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DOI :10.26650/jes.2024.1496946   IUP :10.26650/jes.2024.1496946    Tam Metin (PDF)

Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi

Elterişhan Elçibey

1991 yılında Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasının ardından eksklav statüsü kazanan Kaliningrad bölgesi, Sovyet sonrası dönemde Rus iç ve dış politika söyleminde önemli bir tartışma konusu olarak ortaya çıkmış ve jeopolitik açıdan stratejik bir önem kazanmıştır. Önceleri Sovyetler Birliği'nin “askeri kalesi” olarak Batı'ya tehdit oluşturan bölge, Sovyet sonrası dönemde askeri unsurları azaltılmış olan, öncelikli olarak savunma işlevi gören ve Rusya anakarası ile doğrudan bağlantısı bulunmayan bir Rus toprağına dönüşmüştür. Bölgenin stratejik önemi, Avrupa Birliği ve NATO'nun birbirini takip eden doğuya doğru genişlemeleriyle daha da artmıştır. Rusya 1990'lardan bu yana Kaliningrad'ın kuşatılmasına şiddetle karşı çıkmış ve bölge Vladimir Putin'in liderliğinde tekrardan askeri açıdan önem kazanmıştır. Batı ile ilişkiler kötüleştikçe, Rusya bölgedeki askeri unsurlarını güçlendirerek bölgeyi Batı’ya karşı askeri bir hazırlık sahası olarak kullanmıştır. Sonuç olarak Kaliningrad, Kremlin için bir güvenlik politikası aracı haline gelmiş ve özellikle Baltık devletleri ile Polonya'ya yönelik süregelen tehdidin bir parçası olmuştur. Bölgede konuşlanan Rus silahlı kuvvetleri, Rusya'nın bakış açısından genişleyen NATO'ya karşı bir denge unsuru olarak hizmet etmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu makale Rusya'nın Kaliningrad üzerinden Batı ile ilişkilerini askeri güvenlik perspektifinden analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

DOI :10.26650/jes.2024.1496946   IUP :10.26650/jes.2024.1496946    Tam Metin (PDF)

The Kaliningrad Question in the National Security of the Russian Federation

Elterişhan Elçibey

In 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kaliningrad region, which gained the status of an exclave, emerged as an important topic of discussion in Russian domestic and foreign policy discourse in the post-Soviet period and gained a strategic geopolitical importance. The region, which previously posed a threat to the West as the "military stronghold" of the Soviet Union, has been transformed into a Russian territory with reduced military elements in the post-Soviet period, primarily serving a defence function and having no direct connection with mainland Russia. The strategic importance of the region has been further enhanced by the successive eastward expansion of the European Union and NATO. Since the 1990s, Russia has strongly opposed the encirclement of Kaliningrad and the region has regained military importance under Vladimir Putin's leadership. As relations with the West deteriorated, Russia strengthened its military assets in the region and used it as a military staging ground against the West. As a result, Kaliningrad has become a security policy tool for the Kremlin and part of the ongoing threat to the Baltic states and Poland in particular. From Russia's perspective, Russian armed forces stationed in the region serve as a counterweight to an expanding NATO. Therefore, this article aims to analyse Russia's relations with the West through Kaliningrad from a military security perspective.


GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET


Kaliningrad, located on the Baltic Sea coast, is a Russian exclave in the westernmost part of the Russian Federation with no direct connection to the mainland and an example of a border region of great importance. Although Kaliningrad is geographically separated from the Russian mainland, it remains an integral part of Russia’s sovereign territory. Kaliningrad’s strategic geographical location and the point at which it has evolved in the historical process also distinguish the region. Originally known as “Königsberg”, the region developed as the capital of East Prussia and remained under German control for 700 years until it was captured by Soviet forces in 1945. Following the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union took control of East Prussia, an action recognised by the Allies at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. The transformation of East Prussia into Kaliningrad was a rapid, comprehensive and sustained effort. The first stage of this process involved the erasure of German cultural and historical elements from the region. In this context, the region underwent a rapid process of Sovietisation, which saw the removal of almost all remnants of German settlements and their replacement with Soviet-style buildings. As a result, Kaliningrad was reconstructed to symbolise the progressive social values of the Soviet Union and to present the Soviet perspective in historical narratives. Kaliningrad played an important role in the strategic military planning and infrastructure of the Soviet Union. In this context, Kaliningrad underwent a serious transformation in the post-World War II period and became a strategically located “military base” on the Baltic Sea. Over time, with a military force of more than 100,000 active military personnel stationed in the region, a vast military-industrial complex and a civilian infrastructure customised to meet military demands, Kaliningrad has emerged as one of the most heavily militarised regions of the Soviet Union. At this point, this military force not only acted as a protective shield, deterring a possible invasion and protecting the region, but also had the capacity to be used as a potential staging area for offensive operations against Western Europe. Kaliningrad’s borders were completely closed to Poland and the West, and access to the region was restricted even for Soviet citizens. Thus, foreigners were prohibited from entering this highly militarised and closed zone. Kaliningrad therefore emerged as a symbolic example of a garrison city, recognised for its strong military infrastructure. The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a profound change in the geographical position of Kaliningrad and in Russia’s internal and external relations. With this development, Kaliningrad, which was previously part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, came under the sovereign authority of the Russian Federation. However, as a result of the independence of the three Baltic states, the region bordering Lithuania and Poland became geographically separated from the rest of mainland Russia. As a result, Kaliningrad underwent a significant transformation, emerging as an exclave, thus raising concerns about the problems associated with its geopolitical position. The emergence of a new geopolitical situation has led to many difficulties in providing the region with basic needs, energy and raw material supplies, transport and military transit. The strategic value of the Kaliningrad exclave has also increased significantly as it has become the westernmost region of Russia. Ultimately, the value of the region was determined by a combination of symbolic and strategic factors. The strategic factor behind Moscow’s actions became apparent as it sought to capitalise on the geopolitical importance of the region. This factor included both the protection of Kaliningrad as a military base against the West and its use as a tool to facilitate Russia’s integration into the Western world. Thus, the region has rapidly become an important component of Russia’s diplomatic agenda and strategic plans, especially in relation to hard security issues. Prior to the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU in the 2000s, Kaliningrad was a contested region, defined not only by its strategic challenge to NATO, but also by the lack of a mutual agreement between the EU and Russia on transit arrangements through the region. To address this problem, the EU resorted to an ad hoc co-operation mechanism to manage transit arrangements for Kaliningrad, while NATO underwent a significant shift in priorities, focusing on ensuring security following the deployment of Iskander missiles in the region. As a result, Moscow’s perception of a growing threat from the West has led to a greater emphasis on the region. Accordingly, the region has become a political tool in Russia’s foreign policy and the Kremlin has used NATO enlargement as a means to legitimise its military presence in the region.


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APA

Elçibey, E. (2024). Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi. Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, 13(2), 195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


AMA

Elçibey E. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi. Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi. 2024;13(2):195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


ABNT

Elçibey, E. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi. Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, [Publisher Location], v. 13, n. 2, p. 195-220, 2024.


Chicago: Author-Date Style

Elçibey, Elterişhan,. 2024. “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi.” Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi 13, no. 2: 195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


Chicago: Humanities Style

Elçibey, Elterişhan,. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi.” Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi 13, no. 2 (Nov. 2024): 195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


Harvard: Australian Style

Elçibey, E 2024, 'Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi', Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 195-220, viewed 15 Nov. 2024, https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


Harvard: Author-Date Style

Elçibey, E. (2024) ‘Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi’, Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, 13(2), pp. 195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946 (15 Nov. 2024).


MLA

Elçibey, Elterişhan,. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi.” Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, vol. 13, no. 2, 2024, pp. 195-220. [Database Container], https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


Vancouver

Elçibey E. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi. Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi [Internet]. 15 Nov. 2024 [cited 15 Nov. 2024];13(2):195-220. Available from: https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946 doi: 10.26650/jes.2024.1496946


ISNAD

Elçibey, Elterişhan. Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenliğinde Kaliningrad Meselesi”. Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi 13/2 (Nov. 2024): 195-220. https://doi.org/10.26650/jes.2024.1496946



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Gönderim06.06.2024
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