Ibn al-Alqamī (d. 656/1258), The Last Vizier of Abbāsīd, and His Relationship with The Mongols
Halil İbrahim HançabayThe rule of the Abbāsīd that lasted for more than five centuries declined after Hulāgū’s destruction of Baghdād. This paper intends to scrutinize the administrative and political activities of Muayyad al-Dīn Ibn al-Alqamī who served as the head of the dār al-tashrīfāt and became ustādār then vizier when the Mongolian threat to the Abbāsīds increased. The main concern of this study is the opinions put forward by Ibn al-Alqamī about the measures which had to be taken against the Mongols, and criticisms raised against him regarding his ideas. That is why the subject to be initially addressed in this article is Ibn al-Alqamī’s apprenticeship as a clerk (kātib) and then his appointment as the ustādār. Subsequently, this will be followed by his vizierate, his relationship with the Mongols and his death.
Abbâsîler’in Son Veziri İbnü’l-Alkamî (ö. 656/1258) ve Moğollar’la İlişkisi
Halil İbrahim HançabayBeş asırdan daha uzun bir süre tarih sahnesinde kalan Abbâsîler, İlhanlı hükümdarı Hülâgû’nun Bağdat’ı işgal etmesiyle yıkılmıştır. Bu çalışma Moğollar’ın Abbâsîler’e yönelik tehditlerini giderek arttırdığı bir dönemde Abbâsî idaresinde Dârütteşrîfât başkanlığı (teşrîfât nâzırlığı), üstâdârlık ve vezirlik yapan Müeyyedüddîn İbnü’l-Alkamî’nin siyasî ve idarî faaliyetlerini mercek altına almayı hedeflemektedir. İbnü’l-Alkamî’nin Moğol tehlikesine karşı alınması gereken tedbirler kapsamında ortaya koyduğu görüşler ve bununla irtibatlı olarak kendisi hakkında ileri sürülen iddialar bu çalışmanın odak noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Bunun için öncelikle İbnü’l-Alkamî’nin yetişmesi ve üstâdârlık görevini üstlenmesi incelenmiş, ardından vezirliği, Moğollar’la ilişkisi ve vefatı üzerinde durulmuştur.
The Mongols that carried out one of the biggest invasions in world history, deeply affected the history of Islam due to the destruction they caused in the geographies where Muslims lived. After Genghis Khan (602-624/1206-1227), the Mongol ruler Möngke (649-657/1251- 1259) commissioned his brother Hūlāgū (654-663/1256-1265) to capture Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Caucasus and Anatolia, and also Möngke assigned Hūlāgū to rule these regions as a subordinate “ilkhān” (ruler of the region). Thus, the state, whose administrative center was Tabriz and was established in 654 (1256), became independent in 695 (1295) and was named Ilkhānids (654-754/1256-1354) in relation to the title of ilkhān carried by Hūlāgū. Hūlāgū captured Alamut and its surrounding castles in 654 (1256) as a duty given to him, invaded Baghdad two years later and eliminated the Abbāsīds (132-656/750-1258). The present study deals with the political and administrative activities of Ibn al-Alqamī in a period when the threats of the Mongols against the Abbāsīds increased. The views put forward by Ibn alAlqamī within the scope of the measures which needed to be taken against the Mongolian danger and the allegations made about him in connection with these measures constitute the focus of this study.
Ibn al-Alqamī started his administrative career as a clerk under the auspices of his uncle, Ustādār Adūd al-Dīn Abū Nasr al-Mubārak and he was promoted to the head of Dār al-tashrīfāt and then to ustādār and lastly to vizier, respectively. It can be said that in the appointment of Ibn al-Alqamī to the vizierate, the highest position after the caliphate under the Abbāsīd administration, his skill in the profession of clerk and his successful fulfillment, as well as his good relationship with the Ustādār Ibn al-Nākıd and the patronage of ustādār were effective. It is possible that some practices that had become relatively basic in the Abbāsīd administration history since 6th/12th century could be considered in his appointment. At this point, it should be emphasized that it was important for Ibn al-Alqamī to fulfill his duty as an ustādār. As a matter of fact, some people such as Nizām al-Dīn Ibn Jahīr (d. 549/1154) and Abū al-Faraj Adūd al-Dīn Ibn al-Muslimah (d. 573/1178), who were the predecessors of Ibn al-Alqamī, rose from ustādār to vizierate. It can be said that a similar statement is also valid in terms of the sectarian affiliation of viziers. Especially since the Caliph al-Nāsır-Lidīn Allāh, in order to establish the authority of the caliphate over all Shiite and Sunni groups, people from Hanafi and Shafii sects were appointed to some high-level positions while persons from Shiite thought such as Ibn al-Qassāb (d. 592/1196), Nāsır alLidīn Nāsır ibn al-Mahdī (d. 617/1220) and Muayyad al-Dīn al-Qummī (d. 630/1232) were assigned as vizier. In this sense, it can be thought that the fact that Ibn al-Alqamī was Shiite, was effective in his appointment to the vizierate. It is seen that Ibn al-Alqamī, who had a very close relationship with the Caliph Musta‘sim in the first period of his vizierate, gained an important administrative influence. Apart from the Caliph, it