Genel Kurulun Yönetim Kurulu Üyelerini Azil Yetkisinin Sınırlandırılması
Yönetim kurulu üyelerinin azlini zorlaştıran düzenlemeler, bir taraftan farklı bağlamlarda şirket tüzel kişiliğinin, azınlık pay sahiplerinin ve yönetim kurulu üyelerinin menfaatlerinin korunmasına hizmet edebilmekte; ayrıca ülkemizdeki gibi blok pay sahipliği yapısının yaygın olduğu hukuk sistemlerinde, çoğunluk ve azınlık pay sahipleri arasında kontrol paylaşımını da mümkün kılmaktadır. Diğer taraftan ise, genel kurulun yönetim kurulu üyelerini görevden alma konusundaki mutlak ve devredilemez yetkisini sınırlandırmakta; böylelikle yönetim kurulu üyesi ve şirket arasındaki güvenin sarsıldığı durumlarda ilgili üyenin görevine son verilebilmesi imkânını daraltmaktadır. Öte yandan Türk Hukukunda, genel kurulun yönetim kurulu üyelerini azil yetkisini sınırlandıran düzenlemelerin ortaklık düzeninde geçerli olup olmadığı hususunda bir belirsizlik vardır. Bu çalışmada esas sözleşmedeki bir düzenlemeyle, genel kurulun yönetim kurulu üyelerini görevden alma yetkisinin sınırlandırılmasının mümkün olup olmadığı konusunda iki soruya cevap aranmıştır: Bunlardan biri, böyle bir kararın alınmasının belirli bir süreye yahut haklı sebeplerin veya bazı şartların varlığına bağlanıp bağlanamayacağı; diğeri ise, genel kurul toplantısı ve kararı açısından, özel yetersayılar aranıp aranmayacağıdır. İlk soruya öğretide genellikle olumsuz cevap verilmesine karşılık, ikinci soruya verilen cevap ise olumlu yöndedir. Çalışmada savunduğumuz görüş çerçevesinde, yönetim kurulu üyelerinin azli imkânının haklı sebep, koşul, süre veya yaptırım gibi düzenlemelerle sınırlandırılması mümkün olmamalıdır. Benzer şekilde yönetim kurulu üyelerinin görevden alınması hususunda toplantı ve/veya karar yetersayılarının da kanuna göre ağırlaştırılması imkân dahilinde olmamalıdır. Anılan türdeki düzenlemelerin esas sözleşmeye eklenmesi hâlinde ise, bunların bâtıl olacağının kabulü gerekir.
Limitation of the General Assembly’s Authority to Dismiss the Members of the Board of Directors
Provisions that restrict the dismissal of board members can serve to protect the interests of a company’s legal personality, minority shareholders, and board members in various contexts. It also enables control to be shared between majority and minority shareholders in legal systems where the block shareholding structure is the prevailing model, such as in Türkiye. However, these types of provisions limit the absolute and inalienable power of the general assembly to dismiss members from the board of directors. Thus, in cases where the trust has been broken between a board member and the company, these provisions limit the ability to dismiss the relevant member from duty. Nevertheless, an uncertainty exists within Turkish Law regarding whether the arrangements limiting the dismissal of board members are valid within the corporate structure. This study seeks answers to the following two questions about the possibility of limiting the general assembly’s authority to dismiss board members through a regulation in the articles of association: Can such a decision be tied to a certain period or to the presence of justified reasons or of certain conditions, and can special quorums be called for in a general assembly meeting regarding such a decision. While the answer to the first question in the existing doctrine is generally negative, the answer to the second question is positive. In accordance with the opinion adopted in this study, limiting the dismissal of members of the board of directors should not be possible through regulations such as just cause, conditions, time, or sanctions. Similarly, increasing the meeting and/or decision quorums should also not be possible regarding the dismissal of members from a board of directors.
Restricting the general assembly’s power to dismiss members from the board of directors may have considerable functions, especially for the company itself. However, these regulations also have effects that may damage the absolute and inalienable nature of such power, block the decision-making process in a company, and limit the ability to terminate the trust-based legal relationship between the company and a board member, thus resulting in negative consequences. Under Turkish Law, the validity of provisions in the articles of association limiting the dismissal of board members is unclear. This paper seeks to answer to the questions of (i) whether the removal of board members can be tied to a certain period or the presence of justified reasons or certain conditions, and (ii) whether special quorums can be sought regarding a general assembly meeting and this type of decision. While the answer to the first question is generally negative in existing doctrine, the answer to the second question is positive.
The paper first conducts a comparative study using a functional perspective. Hence, the research provides the responses and alternative solutions found in various legal systems to the questions at hand. In comparative law, the authority of the general assembly to dismiss members from the board of directors directly or indirectly (e.g., through a supervisory board as in German law) is understood to not be able to be limited as a rule. In this context, the authority of the general assembly to dismiss members from the supervisory board cannot be limited in German Law. However, the ability to aggravate quorums or to anticipate certain conditions regarding the decision-making procedure is accepted. In US law, the State of Delaware has the mandatory rule that, with two exceptions, board members can be removed from office without cause. In French law, the general assembly’s power to dismiss members from the board of directors is absolute: the use of this authority cannot be conditional, and the existence of any reason cannot be sought. Even though not as strict as French law, the United Kingdom regulates shareholders’ authority to dismiss members from a board of directors as a mandate. However, the procedural rules that are to be followed in terms of the general assembly’s decision to dismiss board members and the contractual rights granted to the members constitute the limits of their freedom in this matter.
The purpose as well as the wording of Article 408/2(b) of the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC) No. 6102) and TCC 364 do not allow provisions to articles of association that limit the general assembly’s authority to dismiss members from a board of directors. Therefore, such regulations are concluded to constitute a legal deviation and are not explicitly allowed within the meaning of TCC 340. Provisions to the articles of association that limit the general assembly’s authority to dismiss board members, such as for just cause, additional conditions, time, or sanctions, would infringe upon shareholders’ right to supervise [TCC 447/1(b)], deter the basic structure of the company [TCC 447/1(c)], and violate TCC 364. Thus, these types of provisions should be accepted as null and void. A heavier quorum should not be included in the articles of association with regard to dismissing members from the board of directors. The articles of association that require a quorum higher than what is legally stipulated for dismissing board members should be deemed invalid. This conclusion is not generally applicable to all general assembly resolutions; due to its importance, however, it does apply to decisions about dismissing members from the board of directors.