The Ottoman Empire became involved in the First World War by bombing the Sevastopol Port of Russia on October 29, 1914. Enver Pasha played a critical role in the course of the war by simultaneously undertaking the duties of the Minister of War, Chief of the Military Staff, and Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Enver Pasha and a group of former administrators had to leave the country as a result of the Ottoman Empire’s acceptance of defeat with the Armistice of Mudros signed on October 30, 1918. Enver Pasha had contacts in various countries, especially Russia, during his time abroad. Using these contacts, he attempted to become a power element both in Central Asia and in the Ottoman geography. At first, he thought of establishing an army in Central Asia and attacking the British colonial roads with support from Russia. However, following the Battle of İnönü, he began to adopt the idea of crossing into Anatolia more. This idea caused a conflict between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In this period, the French Government was criticized by its public opinion for the existing occupation in Antep (Aintab) and its surroundings. Questioning the logic of being an occupier in this region, thousands of kilometers away from France, the French public wanted to prevent further loss of soldiers and money. The French Government began to seek a dialog formula with Ankara at the point when its national interests met with the demands of its public opinion. Meanwhile, news about the National Struggle Movement in Anatolia and Mustafa Kemal Pasha began to appear in the French press, and some French writers began to publish books about the National Struggle. In such an environment, the tension between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha was reflected in the French press. Even in some books published in France at that time, various opinions were put forward on this issue. This tension was so high that it even came to the fore in the French parliament. The French Government was questioning the results of the partition agreements with Britain specific to the Ottoman geography while trying to calculate the consequences of reconciliation with the Ankara Government after the Battle of Sakarya resulted in a Turkish victory. At this point, whether the center of gravity in Anatolia was on the side of Mustafa Kemal Pasha or Enver Pasha became a matter of curiosity in French public. This study examines how the tension between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha during the War of Independence was perceived by French public.

We used thirteen different French newspapers for this study. We particularly focused on Le Petit Parisien, Le Petit Journal, Le Journal, and Le Matin, the so-called big five newspapers. Le Temps, a newspaper close to the state, l’Humanité and Le Populaire, representing the radical left, Le Radical, a weekly–monthly publication with a socialist tendency, Journal des Débats appealing to the bourgeois class, Le Gaulois, a right leaning paper; and although their circulations were low, Le Figaro, which had a strong influence, and L’Action Française with Bonapartist tendencies, and Excelsior, known for their visual materials and published weekly, were the other sources of our research. In addition, to understand the opinion of the French Government, we used French diplomatic documents and parliamentary debates of the French Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, the book named L’Aventure Kémaliste (Kemalist Adventure), which was published in Paris during the years of our research, is among the sources used.

The results revealed that in the French public opinion, the tension between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha was misinterpreted as a “cooperation” rather than a “disagreement” or a “conflict” until the Ankara Treaty was signed between the Ankara Government and France on October 20, 1921. It was observed that in French politics, it was claimed that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha acted together and that Enver Pasha established the dialog between Ankara and Moscow. In addition, it was observed that the idea that these two important figures, who were allegedly in cooperation, were also pro-German was adopted. Furthermore, the press was in line with the opinions of French politicians in that period until the Ankara Treaty. Some columnists even claimed that the cooperation between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha was organized by Germany and Russia to put the French in trouble in Muslim geographies, especially in North Africa. In addition, this study based on newspapers with different political tendencies determined that the French newspapers approached our research topic from the same perspective, regardless of their political tendencies. It seems that the French public at last began to fully understand the tension between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Enver Pasha only with Franklin Bouillon’s visit to Ankara following the Turkish victory in the Battle of Sakarya. More specifically, after the Ankara Treaty was signed at the end of this visit, the French began to show considerable interest in Mustafa Kemal Pasha  and the Turkish War of Independence and constantly sent journalists to Ankara. However, it is noteworthy that even in some news published after the visit, unrealistic information and claims on the subject continued to appear in the French public occasionally. This may be due to the limited communication conditions of the period and perhaps the disinformation of French news sources abroad.