Traditionally, Kantian thought is rooted in the notion that a priori concepts are fundamental, universal, and necessary preconditions for experience. These concepts are usually seen as independent of empirical influences, forming a core part of Kant’s epistemology as laid out in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, this article argues for a nuanced reinterpretation, challenging the conventional understanding by proposing an epigenetic model for the formation of a priori concepts. This approach not only revisits the core of Kantian epistemology but also brings in a dynamic perspective on how rationality and autonomy interact within the context of life. 

One of the key philosophical debates underpinning this re-evaluation is the opposition between preformationism and epigenesis, a contrast that Kant himself draws upon, particularly in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment. Preformationism suggests that all traits and structures are pre-determined, much like pre-written codes that only need to unfold over time. In contrast, epigenesis emphasizes a formative process, where structures are not pre-given but develop through interaction and adaptation. The article argues that a priori concepts can be better understood through an epigenetic framework, where they are not fixed and predetermined but rather self-generated through cognitive processes. This allows for a more flexible and evolving understanding of these concepts, resonating with the dynamic interplay between reason and experience.

To support this interpretation, the article draws parallels with the biological concept of Bildungstrieb (formative drive), introduced by the German biologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Blumenbach’s theory was influential in the late 18th century and emphasized the capacity of living organisms to self-organize and develop autonomously. By drawing on this concept, the article suggests that rational concepts, much like living organisms, exhibit a form of self-organization. This interpretation positions a priori concepts not as rigid structures imposed upon experience but as emergent properties that arise from the interaction of the cognitive faculties. This approach is not merely metaphorical; it seeks to underline a genuine parallel between biological development and cognitive formation, suggesting that understanding the latter could benefit from insights gained from the former. 

Reflective judgment, as examined in Kant’s Critique of Judgment, serves as a central point in this argument. Unlike determinative judgment, which applies existing concepts to specific objects, reflective judgment is concerned with finding new principles that can unify diverse phenomena. The article posits that reflective judgment has an autonomous and creative role, capable of generating new principles that arise from engaging with the contingencies of life. This capacity for adaptation and responsiveness to the unexpected aligns with the epigenetic model, where concepts develop not in isolation but through an ongoing process of reflection and adjustment. In this way, reflective judgment embodies a form of self-organization that challenges the static, preformed nature of traditional a priori concepts.

The article further builds on this reinterpretation by engaging with contemporary philosophical discussions, particularly the work of Catherine Malabou. Malabou’s interpretation of Kant introduces the idea of a "plastic" or flexible transcendental, suggesting that even the most fundamental structures of cognition can undergo transformation. This plasticity is likened to biological plasticity, where organisms can adapt to changing conditions. Malabou’s insights help to support the article’s claim that Kant’s transcendental framework should not be seen as a rigid, unchangeable system but as one that is capable of evolution and adaptation, particularly through the mechanism of reflective judgment. Thus, the transcendental is reimagined as a dynamic and living structure, open to change rather than confined to static, predetermined rules.

In rethinking the transcendental through the lens of reflective judgment, the article also revisits Kant’s ideas on causality and contingency. Traditional Kantian causality is deterministic and operates according to universal laws. However, when applied to the realm of life, strict determinism falls short of capturing the adaptive, contingent nature of living beings. The article suggests that reflective judgment allows for a reconceptualization of causality that accommodates contingency, providing a framework that can account for the flexibility and unpredictability inherent in life processes. This form of "contingent causality" does not undermine the structure of reason but rather expands it, allowing for a richer understanding of how principles can emerge from experience without being entirely determined by it. 

Ultimately, the article argues that this reinterpretation has broader implications for how we understand the relationship between autonomy, rationality, and nature. If a priori concepts can be understood as emergent rather than pre-given, then rationality itself can be seen as a more fluid, adaptive, and creative force. This perspective contrasts sharply with more rigid, classical notions of rationality, where reason is viewed as a purely deterministic and inflexible system. By proposing that reason, much like life, has the capacity for self-organization and adaptation, the article suggests a new way of thinking about autonomy—one that emphasizes flexibility, responsiveness, and the ability to generate new principles rather than merely applying pre-existing ones.

The implications of this argument extend beyond Kantian philosophy to contemporary debates in fields like philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and epistemology. By framing the transcendental in a way that allows for contingency and self-organization, the article opens up possibilities for dialogue with modern theories of complexity, emergence, and systems thinking. It challenges the idea that Kantian philosophy is inherently rigid or closed off from new interpretations, instead presenting it as a system that can accommodate growth, change, and adaptation. This reimagining of the transcendental as a living, evolving structure calls for a re-examination of classical concepts, such as rationality and reflection, and suggests that Kant's insights can still offer valuable frameworks for understanding the dynamic, contingent processes of life and cognition.

In conclusion, this extended analysis repositions Kant’s transcendental philosophy not as a closed, static system but as an open, adaptive framework. By drawing on biological concepts and modern philosophical interpretations, it argues for a model where a priori concepts are seen as products of a formative process akin to the self-organization found in living systems. This perspective encourages a reevaluation of how we understand the interaction between reason and experience, offering a more nuanced, dynamic account of autonomy and rationality that remains relevant to contemporary philosophical discourse.