Epistemik Kaygı Bağlamında Bilimciliğin Epistemolojik Dışsalcı Zemini Üzerine Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme
Alper GürkanBilimcilik, bilgi edinmenin tek yolunun bilimsel yöntem olduğu görüşünü içeren felsefî bir yaklaşımdır. Bilimsel yöntemin uygulanmasında yalnızca maddî gerçekliğin varsayılması nedeniyle bilimcilik metafiziği ve a priori bilgiyi reddeden materyalist ve natüralist bir felsefedir aynı zamanda. İnanışın gerekçelendirilmesinde geleneksel epistemolojide başvurulan normların deneysel olmamaları nedeniyle reddedildiği epistemolojik natüralizmde, gerekçelendirme yerine inanç oluşum sürecinin psikolojik bir betimlemesi yeterli görülür. İnanç oluşumunun dayanaklarının yeterince uygun olup olmadığı endişesini ifade eden “epistemik kaygı”, bilimcileri bilgi için somut bir zemin arayışına itmiştir. Gerçeklikle bilgi arasındaki ilişkide söz konusu zemine bağlı olarak güvenilirlik ve nesnellik nitelikleri öne çıkar. Bilimcilik savunucuları, sorunun çözümü için geliştirilen içselci yaklaşımlarda gerekçelendirme için üst standartlar belirlenmesinin epistemik kaygıyı gidermeyip epistemik geri gitme sorununa yol açtığını düşünürler. İçselci yaklaşımlarda olduğu gibi bilgi için öznenin bilişsel unsurlara erişimini gerekli görmeyen bilimciler, deneysel yöntemin yeterli sayıldığı dışsalcı tutumu benimserler. Bilgi için somut bir zemin arayışını ifade eden epistemik kaygının giderilmek istendiği dışsalcılıkta özellikle normlar, metafizik yargılar ve a priori önermelerden oluşan sorunlar öne çıkmaktadır. Bilginin standartlarının deneyle sınırlandırıldığı bilimciliğin normatiflikten kaçınamaması, bilimsel faaliyetin metafizik varsayımlarla başlaması ve çelişmezlik ilkesinden hareketle a priori bir doğru ortaya konulabilmesi, dışsalcı epistemolojinin somut zemin arayışına engel teşkil eder. Bu durum, epistemik kaygının dışsalcı tutumla aşılamadığı ve yanı sıra epistemoloji özelinde felsefenin bilimselleştirilmesi çabasının da başarılı olmadığı sonuçlarını verir.
A Critical Evaluation on the Epistemological Externalist Ground of Scientism in the Context of Epistemic Concern
Alper GürkanScientism is a philosophical approach that asserts that the scientific method is the only way to acquire knowledge. Since the scientific method only assumes material reality, scientism is inherently a materialistic and naturalistic philosophy that rejects metaphysics and a priori knowledge. In epistemological naturalism, norms are rejected because they are not empirical and a psychological description of belief formation is deemed sufficient. The term ‘epistemic concern’, which reflects doubts about whether the foundations of belief formation are sufficiently appropriate, has driven proponents of scientism to search for a concrete ground for knowledge. In the relationship between reality and knowledge, reliability and objectivity emerge as critical components linked to this foundational ground. Advocates of scientism argue that introducing meta-standards for justification in internalist approaches is not appropriate for knowledge. Consequently, advocates of scientism like externalists who do not find the subject’s access to cognitive elements necessary for knowledge adopt an epistemological attitude in which the empirical method is considered sufficient. However, within externalism, issues such as norms, metaphysical judgements and a priori propositions become prominent. The limitations of scientism, which confines standards of knowledge to empirical method, are evident in its failure to avoid normativity, its reliance on metaphysical assumptions and its use of a priori propositions based on the principles of non-contradiction. These restrictions show that there are obstacles to studying the concrete grounds of externalist epistemology. Therefore, the epistemic concern cannot be resolved through scientistic attitude, indicating that attempts to scientize philosophy, particularly epistemology, are ultimately unsuccessful.
Following advancements in physics, 19th-century thinkers strongly endorsed the idea of the scientific method as the only path to attaining knowledge. This view, which has significant philosophical implications, was termed scientism in the 20th century. Beyond epistemology, it fosters materialistic attitudes toward ontological, axiological, and religious understandings. The proponents of scientism argued that non-natural scientific disciplines should also be scientized. One method of elucidating scientism is to evaluate the epistemological foundations underlying this perspective. The uniqueness of scientism, which includes ontological and axiological attitudes as well as social, political, moral, and religious interpretations, lies in its proposed solution to the epistemological problem of knowledge.
Scientism, as a materialistic approach, presupposes material reality. This makes epistemic concerns about the possibility of true knowledge comprehensible. The term ‘epistemic concern’, as used in this article, goes further from the question of the nature of knowledge to worries about the reliability of the elements used in the justification of propositions. Epistemological scientism seeks to address these concerns by identifying reliable basis for propositions while avoiding metaphysical assumptions. The scientific method is considered reliable because it is rooted in material reality, and the processes of forming scientific propositions are regarded as reliable because of their connection to reality. In addressing epistemic concerns, scientism adopts an externalist approach, emphasizing the importance of psychological processes triggered by external stimuli in the formation of knowledge rather than focusing on subjects’ access to cognitive elements. In other words, proponents of scientism overlook epistemic norms, principles, and standards, focusing instead on the reliable or warranted outcomes of experiments. Because the norms employed in traditional epistemology are not based on empirical evidence. In the context of the question of what can truly be known, epistemic concerns emerge from the expectation that knowledge should have an objective external foundation. The epistemic regress problem presents challenges in justifying metaphysical propositions through appeals to a priori principles. Consequently, the scope of genuine knowledge is often considered to be limited to material reality, which can be apprehended through perception and objective experimentation. Within this framework, the resolution of epistemic concerns is sought through the establishment of a reliable, logically structured process for acquiring knowledge, rather than solely addressing the conditions under which the subject is justified. In summary, this reliable knowledge acquisition method aligns with the scientific method as a means of attaining understanding.
This perspective establishes methodological boundaries for disciplines beyond the natural sciences, influencing philosophy, humanities, and social sciences. This article examines the foundations of these limitations and draws philosophical conclusions using a philosophical analysis method. For this reason, it begins by emphasizing scientism, highlighting its central role in the problem of knowledge. It argues that scientism is fundamentally rooted in an epistemic concern, which arises from the question, “How can we know that we know?”. This concern represents the quest for a solid foundation to support the reliability of knowledge acquisition processes. Since the core elements of human beliefs—such as perception and sensation—are derived from reality and objectivity, reliability is considered a characteristic of empirical investigation. The relationship between the ontology of scientism and the externalist approach of epistemological scientism has a central position in this analysis. Therefore, after the general epistemological analysis, epistemological scientism and epistemological naturalism are evaluated in the context of externalism. This evaluation focuses on three key challenges facing scientistic epistemology: normativity, metaphysical judgments, and a priori propositions. This article explores these issues within the context of externalism and analyzes their implications for addressing epistemic concern.
In conclusion, this paper argues that externalist stance and epistemological scientism, as a kind of it, do not effectively address the issues surrounding epistemic concern. This is because the norms of knowledge and rationality cannot be overlooked in the externalist framework. Additionally, both the presence of metaphysical presuppositions in scientific practice and theory and the role of a priori knowledge must be acknowledged. These factors pose significant challenges to defending scientism and the externalist position in the context of epistemic concern. Since the initial problem of epistemic concern remains unresolved, scientism will continue to encounter logical difficulties.
