Türkiye’de Ara Rejimler ve İşinsanları
Haluk AlkanAskeri rejimler ile işinsanları ve ekonomi politikaları arasındaki ilişki literatürde farklı açılardan ele alınmıştır. Bu çalışmalar ağırlıklı olarak darbeler ile ekonomik büyüme ve istikrar arasındaki uzun ve orta dönemdeki ilişkileri inceleyen araştırmalardır. Türkiye, darbe dönemlerinin kısa süreli olması ile diğer birçok ülke örneğinden ayrılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte ara rejimlerin Türkiye’de ekonomi politikaları ve işinsanlarını temsil eden temel aktörler üzerinde kalıcı etkileri olmuştur. Makale Türkiye’de ara rejim dönemlerinin işinsanlarının temsil yapısı ve davranış eğilimleri üzerindeki etkilerini belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda öncelikle ilgili literatür taranarak analiz parametreleri belirlenmekte, ikinci olarak 1961-1965; 1971-1973 ve 1980-1983 dönemleri temelinde Türkiye’de ara rejimler ve işinsanları arasındaki ilişkiler incelenmektedir. Çalışmada daha sonra askeri rejim dönemlerinde geliştirilen politikaların, yasal düzenlemelerin ve yeni kurumların sektörel düzeyde işinsanı örgütleri üzerindeki uzun dönemli etkileri analiz edilmektedir. Makalenin sonuç bölümünde ulaşılan bulgular tartışılmaktadır.
Interim Regimes and Businesspeople in Türkiye
Haluk AlkanThe relationship between military regimes, businesspeople, and economic policies has been analyzed from various perspectives in the literature. These studies have primarily examined the relationship between coups and economic growth and stability over the long and medium terms. Türkiye stands out from many other countries due to the relatively short duration of its coup periods. Nevertheless, interim regimes have left lasting effects on the economic policies and key actors representing businesspeople in Türkiye. This article seeks to identify the effects of interim regime periods on the representational structure and behavioral tendencies of businesspeople in Türkiye. To achieve this, the article first reviews the relevant literature and establishes the parameters of the analysis. It then analyzes the relationships between interim regimes and businesspeople in Türkiye during the periods of 1961-1965, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983. The study then delves into the long-term effects of policies, legal regulations, and new institutions developed during the military regime periods on business organizations at the sectoral level. The concluding section of the paper discusses the findings.
Academic studies have examined the relationship between coup periods and businesspeople from various perspectives. Most of these studies, authored primarily by economists, have focused on the statistical analysis of the long-term relationship between coups, economic growth, and stability. The literature on this subject highlights the following key points, which this article will consider:
- Coups may arise from economic crises, leading to expectations of economic recovery following the coup. In such cases, the economic policies implemented by the coup regime, the groups it supports, and the actors it includes in the decision-making process become critical.
- A coup that strategically guides the transition to new economic policies has a direct impact on the restructuring and prioritization of economic sectors, subsequently shaping the nature of competition among businesspeople.
-The organizational nature of a coup-whether carried out hierarchically within the chain of command or through collaboration among various military factions significantly influences the direction of economic policies and the dynamics of competition between business groups.
Meanwhile, the literature on the subject has predominantly relied on research methods utilizing long-term economic data, leading to the conclusion that the effects of military regimes must be evaluated in conjunction with the policies and practices implemented during normal non-coup periods. Compared to regions such as Latin America, the Far East, and even Europe, the relatively short duration of coup periods in Türkiye requires a focused analysis specific to these transitional phases. This study primarily examines the long-term impacts of decisions made and relationships established during these interregnum periods. Additionally, it explores how interim regimes have influenced competition among sectoral groups and organizations, as well as the behavioral tendencies of businesspeople-topics that have been insufficiently explored in the existing literature.
As noted, Türkiye has not experienced prolonged military regimes, with coups instead serving as interim periods aimed at political, social, and economic restoration. However, the strategic policies and institutional changes implemented during interim regimes have had lasting consequences. In Türkiye, coups occurred during periods of significant economic policy shifts, bringing about changes among businesspeople that profoundly influenced sectoral priorities and positioning. For instance, Türkiye adopted an import-substitution industrialization policy following the 1960 coup, while the coup of September 12, 1980, laid the political and socioeconomic groundwork for implementing the January 24, 1980 decisions that facilitated the transition to neoliberal policies. Regulations introduced during the 1960 and 1971 coups significantly affected the representation and authority structures of businesspeople, further deepening divides between industrialist groups and commercial or agricultural groups within the Union of Chambers, the umbrella organization for businesspeople. These developments fostered closer relationships between large industrialists, the military, and the bureaucracy. The Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), representing the country’s leading business elites, has consistently advocated for the formation of national consensus governments involving centrist parties during democratic periods. TÜSİAD also supported the appointment of technocrats and bureaucrats in governance. In 1979, TÜSİAD became a prominent voice of opposition to Bülent Ecevit’s government, using classified advertisements as part of its counter-propaganda. Similarly, in late 1995, TÜSİAD published newspaper advertisements titled “Çağrı” (Call) to oppose a potential coalition government led by the Welfare Party (RP), openly endorsing a coalition of centrist parties. Meanwhile, commercial and agricultural groups, perceiving themselves as marginalized during the interim regimes, distanced themselves from coup administrations under the umbrella of chamber organizations. Instead, they prioritized cultivating close relationships with center-right political parties, believing this approach would better safeguard their sectoral interests. Meanwhile, commercial and agricultural groups, believing that they had been punished during the interim regimes, distanced themselves from the coup administrations under the umbrella of chamber organizations and gave importance to developing close relations with center-right political parties, as they thought doing so would allow them to protect their sectoral positions more easily.
The divergence observed during the interim regime periods played a crucial role in fostering confrontational tendencies among worker organizations representing various sectors. The punitive and reward policies implemented during these periods further exacerbated the divisions between different business groups, with confrontational attitudes persisting even under democratic conditions. Interim regimes in Türkiye have significantly influenced numerous areas, including the formation of business organizations, the regulation of competition among business groups, and the shaping of legal frameworks. These interventions disrupted the natural consolidation of business politics-state relations, as third-party actors frequently intervened. Consequently, this dynamic reinforced confrontational tendencies in both business and political spheres. Moreover, this type of relationship enabled political authorities in Türkiye to more easily implement selective policies targeting business groups during democratic periods.
