Must Phenomenology be Transcendental?
Eylem HacımuratoğluAn example of criticism of the transcendental character of phenomenology from within the phenomenological movement has recently been presented by Claude Romano. I argue against Romano’s criticism. The first section is devoted to the claim that the Cartesian character of early Husserlian phenomenology and its transcendental turn resulted from taking scepticism seriously. According to Romano, the reasons that force phenomenology to be a transcendental philosophy can be rejected. Moreover, a transcendental phenomenology is already impossible because of the incompatibility of the basic phenomenological theses: Realism, dualism and transcendentalism.
The second section demonstrates how these seemingly incompatible theses together make a transcendental phenomenology possible. The third section deals with the universal epoché beyond the idea of a limited epoché on which Romano’s critique of transcendental phenomenology is based. The fourth chapter argues that Husserl’s main interest in scepticism has to do with the historical role assigned to scepticism, depending on the original idea of philosophy as universal, rigorous and first science. The fifth section demonstrates that transcendental phenomenology is the only genuine philosophy capable of realising this idea of philosophy by overcoming scepticism. In conclusion, I argue that phenomenology’s originality depends on its transcendental nature, as long as it is understood as a position that investigates the conditions of possibility of being and knowledge of objects in the face of all forms of objectivism.
Fenomenoloji Transandantal Olmak Zorunda mı?
Eylem HacımuratoğluFenomenolojik hareket içinden fenomenolojinin transandantal niteliğine yöneltilen eleştirilerin bir örneğini yakın zamanda Claude Romano sunar. Makalede Romano’nun eleştirisinin neden isabetli olmadığı tartışılacaktır. Birinci başlık, Husserlci fenomenolojinin başlangıçtaki Kartezyen karakterinin ve transandantal dönüşümünün, şüpheciliğin ciddiye alınmasından kaynaklandığına dair iddiaya ayrılmıştır. Romano, Husserl’i transandantal fenomenolojiye götüren şeyin, felsefenin görevinin şüphecilik karşısında bilimleri temellendirmek olduğunu düşünmesi ve evrensel bir şüpheden hareketle bilinç ile gerçeklik arasında indirgenemez bir ontolojik ayrım varsayması olduğunu ileri sürer. Oysa Romano’ya göre fenomenolojiyi transandantal bir felsefe olmaya zorlayan bu gerekçeler reddedilebilir. Zaten transandantal bir fenomenoloji olanaklı da değildir; çünkü transandantal kuruluş fikri, bilinç ve gerçeklik arasında varsayılan ikici ontolojik ayrımla ve fenomenolojinin gerçekliğe olduğu haliyle doğrudan erişime izin vermesiyle bağdaşmaz görünür. İkinci başlıkta, bağdaşmaz görünen bu tezlerin, korelasyonun kendisinin bilinç ve dünyaya önceliğini, bedenli bilinçle dünyanın kökendeki olgusal etkileşimini, zamansal ve çağrışımsal sentezler boyunca anlamın genetik kuruluşunu hesaba kattığımızda transandantal bir fenomenolojiyi nasıl birlikte olanaklı kıldığı gösterilecektir. Üçüncü başlık, Romano’nun transandantal fenomenoloji eleştirisinin dayandığı sınırlı epokhe’nin karşısına evrensel epokhe’yi koyacaktır. Dördüncü başlıkta Husserl’in şüpheciliğe yönelik esas ilgisinin, kökensel felsefe idesinden hareketle şüpheciliğe biçtiği tarihsel role bağlı olduğu açıklanacaktır. Son başlık ise, transandantal fenomenolojinin, şüpheciliği alt ederek felsefe idesini gerçekleştirebilecek tek sahici felsefe olduğunu ortaya çıkaracaktır. Sonuç olarak, transandantal fenomenoloji, realizm karşısındaki idealist bir konum olarak değil, her türlü nesnelcilik karşısında, nesnelerin varlığının ve bilgisinin olanak koşullarını araştıran bir konum olarak anlaşıldığı sürece, fenomenolojinin özgün bir felsefe olmasının onun transandantal niteliğine bağlı olduğu savunulacaktır.
