirty years. The German version of plea-bargaining first emerged as a clandestine mode of adjudication between the judge, defense counsel, and prosecutor. The Federal Court approved this practice and formulated guidelines for it. Acting upon open calls from the Federal Court for legislation regarding bargaining, the legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) in 2009. The CCP has remained in force since 1877 and its 2009 amendment is deemed one of the most significant changes in its history. The German plea-bargaining process is judge-dominated: the defendant agrees to confess to the charges, and in return, the court assures that it will not exceed an agreed-upon sentence. The public prosecutor holds the right to veto such agreements. Unsurprisingly, plea-bargaining is thus in tension with the traditional principles of the CCP, for instance, the tenet of material truth. In a 2013 judgment, the German Constitutional Court upheld the 2009 legislation; however, it emphasized the traditional principles and fair trial. The Court also stipulated stricter rules pertaining to transparency and documentation than was envisaged in the 2009 legislation. An empirical study in 2020 reported a decline in the formal practice of plea-bargaining since the 2013 judgment by the Court. The present article adopts a historical and doctrinal perspective to offer an analysis of the major themes and issues related to the German plea-bargaining debate, taking due note of recent empirical research on the subject.
Alman Ceza Muhakemesi Hukukunda İddia Pazarlığı Kurumu
Ali Emrah Bozbayındırİddia pazarlığı kurumu, Alman Ceza Muhakemesi Hukuku’nun son otuz yıldaki en tartışmalı konularının başında gelmektedir. Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti’nde iddia pazarlığı kurumu, ilk önce gizli bir uygulama olarak hâkim, sanık, müdafi ve savcı arasında gerçekleştirilen, ceza muhakemesinin neticelendirilmesi amacına hizmet eden bir muhakeme usulü olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Alman Federal Yüksek Mahkemesi, mevzuatta düzenlenmemiş olmasına rağmen kurumu bazı çekincelerle de olsa kabul etmiş ve uygulamada dikkat edilmesi gereken hususlara ilişkin kıstasları tayin etmiştir. Nihayet, 2009 yılına gelindiğinde Alman Federal Yüksek Mahkemesi’nin talepleri neticesinde kanun koyucu, İddia Pazarlığına İlişkin Kanunla (Verständigungsgesetz) Alman Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nu tadil etmiş ve bu değişiklik 1877 yılından beri yürürlükte olan Alman Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nun tarihindeki en önemli değişikliklerden biri olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Alman iddia pazarlığı modeli hâkimin başat rol oynadığı olduğu bir usul olup, sanığın mahkemede suçunu ikrarı (Geständnis) karşılığında, mahkeme üzerinde anlaşılan cezanın üzerinde bir ceza vermeme sözü vermektedir. Buna ilave olarak, savcılık bu anlaşmayı veto yetkisini haizdir. Bu nedenle kurumun, Alman Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nun maddi gerçeğin araştırılması gibi temel ilkeleriyle uyumlu olup olmadığı münakaşalıdır. Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi ise 2013 yılında verdiği kararında, iddia pazarlığına ilişkin kanunun Anayasa’ya uygun olduğuna karar vermiş; ancak ceza muhakemesinin temel ilkelerini ve adil yargılanma hakkını vurgulamıştır. Mahkeme ayrıca, şeffaflık ve tutanağa geçirme konularında kanuna nazaran daha sıkı kıstaslar tayin etmiştir. 2020 yılında gerçekleştirilen bir ampirik çalışmaya göre ise resmi iddia pazarlığının uygulaması, Anayasa Mahkemesi’nin 2013 tarihli kararından bu tarafa düşüş göstermiştir. Makalede, Alman iddia pazarlığı tartışmasının temel konuları ve meselelerinin, konu hakkındaki ampirik çalışmaları da dikkate almak suretiyle tarih ve öğreti zaviyesinden tahlil edilmektedir.
Trial-avoidance procedures have functioned significantly in varying scopes and degrees in diverse criminal justice systems in common law and civil law countries, particularly over the last three decades. Among such practices, plea-bargaining and its functional equivalents have expanded across the globe. Plea-bargaining shakes the foundations of traditional criminal trials more than any other form of accelerated adjudication. Conventionally, criminal trials aim to establish the material truth through comprehensive inquiries into facts. Yet, recourse to plea-bargaining or institutes that share its fundamental principle of du ut des continues to expand. The substance of such bargains generally entails an exchange of confession or admission of the procedure for a more lenient punishment.
The particularities of such procedures are apparently based on the principle of consensus or consent between the parties and differ significantly among jurisdictions. However, a common element unites all variants: the defendant waives the right to a traditional trial and receives a more lenient sentence in return. Such a seemingly appealing exchange would reduce case backlogs and help the judiciary if the inherent inequality of the negotiating parties is disregarded. Dispensing with truth also generally implies a lenient punishment for the guilty but a harsh adjudication for innocent individuals or offenders who could have availed of the opportunity at their trials to tender valid justifications or excuses for their criminal acts. Unsurprisingly, therefore, generations of lawyers have voiced their disagreement with the ascent of plea-bargaining comparatively or in the context of a particular jurisdiction.
The present study examines the roots and current state of the German version of plea-bargaining (Verständigung). This practice allows defense counsel to negotiate with a judge so that the defendant can confess to an offense cited in the indictment in exchange for a more lenient sentence than would be meted if the defendant were to contest the charge in a traditional contested trial. The prosecutor holds the right to veto such an agreement. Specifically, the defendant undertakes to confess the cited charges in court, and the court assures in return that it will not exceed an agreed-upon sentence. In the German model, the judge initiates the plea-bargaining procedures, not the prosecutor. Germany is unique in Europe in the implementation of this model of judicial plea-bargaining. The present study begins with a brief overview of the core principles of the 1877 German Criminal Procedural Code. The basic structure of the Code has remained intact despite numerous subsequent amendments. The Code is founded on the principle of immediacy and the notion of the search for truth at a public trial. Indeed, according to para 244 sec. 2 of the Code, the court is charged with ascertaining that all evidence required to discover the truth about a case is produced at trial. The court calls and interrogates witnesses and experts and introduces documentary and real evidence. The German criminal justice system was once dubbed a framework without plea-bargaining because of its dedication to truth in adjudication. Yet, the German version of plea-bargaining developed from the grassroots since the mid-1970s. It was initially shaped by the judiciary as a clandestine practice unknown to legal scholarship. This practice was first illuminated at the beginning of the 1980s. Since then, it indubitably remains the most contested issue of German criminal procedure jurisprudence because the institute of bargaining shakes the fundamental tenets of the German criminal procedural model.
Nevertheless, the negotiation of criminal judgments between the court and the parties was acknowledged under specific rules in the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Germany. Subsequently, the German legislature authorized such negotiations by passing an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code in 2009. The new provisions of the Code systemized the existing jurisprudence to a great extent and were upheld by the German Constitutional Court in 2013. The Court’s decision attempted to regulate and delimit the practice of bargaining through a set of criteria pertaining principally to rules concerning the transparency and documentation of proceedings. Remarkably, a recent empirical study revealed a decline in the practice of plea-bargaining as enshrined in the Code since the 2013 judgment of the Constitutional Court. Thus, the present study probes into the reasons for ongoing informal negotiations conducted outside the ambit of the codified procedures of pleabargaining stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Code.
Overall, the current article sequentially discusses the roots of German pleabargaining, the scope of the current legislation, doctrinal debates surrounding the institute, the 2013 judgment of the Constitutional Court, the most recent empirical studies regarding formal and informal bargaining practices, and future probabilities.
