Hukuk Düzeninin Birliği İlkesi Çerçevesinde Zorunluluk Hâlinin Hukukî Niteliği
Rıfat Murat Önok, Işık ÖnayZorunluluk hâline ilişkin olarak Türk öğretisinde bugüne kadar yapılmış çalışmalarda konunun medeni hukuk ve ceza hukuku bakımından çoğunlukla ayrı ayrı ele alındığı görülmektedir. Hâlbuki konunun medeni hukuk ve ceza hukuku arasındaki etkileşim dikkate alınarak, hukuk düzeninin birliği ilkesi ışığında incelenmesi bir gerekliliktir. Özellikle Türk Ceza Kanunu ve Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu’nun 01.06.2005’te yürürlüğe girmesinden sonra zorunluluk hâlinin hukuki niteliği ceza hukuku öğretisinde yoğun bir şekilde tartışılmış, fakat bu tartışmalarda, zorunluluk hâlinin medeni hukuk bakımından bir hukuka uygunluk sebebi teşkil ettiği ve bunun doğurduğu sonuçlar yeterince dikkate alınmamıştır. Bu çalışmada zorunluluk hâli hem medeni hukuk hem de ceza hukuku açısından bu bakış açısıyla ele alınmakta ve hukukun bu iki disiplini arasındaki etkileşime dikkat çekilmektedir. Çalışmada öncelikle hukuk düzeninin birliği ilkesi hakkında genel açıklamalara yer verilmekte, ardından sırasıyla medeni hukuk ve ceza hukuku açısından zorunluluk hâli incelenmektedir. Yapılan değerlendirmeler sonucunda CMK m 223/3-c’deki açık hüküm karşısında ceza hukukunda zorunluluk hâlinin bir hukuka uygunluk sebebi olmadığı, dolayısıyla TCK m 25/2 anlamında zorunluluk hâlleri bakımından beraat değil, ceza verilmesine yer olmadığı kararı verilmesi gerektiği; bununla birlikte medeni hukuk bakımından zorunluluk hâli teşkil eden fiillerin hukukun birliği ilkesi gereği ceza hukuku anlamında da hukuka uygun sayılarak, bu hâllerde beraat kararı verilmesi gerektiği sonucuna varılmaktadır.
The Legal Nature of State of Necessity in Light of the Principle of Unity of the Legal Order
Rıfat Murat Önok, Işık ÖnayThe current Turkish legal doctrine on the state of necessity mostly handles the concept separately in terms of civil and criminal law. However, the principle of unity of the legal order requires a holistic approach. Especially after the entry into force of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) and the Code of Penal Procedure (CPP) on 01.06.2005, the legal nature of the state of necessity has been extensively discussed in criminal law doctrine. But these discussions rarely, if ever, take the fact that the state of necessity constitutes a ground of justification under civil law into account. This study takes a holistic approach in examining the legal nature of the state of necessity and emphasizes the interaction between civil law and criminal law within the context of grounds for justification. It starts with general remarks on the principle of unity of the legal order and proceeds with a description of the state of necessity with a particular focus on its legal nature from civil law and criminal law perspectives respectively. The study concludes that in light of the clear provision in Art. 223 (3) (c) CPP, the state of necessity does not constitute a justification in criminal law, and therefore, where Art. 25 (2) TPC applies, the judgment to be rendered is not an acquittal, but a decision that infliction of punishment is not required. Nonetheless in cases where the act qualifies as one performed in a state of necessity from a civil law perspective, the act shall also be deemed lawful in terms of criminal law and the court shall decide for acquittal.
State of necessity is a legal concept, which is of importance for both criminal and civil liability. It relieves the perpetrator of an act from criminal liability and deems the act lawful in the context of civil liability. Nonetheless the scope of the concept is not uniform for criminal and civil law: An act may be considered one of necessity within the context of criminal law, whereas not within the context of civil law. This discrepancy is acceptable, albeit not ideal, in light of the principle of unity of the legal order, as it is not uncommon for the same term to mean different things in different branches of law. The interaction between civil and criminal law within the context of necessity’s legal nature is however more problematic. Due to the principle of unity of the legal order, an act is either lawful or wrongful in the eyes of the whole legal order. This means that deeming an act lawful in one branch of law would lead to consequences for another. An inquiry on the legal nature of state of necessity therefore requires a holistic approach. This article deals with the problem of necessity’s legal nature with that in focus and explores the interaction between civil law and criminal law within this context. State of necessity constitutes a ground for justification under civil law (Turkish Code of Obligations Art. 63, para. 2). A state of necessity in civil law exists if a person deliberately inflicts damage on another person’s assets in order to avert an imminent danger directed to a considerably higher interest, which could not have been avoided otherwise. Such a lawful act may nevertheless trigger an obligation to compensate the damage (Turkish Code of Obligations Art. 64, para. 2) for the person who has benefited from the intervention by evading the danger. In cases of dispute, it is up to the court to decide whether and to what extent the damage must be compensated. Under § 4, the regulation and legal nature of necessity under Turkish Penal Code (TPC) is discussed. At the time of the previous Penal Code, necessity was very widely regarded as a justification. The entry into force of the new Penal Code (Law no. 5237) caused great debate around the nature of the new provision embodied in TPC Art. 25 (2). The wording of the provision and a systematic method of interpretation do not lead to a definitive result. As a consequence, two main views emerged. The seemingly (narrowly) prevailing view argues that necessity does not constitute a justification, but either an excuse or a ground precluding culpability. In both cases, Art. 223 (3) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) would apply since this provision does not distinguish between excuses and grounds precluding culpability. On the other hand, numerous writers still argue that necessity constitutes a justification. We are of the opinion that Art. 25 (2) TPC lays down a ground precluding culpability. This is confirmed by the official reasoning of the provision, and the caselaw of the Court of Cassation. Whereas neither the reasoning nor the case-law is binding, we base our view on the clear wording of Art 223 (3) (b) which provides that in case of necessity no punishment shall be imposed on the defendant due to a lack of culpability. In cases where a justification enters into play, Art. 223 (2) (d) shall apply, and the defendant shall be acquitted. Surely, it can be (and has been) argued that a provision of the PPC is not the place where the legal qualification of a provision of the TPC shall be made. Yet, that is what the lawmaker has done. Therefore, even when a perpetrator acts under a state of necessity, his or her act is still criminal, but - in the words of CPP Art. 223 (3) (b) - ‘there is no need to inflict punishment’. The reason for a lack of punishment is the abnormality in the formation of the perpetator’s motive in the face of a grave and imminent danger, which creates a difference in the value judgment to be passed over culpability, and leads to the conclusion that he or is she does not deserve punishment. On the other hand, it cannot be argued that it is impossible to qualify TPC Art. 25 (2) as a justification by virtue of Turkish Code of Obligations Art. 64 (2): whereas it is argued that by reserving the right to demand damages Art. 64 (2) implicitly accepts the unlawful nature of the act, this is not true! That provision is based on equity, and not on the unlawful nature of the act. We conclude that the state of necessity does not constitute a justification in criminal law, and therefore, where Art. 25 (2) TPC applies, the judgment to be rendered is not an acquittal, but a decision that infliction of punishment is not required. Nonetheless in cases where the act qualifies as one performed in a state of necessity from a civil law perspective, the act shall also be deemed lawful in terms of criminal law and the court shall decide for acquittal.