From within the phenomenological movement, criticism has often been directed at phenomenology’s commitment to Cartesian philosophy and its transcendental character. An example of such criticism has recently been presented by Claude Romano, who views transcendental phenomenology as a subjective philosophy and characterises his own phenomenology as “realist”. According to Romano, phenomenology should not and cannot be transcendental. I argue against Romano’s claim and defend that a transcendental phenomenology is possible and that phenomenology, if it is to be an original philosophy, must be transcendental.
The first section is devoted to the claim that the Cartesian character of early Husserlian phenomenology and its transcendental turn resulted from taking scepticism seriously. Romano argues that what led Husserl to transcendental phenomenology was his belief that the task of philosophy is to ground the sciences in the face of scepticism and his assumption that there is an irreducible ontological distinction between consciousness and reality, based on this universal doubt. However, Romano stated that the sciences do not need philosophy to ground their truths; this is already an outdated idea. Secondly, the fact that we can doubt a singular perception does not make us doubt our perception and the existence of the world as a whole. On the contrary, any illusion is possible only on the basis of the continuity and permanence of a structurally coherent world. If the sciences can solve all their problems without the help of philosophy, and if a universal doubt is already impossible, then phenomenology does not have to be a transcendental philosophy based on the cogito. Moreover, Romano argues that transcendental phenomenology is not even possible, since it tries to bring together three incompatible theses –realism, dualism, and transcendentalism.
In the following sections, I will attempt to explain why Romano’s criticisms are unjustified.
The second section is devoted to showing how the theses that Romano claims incompatible can be reconciled and together make a transcendental phenomenology possible. Phenomenology claims to overcome the traditional distinction between appearance and reality through its own notion of phenomena. In this approach, what manifests itself is the thing itself, there is no reality behind its manifestation to which we have no access. Phenomenological intentionality, on the other hand, is to be understood as a mutually constitutive relation or correlation between consciousness and the world on the basis of a factual contact between a sufficiently developed organism and the Earth. Correlation itself precedes consciousness and the world, both of which become what they are by differentiating from each other and within themselves through various syntheses. Taking all this into account, it is possible for phenomenology to be both “realist” and transcendental, and at the same time to recognise the ontological difference between consciousness and worldly objects.
The third section deals with the universal epoché that reveals the consciousness-world correlation beyond the idea of a limited epoché that leads to pure and absolute consciousness. In this way, consciousness is only one of the constitutive elements of a transcendental sphere in which we can consider the mutual constitution of consciousness and the world at different levels. The fourth section argues that Husserl’s main interest in scepticism has to do with the historical role assigned to scepticism, depending on the original idea of philosophy as a universal, rigorous and first science. According to Husserl, true philosophy begins as a theory of knowledge in the face of sceptical attacks about the possibility of knowledge, and then necessarily develops into an ontology understood as the science of being. Just as philosophy undertakes the task of grounding scientific knowledge in terms of its possibility, it also undertakes the task of revealing the conditions of possibility for the existence of the world and of the objects, which the sciences take as given from the outset. Thus, philosophy will precede and ground all other sciences, both epistemologically and ontologically.
The final section shows that transcendental phenomenology, with its own method and theme, is the only genuine philosophy capable of overcoming scepticism and realising the original idea of philosophy. For phenomenology opens a transcendental sphere with the universal epoché which is imposed by scepticism. By describing the essential structures of correlation operating in this sphere, it can elucidate the conditions of possibility of all beings and their knowledge, and thus epistemologically and ontologically ground all sciences. In conclusion, for Husserl, taking scepticism seriously is not a Cartesian project and ideal, but a matter directly related to what philosophy is and should be at its origin. Phenomenology’s originality depends on its transcendental character, as long as it is not understood as an idealist position against realism, but as a position that investigates the conditions of possibility of objects and their objective knowledge in their relation to subjectivity in the face of all forms of objectivism.