is understood that Ibn al-Alqamī wanted to establish close relations with other high-level state leaders such as Davātdār alSagīr Mucāhid al-Dīn Aybag and Davātdār al-Kabīr Amīr Alā al-Dīn al-Taybarsī, but he was not successful in this matter. In addition to Aybag and al-Taybarsī, some people in the close vicinity of the caliph were distant to Ibn al-Alqamī after he was appointed to the vizierate. The attitudes of these people against Ibn al-Alqamī caused him to lose his position next to the caliph and to keep relatively in the background in terms of administration. In Karkh, Aybag and Abu Bakr’s, the son of the caliph, excessive behavior towards the Shiites and Ibn alAlqamī’s inability to prevent these behaviors as a vizier caused the hostility between Ibn alAlqamī and Aybag to become inconclusive. While Ibn al-Alqamī accused Aybag of trying to dethrone the caliph, Aybag accused Ibn al-Alqamī of secretly meeting with Hūlāgū. Aybag’s claims about Ibn al-Alqamī were not limited to this and it is mentioned that Ibn al-Alqamī disbanded the Abbāsīd army and left Baghdad defenseless, and tried to establish a Shiite state by eliminating the Sunni Abbāsīd caliphate. Mamlūk sources used expressions such as “traitor”, “enemy of Islam” about Ibn al-Alqamī. It can be said that one of the possible reasons why Mamlūk historians took such a harsh attitude towards Ibn al-Alqamī, who was known as being Shiite, was sect fanaticism. However, it should not be forgotten that these authors, who wrote their works in a period when the destruction of the Mongols was still happening and in a geography where there was the possibility of encountering a new Mongol attack at any moment, had an extremely negative opinion about the Mongols. In other words, since the Mongols were perceived as a chronic enemy in terms of Mamlūks, bad opinions and thoughts about the Mongols were also reflected in the works that were written in this period. Therefore, it should be considered that the opinions of Mamlūk historians about the Mongols, regardless of the sect’s fanaticism, may have been reflected in the records they narrated about Ibn al-Alqamī. Apart from the Mamlūk sources, there is no information about Ibn al-Alqamī’s correspondence with Hūlāgū in the accounts of historians such as Rāshīd al-Dīn Fazl Allāh, Atā Malik el-Cuvaynī, Ibn al-Tiktakā and in the work named Havādis al-Cāmi‘a. At this point, it can be assumed that Ibn al-Tiktakā, just like the Mamlūk historians, acted with sectarian fanaticism. That is, Ibn al-Tiktakā may not have included the narrations expressing a negative opinion about Ibn al-Alqamī in his work because he belonged to the same sect. It is not possible to be content with the records of the Ilkhānid historians about Ibn al-Alqamī’s administrative career and his relations with the Mongols. In addition, the narrations for and against Ibn al-Alqamī cannot be matched with each other and these narrations alone are far from convincing. However, according to what historians who had different views about Ibn al-Alqamī unanimously stated, it is understood that when the Mongols were besieging Baghdad, Ibn al-Alqamī persistently wanted to send a large amount of money and gifts to Hūlāgū, but al-Mustansir, due to the influence of his close circle, especially Aybag, did not accept the opinion of his vizier. This situation reveals that Ibn al-Alqamī lost his power in terms of administration, and he wanted the Mongol danger to be overcome with the least damage with the gifts sent to Hūlāgū. It should also be considered that this attitude of Ibn alAlqamī may have been reflected in the Mamlūk sources as he collaborated with the Mongols.
Ibn al-Alqamī’s loss of effectiveness and the presence of commanders such as Aybag and Suleyman Shah, who insisted on waging war against the Mongols, show that it is not possible for Ibn al-Alqamī to detract the Abbāsīd army from Baghdad. At this point, it should be noted that the number of one hundred thousand given by some Mamlūk historians for the Abbāsīd army does not reflect the truth. Again in this period, the fact that there were no problems between the Abbāsīd and the Shiites other than the events in the Karkh and the fact that the Mongols carried out a great massacre after the invasion without a distinction between Shiite and Sunni weakens the claim that Ibn al-Alqamī corresponded with Hūlāgū in order to establish a Shiite state. On the other hand, unlike many statesmen, it is unlikely that Ibn al-Alqamī was not killed by the Mongols and left in his former position as evidence of his cooperation with Hūlāgū because the Mongols did not kill many other Abbāsīd statesmen, they left some of them in their former duties, and they did not show the necessary respect to Ibn al-Alqamī as a vizier.
As a result, it should be stated that it is not an easy conclusion to describe this attitude of Ibn al-Alqamī, who desired to contact Hūlāgū at every opportunity, as treason since he thinks that the Mongol danger could be eliminated by sending various gifts.