The Druze of Hauran were the only group of people to have posed serious challenges to the provincial government in Syria in the early years of Abdulhamid II’s reign. By 1878, the Druze had already become a locally powerful group in Hauran, where despite its strategic importance, the Ottoman government was unable to take the measures necessary to impose its authority in the aftermath of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. The local government became weak to the point that it put the regional balance in danger. In other words, the Ottoman authorities held that a peaceful future between the Druze and the other Arab tribes in Hauran depended on a delicate balance that was already under serious threat. To preserve the local balance, the successive governors-general and the central government agreed that the rising power of the Druze should be taken under control by gradually increasing state authority and integrating the region into the Ottoman system. Hence, they firstly tried to limit the new Druze migrations to the region and prevent the Druze from taking new non-Druze villages under their control. Secondly, they tried to gain the support of the strong Arab tribes in and around Hauran against the Druze, and this was apparently one of the decisive factors that contributed to achieving a peaceful solution. Thirdly, the local government secured the cooperation of some distinguished local tribes such as the Ruwala, and more importantly convinced the powerful Atrash family to work with the government. Lastly, the Ottoman authorities spent every effort to prevent foreign interference in Druze affairs, especially from the British, believing that doing so would strengthen the government’s position regarding bringing the Druze to the negotiating table.

Nevertheless, the period under study witnessed the Druze to make efforts to increase their power in the region using practically all opportunities, whether peaceful or otherwise. The case of Ibn Abū ‘Assāf at Izra‘ is one significant example of the peaceful attempts for Druze expansion around Laja. As explained, Cevdet Pasha and the Sublime Porte stood firmly to prevent Ibn Abū ‘Assāf from achieving his goal, and they succeeded without using military force despite the district governor being in favor of a military solution. Realizing the degree of determination on the government’s side, Ibn Abū ‘Assāf for his part wisely accepted a middle-ground solution, which in reality meant recognizing his strong position in the region. 

As for Midhat Pasha’s attitude towards the Druze issue, the governor-general faced the problem at a time when his relations with the central government and the commander of the Fifth Army Corps in Syria were strained. He resigned on October 19, 1879 before taking any action regarding the conflict in Busra al-Harir that had happened in early October. Only when Abdulhamid II refused to accept his resignation did Midhat Pasha start to correspond with the Porte regarding the Busra al-Harir conflict and express his view that the developments in Hauran had reached such a degree that no other way existed apart from the use of force. Both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier insisted that peace should be achieved by reconciling the two parties. By the end of October 1879, Midhat Pasha recognized the fact that the Palace, the Sublime Porte, and the British government, all but him, were all insisting on peaceful solutions and the necessity for avoiding the use of force. The central government underlined time and again the need to use notables and other locally influential figures as mediators between the two parties. The government even put pressure on Midhat Pasha to proceed to Hauran in person and supervise negotiations. Although he resisted this last request, Midhat Pasha finally sent a delegation headed by the Lebanese Druze sheikh Said Talhuq Bey, who played an important role in reconciling the two parties.

The final incident that provided another opportunity to see the Ottoman policy succeed toward the Druze of Hauran took place in late January 1881 at Karak village. The Karak incident was the bloodiest of the three incidents this paper examines. The Sultan, the Porte, and the governor-general unanimously agreed that the conflict had to be solved as soon as possible by peaceful means. Moreover, Abdulhamid II and Hamdi Pasha both held the view that the conflict was not an ordinary blood feud; rather it could be the result of a foreign, probably British, instigation. Hence, Hamdi Pasha took effective measures to prevent communications of the Hauran Druzes with other Druzes in different mutasarrifliks as well as their correspondence with the British and other foreign representatives in the region. They underlined that the speed of achieving a peaceful solution was crucial to prevent any foreign intervention. 

After solemnly assuring the central government that he would not use military force and only the culprits would be brought to justice, Hamdi Pasha deployed more than the usual number of military units to Hauran and sent a special commission to resolve the conflict peacefully. He consistently tried to separate the innocent Druze from the guilty ones, and published proclamations stating that the commission will only interrogate the Druze who had taken part in the incident with the others being able to continue their usual work. He also assured the Druze sheikhs that the commission’s proceedings would be just and reconciliatory (adilane ve muslihane) and that the commission would attempt to work with them to achieve justice. In the end, the commission worked with the powerful Atrash family to reach a settlement. Moreover, Hamdi Pasha managed to gain the support of strong Arab tribes in the region against these Druze. Thus, the Ottoman position can safely be said to have been considerably strengthened as a result of the new measures the government had taken. Lastly, the findings of this article support the existing view that the Ottoman Empire preferred negotiation and reconciliation over coercion in its relations with the Arab tribes in the Bilad al-Sham region during and after the Tanzimat.